Article
Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role
of Public Investment
Miriam Zuk
1
, Ariel H. Bierbaum
2
, Karen Chapple
1
,
Karolina Gorska
3
and Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris
4
Abstract
Scholarly interest in the relationship between public investments and residential displacement dates back to the 1970s and the
aftermath of displacement related to urban renewal. A new wave of scholarship examines the relationship of gentrification and
displacement to public investment in transit infrastructure. Scholarship has generally conflated gentrification and displacement;
however, this review argues for a clearer analytical distinction between the two. Although the displacement discussion in the
United States began with the role of the public sector and now has returned to the same focus, it will be necessary to overcome
methodological shortcomings to arrive at more definitive conclusions about the relationship.
Keywords
gentrification, displacement, neighborhood change, transportation, d emographi c analysis, gender/race/ethnicity, real estate,
infrastructure and capital facilities
In the United States, the ever- changi ng e conomies, demo-
graphics, and physical forms of metropolitan areas have fostered
opportunity for some and hardship for others. These differential
experiences “land in place and specifically in neighborhoods.
Scholars have devoted volumes to analyzing neighborhood
decline, subsequent revitalization, and gentrification as a result
of government, market, and individual interventions. Today,
with increasing attention to millennial and baby boomer migra-
tion to central city neighborhoods, popular and scholarly con-
versations about gentrification have returned to the fore.
The definitions and impacts of gentrification have been
debated for at least fifty years. Central to these debates are the
differential impacts on incumbent and new residents and ques-
tions of who bears the burden and who reaps the benefits of
change. Consistently, activists, residents, a nd community
groups identify displacement as a pressing concern. Anxieties
about residential, cultural, and job dis pla cemen t reflec t the
lived experiences of neighborhood change and the social mem-
ory of displacements past. These changes stem not just from
individual action and market forces but also government inter-
vention. The public sector makes investments to stimulate and
respond to renewed interest in urban living; these investments
put government at risk of becoming an agent of gentrification
and displacement. However, the extent to which public invest-
ments catalyze residential displacement is not well-defined or
quantified in the social science research.
In this article, we review the body of research on residential
displacement related to gentrification and public investment.
Public investment encompasses a wide array of direct activities
(e.g., urban redevelopment, open space revitalization, and con-
struction of infrastructure) and indirect policy actions (e.g.,
land assembly, subsidies, and zoning). In this article, we nar-
row the focus to investments in transportation infrastructure,
specifically rail transit. In recent years, public spending in
transit has grown, while other public spending has stagnated.
1
By tracing attempts to define and measure residential displace-
ment, we highlight significant methodological limitations
including data availabilit y and the timin g of displacement,
which potentially mask the impacts of public investments on
communities.
Given renewed public investment in the urban core, and in
particular the great popularity of transit-oriented development
as a municipal smart growth strategy, the time is ripe to review
the concepts and literature to inform policy and practice sur-
rounding gentrification, residential displacement, and the role
of public transportation investments. This literature review
brings together extensive bodies of scholarship that have
sought to examine these issues. First, we review definitions
and approaches to studying gentrification and residential dis-
placement. We argue that residential displacement is often a
key characteristic of gentrification, yet is also analytically dis-
tinct. Second, we examine the range of studies that have tried to
measure the magnitude of gentrification and residential
1
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
2
University of Maryland, College Park, Georgia, USA
3
Los Angeles Department of City Planning, Los Angeles, CA, USA
4
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Miriam Zuk, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Journal of Planning Literature
2018, Vol. 33(1) 31-44
ª The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0885412217716439
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpl
displacement. Then, we examine the role of public investments
in transportation infrastructure on neighborhood change. We
conclude with a series of questions to guide future research.
Defining Residential Gentrification
The first documented use of the term “gentrification” (Glass
1964) describes the influx of a “gentry” to lower-income neigh-
borhoods in L ondon during the 1950s and 1960s. Osman
(2011) documents even earlier instances of class-based move-
ment into inner-city areas, specifically the history of
“brownstoning” in Brooklyn in the 1940s. Yet, Glass’s effort
generally benchmarks the start of gentrification as a field of
study. Since her identification of the phenomenon, scholars
have attempted to define the complex process of gentrification,
studying it through a range of methodological approaches and
with little unanimity.
Depending on the time and place, gentrification has been
seen as a tool, goal, outcome, or unintended consequence of
revitalization processes in declining urban neig hborhoods,
which are defined by their physical deterioration, concentra-
tions of poverty, and racial segregation of people of color.
Scholars have sought nuanced descriptions and explanations
of gentrification, identifying the spatial, physical, demo-
graphic, and economic dimensions of this kind of neighbor-
hood change.
Gentrification is tied to historical patterns of residential
segregation; segregated neighborhoods experience the “double
insult—a ‘one-two’ knockout” of neglect and white flight in
the 1950s through 1970s followed by the forces of gentrifying
revitalization since the 1980s (Powell and Spencer 2002, 437).
Government and policy have played a key role in creating these
patterns by direct ing public and private capital in ways that
advantage some and disadvantage other neighborhoods (Rose
1984; Harvey 2001; Smith 1982). This link to neighborhood
disinvestment and subsequent decline suggests that gentrifica-
tion occurs in lower-income inner-city neighborhoods (Lees,
Slater, and Wyly 2008; Hamnett 1991; Lees 2000). However,
others also identify gentrification in middle- or higher-income
urban neighborhoods (Lees 2003), suburban neighborhoods
(Charles 2011), and rural areas (Oberg and Nelson 2010;
Phillips 2004; Ghose 2004). Regardless of specific geographic
location, gentrification occurs in places with relatively afford-
able housing stock and often results in physical renovation of
deteriorated housing and infrastructure (Hamnett 1984; Lees,
Slater, and Wyly 2008).
Smith (1996) emphasizes a nexus of actors that facilitate the
gentrification process—developers, builders, mortgage lenders,
government agencies, and real estate agents. Government—at
the local, state, and federal levels—sets the conditions for and
catalyzes gentrification processes through public subsidy and
policy. Government working in conjunction with private actors
makes up the larger political economy that aims to accumulate
capital through land use management and city development,
echoing the idea of the city as a “growth machine (Logan and
Molotch 1987; Smith 1996).
