One Development Project, Two Economic Tales: The St. Louis

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 21

Introduction

This article focuses primarily on the interrelated

economic development project of the St. Louis

Cardinals’ new Busch Stadium (2006) and Ballpark

Village (2014). While the new Busch Stadium

officially opened on April 10, 2006, and Ballpark

Village officially opened on March 27, 2014, nearly

eight years later, since the opening of Ballpark Village

only included the completion of Phase 1, this

interrelated development is actually ongoing and yet to

reach fully planned and promised project completion.

While originally proposed and envisioned as one

simultaneous but layered project, the building and

realization of the two entities eventually became two

separate but interrelated projects, resulting in public

financing of both. Through this evolution, the overall

economic development project changed dramatically,

including key actors, funding, design, and goals. This

research examines both the individual and combined

economic impact, both tangible and intangible, of the

two entities, including in regard to sustainability.

Economics of Professional Sports

This section focuses on the big four major league

sports: Major League Baseball (MLB), National

Basketball Association (NBA), National Football

Dr. Eric Click is Program Coordinator of the Bachelor of

Public Administration and Assistant Professor of Public

Administration, Hauptmann School of

Public Affairs, Park

University, Kansas City, Missouri.

Much of this research builds on and complements the in-depth

analysis of my dissertation, The Impact of the Growth Machine

on Public Financing of Professional Sports Facilities: The

Case of the St. Louis Cardinals and related research on LUTV’s

Books ‘N’ Strikes: https://www.youtube.com/user/thericclick.

League, and National Hockey League (NHL). Relative

to the ongoing subsidization of these leagues,

particularly stadiums/arenas, Raymond J. Keating,

who serves as chief economist with the Small Business

& Entrepreneurship Council (SBE Council), argues:

What is the most subsidized industry in all of

America? Arguably, it is an industry

dominated by small and mid-sized businesses.

I would say that the Kings of the subsidies

game are the four major league sports—the

National Football League (NFL), Major

League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball

Association (NBA), and the National Hockey

League (NHL)—along with minor league

baseball and hockey. After all, what other

industries—other than those actually operated

by the government, like public schools—have

the government subsidize almost all of the

buildings in which they operate? Answer:

None. It’s only pro sports.

Regarding the stadium building boom that started in

the 1980s, Adam M. Zaretsky, Economist at the

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, states:

Between 1987 and 1999, 55 stadiums and

arenas were refurbished or built in the United

States at a cost of more than $8.7 billion. This

figure, however, includes only the direct costs

involved in the construction or refurbishment

of the facilities, not the indirect costs—such as

money cities might spend on improving or

adding

to the infrastructure needed to support the

facilities. Of the $8.7 billion in direct costs,

about 57 percent—around $5 billion—was

Raymond J. Keating, “Taxpayers, Are You Ready for Some

Football?” Small Business Survival Committee, Weekly

Cybercolumn, The Entrepreneurial View #116, September 7,

2000 (www.sbsc.org), quoted in Ansel M. Sharp, Charles A.

20th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2013), 246.

One Development Project, Two Economic Tales:

The St. Louis Cardinals’ Busch Stadium and Ballpark Village

Eric Click

Park University

22 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

financed with taxpayer money.

Further, from 2000 to 2010, twenty-eight new

stadiums were built for approximately $10 billion,

with $5 billion coming from public funders. Thus,

taxpayers covered nearly half the cost to either

maintain or attract a team.

While local or state officials, elected and non-elected,

may often claim they are satisfying the demand for

sports entertainment, their primary underlying

argument is that these professional sports teams bring

major league status to their communities. With this

status, public officials argue teams bring positive local,

state, regional, national and even possible global

exposure, both in branding and marketing, which can

translate to additional opportunities and revenue

generation for local businesses. Thus, news jobs and

business are attracted to the area.

However, Eric Click

contends, “Regarding this public investment and the

economic benefits of professional sporting facilities,

academic studies have found little, perhaps even a

negative economic effect, with investment simply

being reallocated, not generated.”

