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Weapons of Mass Destruction
tional constructs to once again bolster a weakened conventional deterrence.” See “The
Third Offset Strategy and America’s Allies and Partners,” prepared remarks by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Bob Work at Royal United Services Institute, London, September 10,
2015, available at <https://rusi.org/event/robert-work-united-states-deputy-secretary-de-
fense-third-offset-strategy-and-americas-allies>. Deputy Secretary Work later identified
five technological focuses for Third Offset investments: learning machines, human-ma-
chine collaboration, assisted-human operations, advanced manned and unmanned
combat teaming, and network-enabled autonomous weapons that are hardened for cyber
attack and electronic-warfare environments. See Jason Sherman, “DoD Unveils Technol-
ogy Areas That Will Drive ‘Third Offset’ Investments,” InsideDefense.com, December 9,
2015, available at <http://nges.insidedefense.com/inside-pentagon/dod-unveils-technolo-
gy-areas-will-drive-third-offset-investments>.
80
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Obama administration’s
plans for nuclear forces—including the cost to field, operate, maintain, and modern-
ize—would cost $348 billion over the 2015–2024 period or about 5–6 percent of the
administration’s plans for national defense. See CBO, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces,
2015 to 2024 (Washington, DC: CBO, January 22, 2015), 3, available at <www.cbo.gov/
publication/49870>. A report estimated that the United States plans to spend approx-
imately $1 trillion over the next 30 years on maintaining and modernizing its nuclear
forces. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, The U.S. Trillion Dollar Nuclear
Triad (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014),
4, available at <www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/140107_tril-
lion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf>. Modernization costs will peak in the latter 2020s and
early 2030s. In April 2016 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated, “We expect the total
cost of nuclear modernization to be in the range of $350–$450 billion. Although this
still presents an enormous affordability challenge for DOD, we believe it must be funded.
Previous modernizations of America’s strategic deterrent and nuclear security enterprise
were accomplished by topline increases to avoid having to make drastic reductions
to conventional forces, and it would be prudent to do so again.” See Secretary Carter,
“Submitted Statement—Senate Appropriations Committee–Defense (FY 2017 Budget Re-
quest),” Washington, DC, April 27, 2016, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/
Speech-View/Article/744066/submitted-statement-senate-appropriations-committee-de-
fense-fy-2017-budget-requ>.
81
The U.S. nuclear force has been the foundation of national security as long as
adversaries have possessed nuclear weapons. It is not only the primary and irreplace-
able means by which the United States deters a potentially existential attack, but it also
underpins extended deterrence commitments to major allies. Some have asserted that the
United States cannot afford the planned modernization of its nuclear force and advocated
various cost-savings measures, including reducing the number of delivery platforms and
warheads, eliminating the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or bomber legs of the
triad, and canceling the development of the long-range standoff cruise missile. See, for
example, James E. Doyle, “Better Ways to Modernize the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,” Survival
58, no. 4 (August–September 2016), 27–50; Tom Z. Collina et al., The Unaffordable
Arsenal: Reducing the Costs of the Bloated U.S. Nuclear Stockpile (Washington, DC: Arms
Control Association, October 2014), available at <www.armscontrol.org/files/The-Un-
affordable-Arsenal-2014.pdf>; and Global Zero, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force
Structure and Posture (Washington, DC: Global Zero, May 2012), available at <www.
globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf>. Reducing the num-
ber of warheads and delivery platforms within the triad force may have merit, but only as
part of mutual, binding, and verifiable reductions with Russia that preserve or strength-
en strategic stability. The United States has declared its willingness to pursue further
reductions, but Russia has not taken up the offer. See “Remarks by President Obama at
the Brandenburg Gate—Berlin, Germany,” June 19, 2013, available at <www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-ger-
many>. Unilateral reductions, especially given an aggressive Russia that is deploying