The gentrification process also requires in-movers whom
scholars generally describe as those with higher incomes and/
or educational attainment levels than incumbent residents
(Hamnett 1991). To attract in-movers, neighborhoods need to
offer job or recreational opportunities and low or appreciating
housing prices (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008), stabilized nega-
tive social conditions (Ellen, Horn, and Reed 2016), and some
lifestyle or aesthetic appeal (Brown-Saracino 2009). Some gen-
trifiers express a lifestyle preference for gritty, authentically
“urban” experiences (Ley 1996; Zukin 1982) even acting as
agents to preserve some nostalgic, authentic character of a
place (Brown-Saracino 2009). Some also identify political
positions for class or racial and ethnic integration as a motiva-
tion (Brown-Saracino 2009; Ley 1996).
The motivations of gentrifiers, driven by a combination of
cultural preferences, political orientations, and economic
needs, vary. Some scholars argue that gentrification occurs in
“waves,” in which the first in -movers—often referred to as
“pioneers”—are lower-income pe op le with higher leve ls of
educational attainment, such as artists. Their housing location
choices are often driven by affordability considerations as well
as aesthetic preferences and higher tolerance or desire for
racial, ethn ic, and/or class diversity (Lees, Slater, and Wyly
2008). The driving economic needs of first- wave gentrifiers
thus are closely tied to land values, housing location, and indi-
viduals’ position within the labor market (Hamnett 2003). Sec-
ond- and third-wave gentrifiers may be higher-income
professionals, who arrive after the first wave has helped stabi-
lize and sanitize the neighborhood.
Regardless of their mot ivations, in-movers’ presence can
improve the physical environment. These physical upgrades
are a result of both individual actions and state-sponsored
investments in housing and infrastructure and improved ser-
vices and maintenance (Davidson and Lees 2005; Bridge, But-
ler, and Lees 2012; Lipman 2008; Freeman 2006 ). Cost of
living in the neighborhood increases, and this may contribute
to displacement (Hamnett 1984).
Gentrification is a particular kind of neighborhood revitali-
zation, distinct because of its possible displacement effects.
Under an alternative kind of revitalization—incumbent upgrad-
ing—the rise of neighborhood consciousness and advocacy to
improve local conditions catalyzes existing residents to make
improvements (Clay 1979). Incumbent residents stay and reap
the benefits of neighborhood improvements, whereas in gentri-
fication, they can be displaced as the social and economic
environment of neighborhoods shift, and the public sector does
not take action to protect long-term residents.
Gentrification scholarship has focused on interracial or—
ethnic dynamics of neighborhood change, particularly where
white in-movers arrive in neighborhoods with predominantly
residents of color. Recent studies on the prevalence of white in-
movement are mixed, however. Some studies find trend s of
greater white in-migration into poor, nonwhite neighborhoods
(Crowder and South 2005; McKinnish, Walsh, and Kirk White
2010), resulting in shifting racial compositions in gentrifying
neighborhoods and assumed displacement of nonwhite
32 Journal of Planning Literature 33(1)
incumbent residents. Other research, howev er, suggests few
differences by race among hou seholds moving into and out
of gentrifying and nongentrify ing n eighborh oods (Ellen and
O’Regan 2011) and that concentrations of African American
residents may actually deter gentrification (Hwang and Samp-
son 2014).
Some scholars further complicate the understanding of these
demographic shifts. Using qualitative methods, these studies
look at cases of black in-movers into predominantly low-
income black neighborhoods (Boyd 2005; Moore 2009; Pattillo
2008). These studies tie neighborhood-specific processes to
larger structural issues of residential segregation and exclusion.
They argue that black in-movers feel more comfortable relo-
cating to predominantly black neighborhoods because of a his-
tory of housing discrimination in predominantly white
neighborhoods and the suburbs. Further, black gentrifiers may
see their relocation in inner cities as a project of “racial uplift”
for their lower-income black counterparts (Boyd 2005).
Measuring and Predicting Residential Gentrification
The complexity i n defini ng and documenting gentrificati on
qualitatively has yielded similarly complicated efforts at
quantitatively measuring and predicti ng gentrification. While
researchers who use qualitative methods focus on the nuances
of how gentrification unfolds over time, most quantitative
analyses tr eat gentrificat ion as a n outcome ra ther than a pro-
cess. Despite the fact that scholars have foc used on the role of
government, policy, and public in ve stment in spurr ing gentri-
fication since the 1970s, attempts to predict gentrification
havelargelyfailedtoincorporate any measures of public-
sector action.
A number of efforts aim to assess the past and current extent
of gentrification and also to develop a set of predictive models
for where gentrifica tion may oc cur in the future. Scholars
incorporate a diversity of metrics based on what data are avail-
able. Some combine indicators to capture the multiple dimen-
sions of the phenomenon using data on income, race,
educational attainment, housing values, rent, and various
proxies for invest ment or disin vestme nt . Others use si mple
metrics of relative income growth for ease of anal ysis and
comp arison . Many studies quantify gentrification b y census
tract based on changes over time that exceed either absolute
thresholds or benchmarked changes at the metropolitan or
regional level.
In one of the earliest quantifications of neighborhood gen-
trification, Bradway Laska, Seaman, and McSeveney (1982)
look at New Orleans census tracts that were “eligible” to be
gentrified based on the reno va tion poten tial of the ho using
stock (i.e., age and median value). Analyzing property trans-
action data, they estimate the amount of neighborhood renova-
tion as a proxy for gentrification a nd conduct a regression
analysis to determine which of a set of nineteen independent
locational, social, a nd housing stock vari ables significantly
predicted renovation. Locational variables are the only proxy
for public investment (in the form of parks and public housing).
Educational attainment, owner occupancy, and high percentage
of multiunit buildings significantly predict renovation, whereas
the presence of public housing negatively predicts it.
Galster and Peacock (1986) ask whether the operational
definition of gentrification impacted the extent, location, and
causal factors associated with the phenomenon. The authors
identify a census tract’s eligibility to gentrify based on its
aggregate socioeconomic status in 1970 (i.e., income, home
value, educational attainment, and percentage of white). They
analyze socioeconomic and real estate change from 1970 to
1980 in Philadelphia, PA, for (a) proportion of black, (b) pro-
portion of college educated, (c) household inco mes, and (d)
property values. The only potential measures of public invest-
ment are proxies for proximity to parks and universities. Vary-
ing the stringency of each of the four gentrification indicators,
their sensitivity analysis indicates a wide variation in the num-
ber and location of gentrified tracts, finding that as few as 6
percent and as many as 82 percent of eligible tracts have gen-
trified during the time period. They test twelve predictive char-
acteristics on each of these definitions, finding little
relationship and wide variability.