Even though very little economic evidence exists that

public stadium investments generate new revenue from

either local or non-local residents, including relative to

tourism, the opposing belief is often propagated by the

misuse of the “Multiplier Effect.” Zaretsky articulates,

“Of the three circumstances described that purportedly

generate new revenues, the third—funds keep turning

over locally, thereby ‘creating’ new spending—is

probably the most spurious from an economist's

viewpoint. Such a claim relies on what are called

multipliers. Multipliers are factors that are used as a

way of predicting the ‘total’ effect the creation of an

additional job or the spending of an additional dollar

Adam M. Zaretsky, “Should cities pay for sports facilities?”

The Regional Economist, (April 2001), accessed October 15,

2014),

http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=468.

Ansel M. Sharp, Charles A. Register, and Paul W. Grimes,

Economics of Social Issues, 20th ed. (New York, NY:

McGraw-Hill, 2013), 246.

Ibid.

Eric Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities: The Case of the St.

Louis Cardinals” (PhD diss., University of Texas Dallas, 2009),

will have on a community’s economy.”

In 1976,

economist Robert Lucas, who won the 1995 Nobel

Prize in Economics, disproved the validity and

applicability of the multiplier in macroeconomics,

which is known as the “Lucas Critique.”

In essence,

these multipliers are one giant variable generally

calculated through many smaller variables (inputs),

which can result in skewed and unreliable predicted

outcomes—especially based upon who is calculating

them and what they are being used for.

Since high-paying jobs are isolated to primarily the

players and management, who may or may not live in

the area throughout the year, the jobs created by

professional sports franchises are generally low-paying

seasonal service sector jobs.

Further, Sharp, Register

and Grimes point out the occurrence of a “substitution

effect,” stating, “Finally, when a new sports team

arrives in town, a substitution effect will occur with

respect to consumer spending. Local fans who

purchase tickets, concessions, parking, and souvenirs

will have less to spend on other forms of

entertainment. Thus, fewer dollars are available for

spending at businesses such as local restaurants,

theaters, and bowling centers.”

Despite the overall multi-billion dollar professional

sports industry, including some teams valued at over

$1 billion, individual teams, not leagues, are relatively

small businesses. Average team revenue in millions is:

$260.78 (NFL), $204.57 (MLB), $126.78 (NBA), and

$97.63 (NHL).

Note, this is only revenue, not net

income (revenue minus expenses). Hence, these

numbers are small in comparison to the billions of

dollars generated by individual market leading firms

throughout the nation in corporate America.

With public officials increasingly having a hard time

justifying public stadium subsidies, the justification is

moving beyond economics benefits (direct and

tangible) to possible social benefits (indirect and

intangible). Click contends, “Recently, since economic

Zaretsky, “Should cities pay for sports facilities?”

Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys, “The Growth Effects

of Sport Franchises, Stadia and Arenas,” Journal of Policy

Analysis and Management 18, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 603.

Sharp, Register, and Grimes, Economics of Social Issues, 257.

Ibid.

Ibid., 246 and 257.

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 23

benefits have not been adequate to justify public

financing of professional sports facilities, analysts

have explored intangible benefits (benefits beyond

economic) to justify public investment. Intangible

benefits include non-user benefit, non-use value

benefit, indirect benefit, public good benefit, public

externality, public good externality, public

consumption externality, social benefit, or social

spillover benefit.”

Specific claims of possible

intangible benefits include civic pride, reputation, and

image, but placing a value on these benefits is

daunting.

As a result, Sharp, Register and Grimes

state, “Because the primary benefits of a professional

sports team to its local community are intangible and

hard to measure (how much is civic pride worth?), the

debate concerning the use of public funds to support

professional sports is likely to continue. However,

many economists argue that public investments in new

factories and schools would generate greater and

longer-term economic returns to the community than

investments in new stadiums and arenas.”

Despite the complexity of measuring these intangibles,

some scholars are using contingent valuation method

(CVM) on professional sports teams/stadiums.

Since

standard market-based valuations do not apply, CVM

attempts to monetarily quantify public goods and

services through hypothetical market values that ask

respondents willingness to pay (WTP) for a non-

market good or service.

Click states, “Further, even

though CVM studies have found WTP for intangible

benefits, total WTPs (intangible WTPs combined with

tangible WTPs) have generally been far less than

current public stadium subsidies.”

In order to further understand not only the public

stadium subsidies debate but also the overarching

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 9.

Ibid.

Sharp, Register, and Grimes, Economics of Social Issues,

257.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 10-11.

