Review of religion or belief law Definitional issues
petition was not motivated by conscience or religious belief, Article 9 was not
implicated.
33
There does not appear to be any British case where a religion which did
not involve religious belief has been put before the Courts.
34
Thirdly, is it possible to have a religion which is also a belief? It would seem to follow
from the discussion of the importance of belief above, that every religion is by
definition a belief; and the assumptions in cases such as Williamson and others
support this view. The significance of this will depend upon the practical differences
between bringing a claim based on 'religion' and on a 'belief' which happens to be
religious. Justice Burton, in Grainger, saw important evidential distinctions between
the two: (a) 'To establish a religious belief, the claimant may only need to show that
he is an adherent to an established religion. To establish a philosophical belief … it is
plain that cross-examination is likely to be needed';
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(b) 'it is not a bar to
philosophical belief being protected by the Regulations if it is a one-off belief and not
shared by others'.
36
User guidance, such as that from ACAS, suggests a distinction
between what needs to be proven for religion and for belief, with religion satisfied by
'any religious belief, provided the religion has a clear structure or belief system', while
philosophical belief is described with reference to the more detailed and potentially
demanding Grainger criteria (ACAS, 2014a: 3). A differential treatment between
religion and belief appears potentially inconsistent with GMB v Henderson, where it
was stressed that 'The law does not accord special protection to one category of
belief and less protection for another. All qualifying beliefs are equally protected'.
37
If the emphasis on belief as the foundation of religion is accepted, and no practical
difference is to be found in pleading religion or religious belief, the existence of these
separate routes to claim protection might be queried. If, on the other hand, there are
33
Similarly, if we look outside of the workplace to religious hatred, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006
defines religious hatred as hatred against a 'group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of
religious belief' (sch.1).
34
The closest example is perhaps Lord Brown’s dissent in R(E) v Governing Body of Jewish Free School [2009]
UKSC 15: 'Jewish schools in future, if oversubscribed, must decide on preference by reference only to outward
manifestations of religious practice. The Court of Appeal's judgment insists on a non-Jewish definition of who is
Jewish. Jewish schools, designated as such by the Minister and intended to foster a religion which for over 3000
years has defined membership largely by reference to descent, will be unable henceforth even to inquire whether
one or both of the applicant child's parents are Jewish' (para. 248).
35
Grainger, para. 6.
36
Grainger, para. 27. Grainger has been understood as showing, in passing, that a philosophical belief, unlike a
religious one, does not need to be shared by others. The judge in Grainger was here influenced by the EAT
decision in Eweida, which found that a religious belief might not be shared at all by anyone. The Court of Appeal
in Eweida [2010] EWCA Civ 1025 took a different approach, finding that indirect religious discrimination required
group disadvantage. This approach may not have survived the decision of the ECtHR in Eweida and Others v
UK, App no. 4820/10, (2013) which stressed the applicant’s views.
37
GMB v Henderson, EAT 73/14/DM, 13 March 2015, para. 62.
Equality and Human Rights Commission · www.equalityhumanrights.com
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Published September 2015