Melchert and Naroff (1987) use block-level census data
to construct a predictive model of gentrification in Boston,
MA. In their construction of a gentrification index, the
authors rely heavily on Clay’s (1979) definition. They look
at central city locations and combine forty-one variables
that characterize the block’s amenities (e.g., parks), social
composition ( e.g., percentage of white), economic st atus
(e.g., median income), and housing conditions (e.g., per-
centage of units without plumbing). The only indicator of
public investment is open space. The authors identify four
phases of gentrification, defined by the gentrifiers and the
percentage of the housing stock gentrified. Yet, when mod-
eling the phenomen on, they cha racteri ze gentrification a s a
dichotomous variable, having either happened or not. Ulti-
mately ending up with six predictive variables, they deter-
mine that the gentry in Boston preferred: an older housing
stock; proximity to open space of si x to ten ac re s; to live
near downtown, though not too close; and neighborhoods
with depressed housing values.
Freeman (2005) defines gentrifying neighborhoods as
being: (1) central city neighborhoods, (2) initially populated
by low-income households, that had (3) experienced disinvest-
ment (i.e., mostly older housing stock), which subsequently
experienced, (4) an influx of the relatively affluent (i.e.,
increased educational attainment), and (5) an increase in pri-
vate investment (i.e., housing price appreciation). He includes
no public investment variable. Freeman finds that 31 percent of
eligible tracts in the United States gentrified in the 1990s.
Updating these data for Governing Magazine’s analysis of the
country’s fifty largest metropolitan areas, Maciag (2015) finds
that nearly 20 percent of eligible neighborhoods g entrified
since 2000. Yet, some cities had much higher rates of gentri-
fication with over 50 percent of eligible tracts in Minneapolis,
Seattle, Washington, DC, and Portland g entrifying between
2000 and 2013.
Zuk et al. 33
Finally, in his analysis of neighborhood socioeconomic
change between 1990 and 2010, Landis (2015) attempts to
come up with consistent indicators across seventy metropolitan
areas. He defines gentrifying tracts as those with low median
incomes in 1990 that grew by more than two deciles over the
time period. Using this income-only definition, he found that
21 percent of eligible tracts gentrified in the 1990s and 2000s.
Tracts with higher proportions of white residents, college-
educated residents, and pre–World War II housing were more
likely to have gentrified. Yet his predictive model only predicts
4 percent of gentrifying tracts. Despite incorporating variables
measuring public policy related to growth management, the
study does not include any measures of public investment.
Defining Residential Displacement
Displacement is a central concern of gentrification. However,
we argue that it is also a distinct phenomenon that can occur
even in the absence of gentrification.
Scholarly interest in defining, measuring, and predicting
residential displacement dates to the mid-twentieth century,
when the federal urban renewal program, local redevelopment
efforts, and interstate highway construction forcibly displaced
communities of color and low-income communities in urban
neighborhoods en masse. Following these policy efforts, urban
activists were particularly sensitive to the risks of and the role
of government in facilitating displacement (Hartman and
National Housing Law Project 1981).
However, in the 1970s, the nature of displacement was no
longer solely driven by forced removal through public action.
Instead, a growing “back to the city” trend perceived to be
largely driven by private actions an d individual preferences
(albeit with significant yet perhaps more subtle influences from
the public sector) began to dominate public concern about
neighborhood change and residential displacement (Clay
1979). Today’s landscape of downtown revitalization and
migration of both millennials and retiring baby boomers to
central cities (Ehrenhalt 2012) has renewed interest not only
in private actions and individual preferences but also in the role
that government and public investments may spur residential
displacement.
In 1978, the US Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment sponsored the first of a series of reports on revitaliza-
tion and displacement called Urban Displacement: A
Reconnaissance” (Grier and Grier 1978). In this report, the
authors list twenty-five factors that might lead to the involun-
tary movement of people from their place of residence. These
factors imp ly a div erse set of actors: b uild ing ow ne rs who
initiate condominium conversion or rent increases, local gov-
ernment conducting proactive code enforcement and planning
decisions, and banks engaging in redlining practices, to name a
few. In an effort to provide a definition of displacement that
encompasses these various drivers, Grier and Grier (1978, 8)
propose the following, which numerous researchers and agen-
cies have adopted subsequently:
Displacement occurs when any household is forced to move from
its residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or immediate
surroundings, and which:
1) are beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or
prevent;
2) occur despite the househ old’s having met all previously
imposed conditions of occupancy; and
3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible,
hazardous or unaffordable.
Although they use the term “forced” in their definition of
displacement, Grier and Grier do not equate forced with invo-
luntary displacement. In fact, they describe the fact that many
who are displaced are subject to a variety of actions or inactions
that can be explicit or implicit. They (1978, 3) conclude:
For most residents to move under such conditions is about as
“voluntary” as is swerving one’s car to avoid an accident. By the
time the landlord issues notices of eviction, or the code inspector
posts the structure as uninhabitable, few occupants may be left.
Therefore, we cannot define displacement simply in terms of legal
or administrative actions—or even draw a clear-cut line between
“voluntary” and “involuntary” movement.
Newman and Owen (1982) concur that the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary moves is false: “low-income house-
holds who experience extremely large rent increases may tech-
nically ‘choose’ to move, but the likelihood that they had any
real alternative is very small” (p. 137).
In an effort to categorize the causes of displacement,
Grier and Grier (1978) distinguish between disinvestment
displacement, reinvestment displacement, and displacement
caused by enhanced housing market competition. Disinvest-
ment displacement occurs when the value of a property does
not justify investing in its maintenance, therebyresultingin
decay and abandonment. Reinvestment displacement refers
to the case where investments in a neighborhood result in
increased rents to a point whe reitisprofitabletosellor
raise the rent forcing tenants to leave. The authors were
careful t o note that “unrelated a s they see m, these two con-
ditions of displacement may be successive stages in the
cycle of neighborhood change (Grier and Grier 1978, 3).
For example, disinvestment displacement may make way for
new in-movers to purchase inexpensive housing, resulting i n
reinvestment and subsequent displacement. Fina lly, they
argue that enhanced housing market competition, reflecting
broad shifts in the national and regional housing market,
mayhaveanevenlargerimpactthandisinvestmentorrein-
vestment forces.