Richard W. Schwester, “An Examination of the Public Good

Externalities of Professional Athletic Venues: Justifications for

Public Financing,” Public Budgeting and Finance 27, no. 3

(September 2007): 97.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 11.

professional sports subsidies debate, citizens and

decision makers must also examine the unique

structure of the four major league sports, particularly

relative to their product and resource markets. While

the leagues are comprised of contractually obligated

teams, these member clubs are actually franchises that

have “an exclusive right to product and market specific

commercial goods and services within a specified

geographic territory.”

The leagues are controlled by

owners that hire a commissioner (non-owner), whose

primary task is to serve the best interest of the league

in daily operations.

The league rules governing the

relationship between teams and players most directly

affect member club operations and prosperity.

Professional sports operate in imperfect markets,

which operate somewhere between competitive

markets and monopolistic markets.

First, in the

imperfect product markets, “buyers and sellers engage

in the exchange of final goods and services.”

Teams

cooperate through league rules to limit economic

competition among member clubs.

As a result,

Sharp, Register and Grimes write, “Professional sports

leagues are economic cartels. Through the leagues,

teams formally agree to behave as if they were one

firm—a shared monopoly. By forming cartels, sports

clubs can increase the joint profits for all members of

the league by restricting output and increasing price

relative to a competitive market. By sharing the joint

profits from the sale of their output, leagues can ensure

the long-term survival of member teams.”

Through

cooperative joint marketing and revenue sharing,

member team profits result from three primary revenue

streams: ticket and concession sales, merchandising

rights for team souvenirs and novelties, and radio and

television broadcast rights.

Second, in the imperfect

resource markets, “buyers and sellers engage in the

exchange of the factors of production.”

As a result,

Sharp, Register and Grimes comment:

Sharp, Register, and Grimes, Economics of Social Issues,

247.

Ibid.

Ibid., 248.

Ibid.

Ibid., 249.

Ibid., 270.

Ibid., 251.

Ibid., 248.

24 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

In the resource market, professional sports

leagues enforce employment rules that grant

member clubs exclusive rights to player

contracts. When a club holds the exclusive

rights to contract with an athlete, the club is a

monopsony—the single buyer of labor in the

market. A monopsony is able to employ

workers at wages below what would be

observed in a competitive market. In recent

years, professional athletes have the right to

free agency, which reduces the monopsony

power of the clubs. In response to free agency,

the average salaries in professional athletes

have dramatically increased. The size of a

professional athlete’s paycheck reflects the

player’s contribution to his club’s revenue.

Since the 1970s, professional athletes have fought the

monopolistic powers of the league cartels. In response

to team owners, players formed labor unions that are

“a formal organization of workers that bargains on

behalf of its members over the terms and conditions of

employment.”

Labor disputes between the owners

and players’ unions sometimes result in strikes (labor

work stoppages) or lockouts (management work

stoppages). The stoppages primarily revolve around

disagreements with salary caps. By attempting to limit

team spending, player compensation is also limited,

especially during free agency.

A free agent is “a

player whose contract is no longer held exclusively by

one professional sports club.”

The league cartels can continue to operate due to their

unique exceptions, especially baseball, relative to

antitrust laws.

These laws are “legislation designed

to promote market competition by outlawing and

regulating anticompetitive business.”

In 1922, the

Supreme Court ruled in The Federal Baseball Club of

Baltimore v. The National League of Professional

Baseball Clubs that interstate commerce does not

apply to MLB, resulting in antitrust exemption and

precedence that continues to be upheld in legal

Sharp, Register, and Grimes, Economics of Social Issues,

270.

Ibid., 264.

Ibid., 262-264.

Ibid., 263.

Ibid., 249.

Ibid., 212.

challenges. While MLB’s blanket exemption is not

applicable to other professional sports leagues,

additional legal precedence continues to grant limited

antitrust exemption to other leagues. For example, the

Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 permits the leagues to

sell game broadcast rights in a “package deal” instead

of teams competing against each other for

broadcasting. Legal precedence implies that a team’s

economic prosperity is dependent on the league’s

economic prosperity.

Further, recent debate involves

the ability of leagues to control the number of teams,

including expansion and contraction, and also location

and relocation.

