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I. STATE AND FEDERAL FIREARM LAWS, INCLUDING LAWS RELATING TO:
1. SELF-DEFENSE
2. DEFENSE OF OTHERS
3. DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
Maryland continues to follow common law principles on the use of force in self-defense, although there is a statute
(discussed below) on the subject of immunity from civil lawsuits for the use of force to defend a home or a business.
In the case of Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 20 A.2d 485 (1941), which involved a civil lawsuit for
assault and battery, the Court of Appeals of Maryland set forth the general common law principles of the doctrine of
self-defense:
● The law of self-defense justifies an act done in the reasonable belief of immediate danger. If an injury was done by
a defendant in justifiable self-defense, he can neither be punished criminally nor held responsible for damages in a
civil action. ... One who seeks to justify an assault on the ground that he acted in self-defense must show that he
used no more force than the exigency reasonably demanded. The belief of a defendant in an action for assault that
the plaintiff intended to do him bodily harm cannot support a plea of self-defense unless it was such a belief as a
person of average prudence would entertain under similar circumstances. The jury should accordingly be instructed
that to justify assault and battery in self-defense the circumstances must be such as would have induced a
rea[s]onable man of average prudence to make such an assault in order to protect himself. The question whether
the belief of the defendant that he was about to be injured was a reasonable one under all the circumstances is a
question for the consideration of the jury.
Maryland also continues to follow common law principles on the issue of when one may use deadly force in self-
defense. In the case of State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (1984), the Court of Appeals of Maryland
summarized those principles, and stated that a homicide, other than felony murder, is justified on the ground of self-
defense if the following criteria are satisfied:
1. The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of
death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant;
2. The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger;
3. The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict;
4. The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force
than the exigency demanded.
See also Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 429-30, 749 A.2d 787, 793 (2000).
In addition, when one is in one's home, one may use deadly force against an attacker if deadly force is necessary to
prevent the attacker from committing a felony that involves the use of force, violence, or surprise (such as murder,
robbery, burglary, rape, or arson). See Crawford v. State, 231 Md. 354, 190 A.2d 538 (1963).
Duty to Retreat and the Castle Doctrine
Maryland also follows the common law rule that, outside of one's home, a person, before using deadly force in self-
defense, has the duty "'to retreat or avoid danger if such means were within his power and consistent with his safety.'"
DeVaughn v. State, 232 Md. 447, 453, 194 A.2d 109, 112 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 527 (1964), quoting Bruce v.
State, 218 Md. 87, 97, 145 A.2d 428, 433 (1958). See also Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 283, 696 A.2d 443, 458 (1997).
But a person does not have to retreat if it would not be safe for the person to do so. "[I]f the peril of the defendant was
imminent, he did not have to retreat but had a right to stand his ground and to defend and protect himself." Bruce v.
State, supra, 218 Md. at 97, 145 A.2d at 433.
The duty to retreat also does not apply if one is attacked in one's own home. "[A] man faced with the danger of an
attack upon his dwelling need not retreat from his home to escape the danger, but instead may stand his ground and, if
necessary to repel the attack, may kill the attacker." Crawford v. State, 231 Md. 354, 361, 190 A.2d 538, 541 (1963). The