The distinctions in these three types of displacement pres-
sures (disinvestment, reinvestment, and enhanced market com-
petition) resurfaced when Marcuse (1985, 1986) analyzed
displacemen t in New York City. Marcuse argues that when
looking at the relationship between gentrification and displace-
ment, one must first consider the disinvestment of urban neigh-
borhoods and subsequent displacement, which creates “vacant”
34 Journal of Planning Literature 33(1)
land ripe for investment through gentrification. From this per-
spective, gentrification can happen long after displacement
occurs. Therefore, most gentrification -induced disp lacement
studies significantly underestimate the magnitude of the prob-
lem by only looking at “last resident displacement.” Instead, he
argues that “chains” of displacement must be considered. He
further distinguishes between displacement due to physical
reasons (e.g., water is turned off, evictions, rehabilitation, etc.)
versus those due to economic causes (e.g., rising rent). In addi-
tion, Marcuse introduces the concept of “exclusionary dis-
placement” to encompass situations when a household is not
permitted to move into a neighborhood based on conditions
that are beyond their control (e.g., price increases).
Marcuse also suggests that displacement affects many more
than those physically displaced at any moment:
When a family sees its neighborhood changing dramatically, when
all their friends are leaving, when stores are going out of business
and new stores for other clientele are taking their places (or none
are replacing them), when changes in public facilities, transporta-
tion patterns, support services, are all clearly making the area less
livable, then the pressure for displacement is already severe. (Mar-
cuse 1986, 57).
Davidson (2009) expands on this idea; for him, the overempha-
sis on spatial dislocation in displacement literature ignores the
social meaning and practices attached to the lived experiences
of neighborhoods and place. Thus, “it is impossible to draw the
conclusion of displacement purely from the identification
movement of people between locations. People can be displaced —
unable to (re)construct place—without spatial dislocati on”
(Davidson 2009, 228).
Finally, with their focus on evictions, Desmond and Shol-
lenberger (2015) remind researchers that forced displacement
is endemic to poor communities and not confined to gentrifying
neighborhoods. The authors focus o n forced displacement
through both formal evictions processed through the court sys-
tem and informal evictions, which are often “less expensive
and more efficient than forma l evictions” (Desmond and
Shollenberger 2015, 1754). In their analysis of survey data
on the reasons for people’s moves in Milwaukee, they clarify
the overly simplified dichotomy of involuntary/voluntary
moves by reclassifying some seemingly voluntary reasons as
responsive to outside forces. They define thes e responsive
moves as “motivated by housing or neighborhood conditions.
These include rent hikes, a deterioration in housing quality,
escalating violence in the neighborhood, domestic violence”
(Desmond and Shollenberger 2015, 1758). When taking into
account the magnitude and impacts of forced and responsive
displacement in poor black neighborhoods, Desmond (2012)
argues that “eviction is to women what incarceration is to men:
a typical but severely consequential occurrence contributing to
the reproduction of urban poverty” (p. 88).
Based on this review of the literature, we categorize
the various catalysts for displacement from housing units
and neighborhoods (see Table 1). We identify forced and
responsive c auses and further differentiate between direct
physical, indirect economic, and exclusionary causes.
As illustrated, the reasons for displacement may or may not
result from gentrification. While displacement may be a defin-
ing characteristic and outcome of gentrification, this categor-
ization clarifies how displacement can occur in the absence of
gentrification, and that scholarship requires advanced tools to
define and measure these analytically distinct phenomena.
Measuring Residential Displacement
Measuring resident ial displa cement is c hallenging, akin to
“measuring the invisible” as the population under question has
moved away from the place of study (Atkinson 2000). Scholars
use a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to answer
questions across scales that address who and how many people
are displaced, what causes displacement, and what are some
consequences of displacement. These studies stem from an
interest in neighborhood investment and disinvestment by both
private and public sectors.
Newman and Owen (1982) offer perhaps one of the first
comprehensive analys es of displacement. They us e longi-
tudinal data from the panel study on income dynamics to esti-
mate the s cale, nature, and impacts of displac ement. They
categorize moves as displacement related when people move
because of t he conditions of the house or neighborhood,
eminent domain, and eviction by the landlord because of sale
or reoccupation. While they include public action as a cause for
displacement (i.e., eminent domain), they do not explicitly
Table 1. Categories of Displacement.
Forced Responsive
Direct or
physical
causes
Formal eviction
Informal eviction (e.g.,
landlord harassment)
Landlord foreclosure
Eminent domain
Natural disaster
Building condemnation
Deterioration
in housing
quality
Neighborhood
violence or
disinvestment
Removing
parking, utilities,
and so on.
Indirect or
economic
causes
Foreclosure
Condo conversion
Rent increase
Increased taxes
Loss of social
networks or
cultural
significance of a
place
Exclusionary
causes
Section 8
discrimination
Zoning policies
(restriction on density,
unit size, etc.)
NIMBY resistance to
development
Unaffordable
housing
Cultural
dissonance
Lack of social
networks
Zuk et al. 35
look at the impacts of public investment. Newman and Owens
find that the average annual rate of displacement between 1970
and 1977 was roughly 5 percent of all families that moved.
In measuring various forms of displacement in New York
City in the 1970s, Marcuse (1986 ) ex amines disinvestment-
related displacement from abandonment by looking at census
data on the loss of units. He argues that the actual loss under-
estimates the displacement from abandonment due to the spil-
lover effects from vacant property on neighborhood livability
conditions. In addition to abandonment, he quantifies displace-
ment from rehabilitation of multifamily units, the loss of single
room occupancy units, changes in rent, condominium conver-
sions, and landlord harassment. Despite potential duplication
between the various categories, he estimates a range of 40,000
to 100,000 annual displacement-related household moves in
the 19 70s, roughly 8 percent to 21 percent of the estimated
476,011 total moves in New York City in 1979.
In a series of quantitative and qualitative analyses for New
York City, Newman and Wyly classify displacement as
households that move for reasons of housing expense, land-
lord harassment, and displacement by private action (i.e.,
condo conversion). Looking at unique survey data from the
New York City Housing and Vacancy Sur ve y, they find t hat
between 6 percent and 10 percent of all moves in New York
City from 1989 to 2002 were due to displac ement. Th ey argue
that this number could be a signifi cant underestimate due to
the inabi lity of survey data to capture “doubling up,” home-
lessness, or moves out of the region.Furthermore,theyfind
that neighborhood context mattered; for instance, more than
15 percent of all renters movin g into the W illiamsburg/Green-
point neighborhood in Brookly n were displaced from their
previous homes, wherea s less than 4 percent of arrivals in the
Flatlands/Canarsie section of Brooklyn were dis plac ed. In a
subsequent analysis, Wyly et al. (2010) again look at New
York housi ng survey data, a nd when comparing their results
to local eviction data, estimate that the survey misses twelve
of the thirteen displ ac ee s. They a lso fin d that poo r hous eho lds
were nearly twice as likely to be displaced as nonpoor
households.