Regarding this issue in MLB and its

impact on stadium funding, Zimbalist comments:

Further, the commissioner’s office has not

refrained from threatening host cities again and

again that a team will be allowed to move (to a

vacant, viable market) if it does not get

funding for a new stadium. And the

commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel

recommended that MLB follow a more lenient

relocation policy. More recently, of course, the

commissioner’s office has added the threat of

contraction.

Busch Stadium and Ballpark Village

In 2006, the St. Louis Cardinals’ new Busch Stadium

(Busch III) opened in MLB, costing approximately

$400 million. Public funding of 20-25% came from a

combination of Missouri, St. Louis County, and St.

Louis City governments through subsidies and/or

incentives.

Regarding Mark Lamping, then president

of the Cardinals, and Bill DeWitt Jr., principal owner

of the Cardinals, Tritto observes:

In a last-minute scramble, the owners changed

their plans. They had completed the sale of

$200.5 million in private bonds to finance the

project. Now DeWitt Jr. decided to eliminate

Ibid., 249.

Ibid., 255.

Andrew S. Zimbalist, “Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: Why

It Still Matters,” NINE: A Journal of Baseball History and

Culture 13, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 4.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 11.

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 25

Bank One from the equation and bump the

owner’s equity investment in the $387.5

million park from $43.5 million to $90 million.

The county’s $45 million loan, $30.4 million

in state tax credits and the $12.3 million from

the Missouri Department of Transportation

would fund the balance of the project.

DeWitt’s understanding of the plan’s financial

components and his relationships in the

banking industry kept the deal together,

Lamping and DeWitt III said.

Beyond the stadium, shortly after its completion and

opening, per the Cardinal’s agreement with the city,

Ballpark Village was originally scheduled and required

to break ground on a two-part construction project

with commercial development as the first phase and

residential development as the second phase.

Originally, the Cardinals would have paid penalties for

missing Ballpark Village building deadlines.

However, the Cardinals, along with co-developer

Cordish Companies of Baltimore, have renegotiated

Ballpark Village’s overall terms and structure on

multiple occasions with the city and state, most

recently agreeing to current terms in 2012. These

terms finally produced the actual construction and

eventual opening of Ballpark Village in 2014.

Moreover, while the initial agreement did not have

public subsidies for Ballpark Village, the newest

agreement does, as Rivas asserts:

The project has received a generous amount of

local and state subsidies. It received $17

million in bonds from the Missouri Downtown

Economic Stimulus Authority (MoDESA). The

Christopher Tritto, “Ballpark MVP: Lamping Overcame

Harsh Criticism, Political Wrangling to Make the New Busch a

Reality,” St. Louis Business Journal. March 12, 2006, accessed

October 18, 2014,

http://www.stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2006/03/13/f

ocus1.html.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 108.

Tim Bryant, “What’s Next for Ballpark Village?: Developers

Say a Residential Tower and Office Buildings Could Come

Later,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. March 23, 2014, accessed

October 18, 2014,

http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/what-s-next-for-

ballpark-village/article_93853c8f-15da-5861-a66b-

e67368d988cc.html.

city authorized a one-percent sales tax at

Ballpark Village, which is expected to generate

$14 million over 25 years. About $5.5 million

of that sales revenue would go to the city and

the rest to the developers. Ballpark Village also

benefits from a St. Louis City TIF (tax

increment financing), which also puts taxpayer

money back into the project.

Further, while the bonds are secured by the Cardinals

and Cordish, beyond the first phase, in additional

possible phrases, if the developers hit project

benchmarks on retail, office, residential and other

offerings, state and local incentives could eventually

hit $183.5 million.

Busch Stadium and Ballpark Village significant

happenings include:

1) In September 1994, the August Busch III regime

hires Mark Lamping as team president who hires

Walt Jocketty as general manager (GM) who hires

Tony LaRussa as manager.

2) On March 21, 1996, the Gateway Group, Inc.

purchases the Cardinals, which includes principal

owner Bill DeWitt Jr. He has previous investments

in the Baltimore Orioles, Cincinnati Reds, and

Texas Rangers (the latter of which he was a co-

owner with friend President George W. Bush). The

$150 million team purchase includes the stadium

(Busch II), adjacent parking garages, and land. The

group eventually sells the parking garages and land

parcels for $101 million for a $49 million net cost.

Additionally, August Busch III includes in the

purchase $8 million in stadium improvements,

including eliminating artificial turf and returning to

grass. In 2001, the estimated ownership group

worth exceeded $4 billion.

