John HUBER, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Elizabeth..., 2014 WL 2624312...
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
6
*14 Husband appealed and was granted a stay of payment. When the Husband's appeal was dismissed, he was ordered to pay
the judgment with accrued interest until the judgment be paid in full. Wife moved for an execution upon her judgment. The
lower court ordered that husband be required to pay interest on the $100,000 from the time the order to pay was entered. That
order was affirmed on appeal.
First, the Karellas Court found that the judgment of divorce nisi was a final adjudication of the rights of the parties and
constituted “a judgment for the payment of money.” Therefore, the court reasoned, it bore interest from the date of its entry.
Id. at 471-472.
The Court emphasized that G.L. c.235, §8 provides “interest over any period of delayed payment. To hold otherwise would
ignore clear legislative intent in enacting that statute and fly in the face of strong public policy supporting the inclusion of interest
on money judgments.” Id. at 474. The *15 appellate court let stand the award of interest from entry of the judgment nisi.
3
It is the interest on the delayed payment of the court order, coupled with ongoing interest once the complaint for contempt
is filed, that will make Husband whole in the case at bar. If making a party whole were not the rule, those who owe support
payments in divorce cases will be incentivized to delay compliance with court orders as long as possible, knowing they can
invest the money for their own benefit or otherwise use the money. This should not be the case.
No Massachusetts case has squarely dealt with the issue whether periodic payments should come under the umbrella of G.L.
c.235, §8. In Halpern v. Rabb, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 331(2009), a mother was denied such “prejudgment interest” for unpaid child
support that accrued prior to the filing of a contempt complaint. Apparently, she relied upon G.L.c. 215,§34A, which provides
interest only “from the date of filing the complaint,” and G.L. c.231, §6C, which deals only with contractual obligations. Her
*16 reliance on those statutes was said to be mistaken. On the one hand, §34A is quite specific concerning the date interest
begins; on the other hand, the child support obligation merged into the judgment of divorce, so there was no “contractual
obligation” that remained. The Court in that case did not consider the application of G.L. c.235, §8.
Similarly, in Poras v. Pauling, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 535 (2007), the wife relied exclusively on G.L. c.215A, §34A for the award
of interest that accrued prior to filing her complaint for contempt. The decision of the lower court that denied interest pursuant
to that statue held wife to her theory. That view was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 546.
There are several good reasons to read G.L. c.235, §8 to mean that periodic payments of alimony or child support, and other
periodic payments are “judgment [s] for the payment of money.” First, failing to recognize this creates at least one significant
anomaly. We have seen, above, that when the Department of Revenue collects and enforces child support payments, it adds
interest at the rate of .5% per month. That means that when the DOR files a complaint for contempt on behalf of a *17 custodial
parent seeking arrears in child support, there is an award of “prejudgment interest” in the context of the contempt; but if the
same person files his/her own contempt without the assistance of DOR, there would be no award of prejudgment interest on
the overdue amounts unless G.L.c.235, §8 applies.
Second, our legislature has employed nearly the identical language of G.L. c.235, §8 in referring to periodic payments of support.
G.L. c.215, sec. 34A governs, among other things, the award of legal fees in contempt actions where support has not been
paid. In section (a), par. 4 of that statute, (See Addendum) the legislature uses the phrase “an order or judgment for monetary
payment” to signify orders or judgments for periodic support payments. The terms, “judgment for the payment of money,” as
used in G.L. c.235, §8 and “judgment for monetary payment,” as used in G.L. c.215, §34A are as close as our language allows.
If periodic payments are “judgments for the payment of money” in one instance, they should be so regarded in the other.
Finally, In Karellas, supra, a single payment was ordered to be made pursuant to a divorce judgment.That was deemed, “a
judgment for the payment of *18 money.” What if two payments were ordered? Would an order to make two payments be a
judgment for the payment of money? What about three payments? The point is, the fact that a judgment requires many payments
does not deprive it of being essentially a judgment for the payment of money.