Finally, in their survey of renters in Milwaukee, WI, Des-
mond and Shollenberger (2015) find that more than one in eight
Milwaukee renters experienced at least one forced move (for-
mal or informal eviction, landlord foreclosure, or building con-
demnation) over a two-year time period. The rates differed by
race/ethnicity; they found that 8 percent of white renters, 15
percent of black renters, and 29 percent of Hispa nic renters
experienced forced moves. Nearly half of all forced moves
were informal evictions. Formal evictions, on the other hand,
were less common, constituting less than one-quarter of forced
moves. Out of all moves in the previous year, they find that
roughly 11 percent were due to displacement. In contrast, the
American Housing Survey (AHS) of 2009 estimates between 2
percent and 5 percent of moves were due to displacement.
Desmond and Shollenberg er argue that th e AHS undere sti-
mates displacement due to open-ended questions that do not
adequately capture informal evictions.
Together, these studies demonstrate the complexity of ade-
quately quantifying the scale of the displacement phenomenon.
Nevertheless, researchers find that roughly between 5 percent
and 10 percent of moves are due to reasons beyond a house-
hold’s control, which can vary substantially between neighbor-
hoods and socioeconomic groups.
Gentrification-induced Residential
Displacement
The vast majority of research on displacement has focused on
displacement as an outcome of neighborhood revitalization,
upgrading, and/or gentrification. Both the methods and the
definitions of gentrification and displacement in these studies
range as widely as those identified above. Here, we review this
set of studies, with an aim to understand their differences and
inability to conclusively establish the relationship between
gentrification and displacement.
Early on, researchers focus on surveying people who moved
into and out of revitalizing neighborhoods, examining neigh-
borhoods experiencing increased private and/or public invest-
ment. In a 1981 survey of current and former res idents
(National Institute for Advanced Studies 1981) of the rapidly
revitalizing Hayes Valley neighborhood of San Francisco,
researchers find that from 1975 to 1979, one out of four movers
(both out- and intramovers) from their sample were displaced.
Displacees were more likely to be African American, less edu-
cated, poor, renters, elderly, and living alone in comparison to
in-movers and residents who stay. Researchers also find that
displacees moved out for a variety of reasons including
investment-related causes (e.g., rising rent) but also
disinvestment-related reasons (e.g., poor housing quality), call-
ing into question both the direction and timing of the relation-
ships between neighborhood revitalization, disinvestment, and
displacement. In a related study, Schill, Nathan, and Persaud
(1983) surveyed out-movers from nine revitalizing neighbor-
hoods in five cities. They find that 23 percent of out-movers
from 1978 to 1980 were displaced. Overcrowding, frequency
of previous moves, unemployment, and marital status predicted
displacement. Despite the high rates of displacement, the authors
acknowledge the potential for undersampling of the most vul-
nerable and more transient households.
In London, Atkinson (2000) defines gentrification by
increases in professionalization in the city’s boroughs without
regard to private or public investment. Using synthetic
cohorts of census data, he finds clear links between the rise
in gentrification and displacement of vulnerable groups in
London. Analyzing similarly large areas for Boston, Vigdor,
Massey, and Rivlin (2002) ask whether low-status households
were more likely to exit housing units in gentrifying areas
relative t o other p arts of the Boston metropolitan a rea. Com-
bining data from the AHS with aggregate data from the cen-
sus, they ran a regression of residential stability on location in
gentrified zones (defined by demographic characteristics of
the r esidents, and not private or public investment flows).
They find that housing turnover was greater in gentrifying
36 Journal of Planning Literature 33(1)
zones; however, low educational attainment appears to pre-
dict housing stability rather than t urnover, w hen interacting
with l ocation in a gentrified zone.
Freeman and Braconi (2004) use New York City survey data
to compare exit rates of poor households in gentrifying subbor-
oughs to the exit rates of the poor in nongentrifying low-
income neighborhoods from 1991 to 1999. They find that poor
households residing in gentrifying neighborhoods were less
likely to move than poor households residing elsewhere. How-
ever, people moving into gentrifying neighborhoods were of a
higher socioeconomic status than those leaving, indicating pos-
sible exclusionary displacement. They do not analyze the
effects of public investment. Newman and Wyly (2006) argue
that the “gentrified” neighborhoods of New York in Freeman
and Braconi’s study had already seen the displacement of poor
households in earlier decades and that the nongentrifying poor
neighborhood control groups included residents of some of the
poorest areas of the city with respective high turnover rates,
creating an artificially high standard to use as a control.
Other studies have looked nationally to try to identify the
factors resulting in displacement, capitalizing on different data
sets. Freeman (2005) analyzes the panel study on income
dynamics data and compares displacement in poor gentrifying
census tracts (defined by both demographic shifts and private
investment) to poor census tracts that did not gentrify. He finds
that rental inflation was a significant predictor of mobility, and
displacement was higher in gentrifying as opposed to nongen-
trifying tracts. Although positive and statistically significant,
Freeman dismisses the relationship between gentrification and
displacement as small. The analysis does not include indepen-
dent variables measuring public investment.
McKinnish, Walsh, and Kirk White (2010) analyze the con-
fidential national census long form data from 1990 to 2000 to
understand who moves into and out of gentrifying neighbor-
hoods (defined by demographic characteristics). The authors
find that migrants into gentrifying tracts were more likely to be
higher inco me, college educated, younger and less likely to
have children and be immigrants when compared to nongen-
trifying low-income tracts. They also find statistically signifi-
cant higher exit rates of low-education black and Latino
residents from gentrifying neighborhoods.
Finally, Ellen and O’Regan (2011) use the AHS to compare
characteristics of households that moved into or out of gentri-
fying neighborhoods (defined by median household income
gains). They find that neighborhood income gains did not pre-
dict two-year household exit rates, even among vulnerable
groups. Neither McKinnish, Walsh, and Kirk White nor Ellen
and O’Regan explore the role of private or public investment in
their analyses.
Using a unique individual-level data set on credit scores,
Ding, Hwang, and Divringi (2016) largely confirm Ellen and
O’Regan’s (2011) study, finding that low-credit score residents
of gentrifying neighborhoods (defined by home values) were
no more likely to move out than similar residents of nongen-
trifying neighborhoods. They were, however, more likely to
move to lower-income neighborhoods . When differentiating
between different stages of gentrification, the authors find that
low-score residents were slightly more likely to move out of
neighborhoods that had been gentrifying for an extended period
of time (i.e., two decades or more). In addition, they find that
in-movers to the gentrifying neighborhoods were more likely to
be of higher-income levels, suggesting that exclusionary dis-
placement is occurring. T his study only captures moves by
residents with a credit score and thus may be missing displace-
ment for the lowest income residents and many renters. In a
subseq uent study of Philadelphia, Chizeck (2016) finds that
gentrifying neighborhoods lost low-cost housing at five times
the rates of nongentrifying neighborhoods.
Finally, in analyzing evictions cases in Los Angel es in
the 19 90s, Sims (2016) finds that gentrification explains
only o ne of the four “displacement ge ogra phie s,” while the
other three are nongentrifying or pregentrifying contexts
related to capital accumulation facilitated by public and
private institutions. Sims argues that abnormally high rates
and concentrations o f evictions ca n thus repre se nt restr uc-
turing housing and labor markets, and possibly even the
strategic action of landlords, rather than simply the individ-
ual behavior of tenants.
Although varied in their approaches and results, one consis-
tent finding across these studies is that in-movers to gentrifying
neighborhoods are wealthier, whiter, and of higher educational
attainment than incumbent residents, and out-movers are more
likely to be renters, poorer, and people of color than in-movers
(see Table 2). The research also consistently shows that rent
appreciation predicts displacement.
However, the studi es are not consistent in their findings
that gentrification induces displacement. Why the discre-
pancy? One possible explanation for the unexpected residen-
tial stability i s t hat the normal neighborhood turnover process
slows in neighborhoods that are gaining new amenities (along
with new r esidents); residents try harder to stay in the neigh-
borhood, even if it means paying more rent or doubling up
(Chapple 2014; Freeman 2006). Yet, these higher rent bur-
dens are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term, result-
ing in displacement in a longer-term framework than is
typically measured.
Other reasons for the inconclusive evidence on the links
between gentrification and displacement include definitional
and methodological shortcomings of the research. For
instance, quantitative analyses have systematically failed to
characterize the various stages of gentrification that a neigh-
borhood may be experiencing, choosing instead to categorize
gentrification as a static outcome. This dichotomy also leaves
out the potential for gentrification-related displacement to
precede gentrification, especially when property owners
attempt to vacate units in anticipation of rising rents and
neighborhood change. Furthermore, the vast majority of stud-
ies na rrowly defines displace ment under what Marcuse (1985)
would classify as physical or economic d isplacement but
ignores or dismisses exclusionary displacement as simply
succession and replacement. How we define the phenomenon
matters for how we interpret the results.
Zuk et al. 37
Another key limitation is the lack of a consistent and clearly
identified comparison group. While some argue for the com-
parison of poor gentrifying neighborhoods to poor
nongentrifying neighborhoods (i.e., Freeman 2005), others
believe displacement rates should be compared to more stable
neighborhoods (i.e., Newman and Wyly 2006). These
Table 2. Quantitative Studies on the Relationship between Gentrification and Displacement.
Author (Year)
Operationalization of
Displacement Operationalization of Gentrification Key Findings
National
Institute for
Advanced
Studies
(1981)
Any nonvoluntary reason for
moving except life cycle
factors (i.e., divorce)
N/A One of four of the out- and intra-neighborhood
movers were displaced. Displaced residents
were more likely to be African American, less
educated, poor, renters, elderly and living alone
in comparison to in-movers and stayers
Schill, Nathan,
and Persaud
(1983)
Displaced residents because
rent was increased, were
evicted or landlord sold the
house
N/A Twenty-three percent of out-movers from 1978
to 1980 were displaced. Crowding, frequency
of previous moves, unemployment, and marital
status predicted displacement
Atkinson
(2000)
Loss of vulnerable populations
(e.g., working class, renters,
and nonwhite)
Increases in the number of professionals
and managers in the area
Larger outflow than inflow of the working class
into gentrifying areas
Vigdor,
Massey, and
Rivlin (2002)
Any exit from a gentrifying zone
over a three- to four-year
period.
Increases in educational attainment and
owner-occupied housing values
Housing turnover was greater in gentrifying
zones. Low educational attainment predicts
housing stability rather than turnover when
interacted with location in a gentrified zone
Freeman and
Braconi
(2004)
Exit rates of poor households Growth in white populations, rent,
educational attainment, and median
income in contrast to other New
York City neighborhoods
Poor households residing in gentrifying
neighborhoods were less likely to move than
poor households residing elsewhere. People
moving into gentrifying neighborhoods were of
a higher socioeconomic status than those
leaving
Freeman
(2005)
Displaced residents for reasons
including downsizing, rent
increase, eviction, divorce, or
joining the arm forces
Disinvested (less new housing stock),
low-income, central city tracts that
experienced increased investment
(housing price appreciation) and
educational attainment
Rental inflation was a predictor of mobility, and
displacement was higher in gentrifying as
opposed to nongentrifying tracts. Poverty rates
declined and educational levels increased for in-
movers into gentrifying neighborhoods. Moves
originating in gentrifying neighborhoods were
more likely to end outside of the neighborhood
Ellen and
O’Regan
(2011)
Two-year household exit rate Neighborhoods experiencing a 5
percent gain in income relative to the
metropolitan area
Exit rates vary from 20 percent to 30 percent and do
not differ significantly between gaining and
nongaining neighborhoods. Entrance of higher-
income homeowners and exit of low-income
renters were an important source of income gains
McKinnish,
Walsh, and
Kirk White
(2010)
Exit rates of vulnerable
population groups
Low-income tracts in 1990 where the
average household income had
increased by over US$10,000 in 2000
Higher exit of low education and retention of
high-education households in gentrifying
neighborhoods. In-movers into gentrifying
tracts were more likely to be higher income,
college educated, younger when compared to
nongentrifying low-income tracts
Ding, Hwang,
and Divringi
(2016)
Exit rates of low credit score
residents
Lower household income, growth in
rent or home value, and increase in
share of college-educated residents
Low-income residents in gentrifying
neighborhoods were not disproportionately
likely to move out. When less advantaged
residents do move, they are more likely to
move to lower income neighborhoods. In-
movers to the gentrifying neighborhoods are
likely to be of higher-income levels
Sims (2016) Eviction rates Not quantified, eviction hot spot
neighborhoods were contextualized
and analyzed through literature
Gentrification explained only one of the four
displacement geographies, while the other
three were nongentrifying or pregentrifying
contexts
Note: N/A ¼ not applicable.
38 Journal of Planning Literature 33(1)
comparison groups are important because they not only provide
a context against which to evaluate results but also reveal belief
systems about our understanding of how neighborhoods should
function.
Finally, and perhaps due to the inherent difficulty of quan-
tification, we found no quantitative studies that attempt to ana-
lyze the scale of what Davidson (2009) might call “nonspatial
displacement,” namely, the loss of social meaning, cultural
practices, and social networks associated with gentrifying
neighborhoods. Notably, we also found little or no attempt to
identifytheroleofpublicinvestment in gentrificati on or
displacement.
The Role of Publicly Financed Transit
Infrastructure in Spurring Gentrification
and Residential Displacement
The vast majority of research on the drivers of gentrification
and displacement has focused on private actors a nd capital.
However, the public sector can play an important role in neigh-
borhood transformation through a number of avenues: invest-
ing in physical infrastructure, structuring land use decisions,
and incentivizing business location, to name a few.
This review does not include the impacts of all urban public
investment types, which can range from large-scale redevelop-
ment projects to smaller-scale streetscape interventions. Nor do
we look at the impacts of land use decisions (e.g., zoning) or
other government interventions (e.g., tax abatements) that can
shape the urban environment. Although important, such rela-
tionships are currently understudied and therefore lack an exist-
ing evidence base for us to review.
Instead, we review the existing literature on one type of
public investment that has received increased attention: pub-
licly financed rail transit. Just as urban renewal spurred gentri-
fication and displacement in earlier decades, new transit
investments in built-up urban neighborhoods have the potential
to shape neighborhood c hange. Studies of the relationship
between rail transit and neighborhood change take two forms.
One set of studies takes advantage of readily available data on
housing sales, housing values, new development, or renova-
tions to quantify real estate appreciation. Another group of
studies describe the relationship between transit and various
indicators of gentrifying neighborhoods.
Rail Transit and Real Estate Appreciation
Transit is a desirab le neighborhood amenity because it can
improve accessibility to jobs and other destinations. However,
disamenity effects also exist from being “too close” to transit,
including heightened noise, congestion, pollution, and traffic
(Kilpatrick et al. 2007). Largely due to data availability, most
empirical studies on the impact of transportation investments
focus on changes in property values rather than land use, house-
holds, racial transition, or cultural meaning (Landis et al.
1995). Consensus across the literature suggests that the acces-
sibility benefits of living near transit outweigh the potential
nuisance effects, and that proximity to public transit often leads
to higher home values and rents (Wardrip 2011).
Several literature reviews summarize research related to the
home price premiums that come with proximity to transit.
These premiums vary significantly. Cervero and Duncan
(2004) find that the premium for home prices ranged from 6
percent to 45 percent. Diaz (1999) sets the range between 3
percent and 40 percent. Meanwhile, Hess and Almeida (2007)
find a maximum premium of 32 percent, although noting that
some studies found no e ffect, while oth ers found ne gative
effects.
In a review of existing research on the topic, Giuliano and
Agarwal (2010, 228) argue that “the literature does not estab-
lish unambiguously whether or not rail transit investments get
capitalized in property values.” They attribute inconsistent
findings in part to differences in research methods and in the
local conditions. They note that transit systems have an appre-
ciable impact on accessibility only where road networks are
insufficient for handling travel demands (i.e., where congestion
is severe).
Overall, the i mpact of transit on home values can vary
depending on a number of mediating factors such as housing
tenure and type, the extent and reliability of the transit system,
the strength of the housing market, and the nature of the sur-
rounding development (Wardrip 2011). In an area with a strong
housing market and a reliable transit system, the price premium
may be much higher than the average. Additionally, e ffects
may v ary for different stations within a single market. For
instance, transit stations may have little or no impact on hous-
ing prices in some neighborhoods but a significant impact in
others (Wardrip 2011). Effects may also vary depending on the
type of housing (single family or multifamily; Zhong and Li
2016). Some studies have also found that t ransit expa nsion
plans may drive increases in property values before any-
thing is built (Knaap, Ding, and Hopkins 2001). Research
suggests that heavy rail systems have a greater impact on
property values than light rail systems. This is likely due to
heavy rail’s great er freque nc y, spee d, an d scope of servic e
as compared to most light rail networks (Brinckerhoff 2001;
Landis et al. 1995).
Rail Transit, Gentrification, and Displacement
Although the vast majority of the literature focuses on the
impacts of transit on real estate value, a number of scholars
are beginning to investigate the relationship between transit
investments and gentrification, with an imp lied relationship
to residential displacement. Even as these new studies are able
to identify a connection between transit investment or transit
proximity and gentrification, results conflict due to methodo-
logical flaws and the failure to examine different forms of
displacement (Rayle 2014). As Revington (2015) points out,
even as this literature has begun to connect transit with neigh-
borhood change, it often fails to operationalize gentrification
fully. Viewed according to Smith (1982), a nexus of actors is
coordinating transit investment to facilitate the movement of
Zuk et al. 39
capital and capture the profits as the value is capitalized into
land. New transit systems become ammunition for cities mar-
keting themselves in the global competition for capital. Yet,
most of the studies to date have examined only one aspect of
gentrification such as home price increases.
Much of the research relating transit investments and gen-
trification stems from efforts to aid activists and governments
to bette r understa nd, pre dict, and plan f or neighbo rhood
change. One of the earlier iterations of work predicting gentri-
fication is a presentation by researchers from the Urban Insti-
tute (Turner and Snow 2001). Analyzing data for the
Washington, DC, area, they identify the five leading indicators
as predictive of future gentrification (defined as sales prices
that are above the district’s average) of low-income areas,
including good metro access. In a Dukakis Center for Urban
and Regional Policy report, Pollack, Bluestone, and Billingham
(2011) affirm that transit can be a catalyst for neighborhood
renewal, noting that such accessibility improvements could
potentially “price out” current residents because of rising prop-
erty values and rents. They find increases in rents, household
incomes, and vehicle ownership near transit in twelve US cit-
ies. Similarly, Kahn (2007) looks at fourteen US cities with
transit systems that expanded from 1970 to 1990 and finds that
transit-adjacent census tracts experienced disproportionate
increases in property values and educational attainment. Focus-
ing on changes in median household income, Barton and Gib-
bons (2017) show that nearby subway stops are a significant
predictor for income growth but are secondary to many other
factors. Deka (2016) analyzes changes in home values, rent,
and race/ethnicity near rail transit in New Jersey, finding sig-
nificant positive impacts only on home values. A qualitative
analysis of a new transit line in suburban Vancouver finds that
the state support of densifying neighborhoods near transit
threatened the housing stability of disadvantaged residents
(Jones and Ley 2016).
Other studies adopt more complex definitions of gentrifica-
tion. In an analysis of two Swiss cities, Re´rat and Lees (2011)
look specifically at “new build gentrifiers” who live in new
developments near transit, finding that they disproportionately
value the proximity and connectivi ty in their new neighbor-
hoods. In a study for the Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments, Chapple (2009) adopted Freeman’s (2005) definition
of gentrifying neighborhoods. She shows that a number of
socioeconomic, locational, and built environmen t variables,
including proximity to rail transit, predicted gentrification.
Increasingly, researchers are not just looking at a neighbor-
hood’s proximity to transit but pinpointing the timing of the
transit investment and analyzing subsequent neighborhood
changes. Thus, using a survival analysis, Grube-Cavers and
Patterson (2015) show that proximity to rail transit is positively
and significantly related to the onset of gentrification in
Toronto and Montreal, but not Vancouver, perhaps because
gentrification i n that city was already advanced.
Over time, gentrifi cation is spreading away from down-
towns. A recent study of Los Angeles and San Francisco ana-
lyzes gentrification and displacement separately, finding that
transit proximity plays a significant role but depending on
when it is implemented and its location within the metropolitan
region (Chapple et al. 2016). This study is the first to analyze
different dimensions of displaceme nt, including the loss of
low-income residents, the loss of affordable housing, and the
exclusion of low-income in-movers, in relation to transit.
Conclusions: Toward a Research Agenda
on Gentrification, Displacement, and Public
Investment
Scholarly interest in the relationship between investment and
displacement dates back to the 1970s, in the aftermath of urban
renewal. More recently, a new wave of scholarship examines
gentrification, primarily in strong market cities, and its rela-
tionship to public investment, particularly in transit. The results
of these studies are mixed due, in part, to methodological
shortcomings.
Despite the US c ontext of growin g income seg regation,
residential and commercial gentrification is occurring in
lower-income neighborh oods, transforming the meaning of
the neighborhood. Although research ers experience sever e
data and analytic challenges in measuring the extent of
displacement, most studies agree that gentrification at a
minimum leads to exclusionary displa cement and may push
out some renters as well, while others manage to stay.
Although early research on neighborhood change tended
to undere mphasize the role of the state, more recent work
has identified an impac t of public investment in the form of
fixed-rail transit.
To better address the needs of policy makers, community
activists, and researchers alike, there is an urgent need to
improve the body of research related to public investments,
gentrification, and displacement. In some cases, this will
require new data sets and methods, whereas in other cases, it
will involve more qualitative methods and consistent measures.
Here, we outline some questions to guide future research:
(1) How do different types of public investments influence
not only neighborhood change but also residential and
commercial displacement?
(a) Does the type or quantity of investment matter?
(b) What are the displacement impacts of different
forms of public investment and action, not only
fixed-rail transit but also streetscape improve -
ments and rezoning, among others?
(c) How does timing matter from ea rly planning
phases to investment and implementation?
(d) What is the impact of market rate versus subsi-
dized housing production at the neighborhood
and regional scale?
(2) How do public investments impact commercial change,
specifically related to small businesses, employment
patterns, affordability of goods and services, and change
in clientele? How does this relate to residential change?
40 Journal of Planning Literature 33(1)
(3) What are the social, economic, and health impacts of
gentrification and residential displacement?
(4) What can planners and policy makers do to mitigate
residential displacement? Which types of antidisplace-
ment strategies are most effective?
As this article highlights, drawing the analytical distinction
between gentrification and displacement is critical to advan-
cing methodological and theoretical approaches. U ntil the
methodological challenges and these additional research ques-
tions are addressed, empirical research on gentrification and
displacement will only have limited application in policy mak-
ing and urban planning efforts to stabilize neighborhoods and
prevent residential displacement.
Authors’ Note
The statements and conclusions of this article are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the California Air Resources
Board.
Acknowledgment
The authors are grateful for the input of Paul Ong and Trevor Thomas
in the conceptualization and review of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work
summarizes a larger literature review that appeared as a working
report, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and
funded by the California Air Resources Board as part of the project
Developing a New Methodology for Analyzing Potential
Displacement.”
Note
1. Spending on mass transit and rail as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) increased from 0.13 in 1966 to 0.40 in 2014. During
the same period, spending on highways decreased from 1.61% of
GDP to 0.96 (Congressional Budget Office 2015).
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Author Biographies
Miriam Zuk, PhD, is the director of the Center for Community
Innovation at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research
focuses on equitable urban development, affordable housing, and
environmental justice. She was previously the deputy director of
Air Quality Research for the Mexican Ministry of Environment in
Mexico City.
Ariel H. Bierbaum, PhD, is an assistant professor of urban studies
and planning in the School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation
at the University of Maryland. Dr. Bierbaum’s research explores ques-
tions about the mutually constitutive relationship between racial
inequality, urban planning, and public education.
Zuk et al. 43
Karen Chapple, PhD, is a professor of City and Regional Planning at
the University of California, Berkeley. She studies the governance,
planning, and development of regions in the United States and Latin
America, with a focus on housing and economic development. Her
recent book (Routledge, 2015) is entitled Planning Sustainable Cities
and Regions: Towards More Equitable Development.
Karolina Gorska, PhD, is a planner in the Urban Design Studio at the
Los Angeles Department of City Planning. Her research interests
focus on social and political issues in plann ing, urban design, and
historic preservation. She received her PhD in 2015 from the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles.
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, PhD, is a professor at the University of
California, Los Angeles Department of Urban Planning. Her books
include Urban Design Downtown: Poetics and Politics of Form
(1998), Jobs and Economic Development in Minority Communities
(2006); Sidewalks: Conflict and Negotiation over Public Space
(2009), Urban Design Companion (2011), and The Informal American
City: Beyond Taco Trucks and Day Labor (2014).
44 Journal of Planning Literature 33(1)