3) In 1997, the Cardinals, led by Mark Lamping, first

pitch the idea of a new ballpark, stressing stadium

Rebecca Rivas, “Millions in Ballpark Village Construction

Dollars Not Monitored,” St. Louis American. January 23, 2014,

accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_9b224d2

e-83d1-11e3-8af9-001a4bcf887a.html.

Bryant, “What’s Next for Ballpark Village?”

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 74.

Ibid., 75-77.

26 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

maintenance and improvement costs and proposing

a public-private partnership to finance.

4) In 2000, the Cardinals, with Mark Lamping, start

to pursue public stadium funding in the state

Legislature (Jefferson City, Missouri).

5) In May 2001, Fred Lindecke, retired political

reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and

Jeannette Mott Oxford, grassroots coordinator and

future state representative (D-St. Louis City),

formed the Coalition Against Public Stadium

Funding, encompassing members from all parties

and backgrounds that were united by their

opposition against “wasting tax revenue on

subsidizing millionaires to build ball parks.”

Throughout the summer, in St. Louis City, the

coalition start circulating initiative petitions to get

on the ballot an ordinance mandating a citywide

vote for any public financing for a new ballpark or

any professional sports facilities.

6) On June 19, 2001, the Cardinals sign a

memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the

St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and Missouri

covering plans for the new Ballpark and Ballpark

Village in the downtown.

Gov. Bob Holden,

recently-elected Mayor Francis Slay, County

Executive Buzz Westfall, and the Cardinals

announce the tentative $646 million

redevelopment.

7) In early 2002, the Cardinals continue to pursue and

lobby, including using lobbyists Tom McCarthy

and Jon Bardgett, for public stadium funding

through Mark Lamping in the state Legislature, but

the Legislature (House) fails to vote on a $100

million stadium funding bill package known as the

Sport Center Redevelopment Act (SCRA). House

Minority Leader Catherine Hanaway (R) and

Representative Jim Foley (D) co-sponsored the 41-

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 77.

Ibid., 78.

Fred Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for

Stadiums. Coalition Chronology,” (March 2009): 1.

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens,” media release, accessed October 18,

2014,

http://www.stlballparkvillage.com/images/press/Press%20Rele

ase_$100%20Million%20First%20Phase%20of%20Ballpark%

20Village%20Opens_3.27.14.pdf.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 82.

page failed bill with Peter Kinder (R-Cape

Girardeau) leading the charge.

8) By late May 2002, the Cardinals and Mark

Lamping start to seriously pursue other financing

options in locations outside of downtown St.

Louis. By mid-June, the Cardinals have fifteen

financing proposals, narrowing them down to nine

sites (cities) by late August. Illinois Gov. George

Ryan proposes five possible Metro East area sites:

East St. Louis (two locations), Madison, Dupo, and

Fairmont City. By late September, the East St.

Louis Riverfront site of the Casino Queen emerges

as the Illinois location, with a full plan in place

calling for the Cardinals to pay $103.9 million

total and the state stadium authority to pay the

remaining $266.9 million of the $370.8 million

total cost.

9) In May 2002, the Coalition Against Public

Stadium Funding submits petitions totaling 18,000

signatures to the St. Louis Election Board, with

14,000 found valid. The Coalition’s ordinance,

Proposition S, qualifies for the November ballot

voting.

10) On November 4, 2002, the Cardinals and the City

of St. Louis sign a deal, including the finalization

of two agreements. The agreements include

penalties if the Cardinals sell the team or move

after stadium completion, and also requirements to

make available 486,000 tickets at $12 a ticket in

year 2000 dollars, redevelop two nearby stadium

blocks for a $60 million Ballpark Village, donate

at least $100,000 for neighborhood ballpark

building, and donate 100,000 tickets to both St.

Louis City and County youth and charitable

organizations.

Further, by this point in the

stadium funding process, nearly all articles

regarding the stadium funding included a

disclaimer, “Pulitzer Inc., which owns the Post-

Dispatch, and Pulitzer’s chairman, Michael E.

Ibid., 80-88.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 88-89.

Fred Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for

Stadiums. Coalition Chronology,” 1.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 90.

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 27

Pulitzer, are part-owners of the Cardinals. Their

combined stake is slightly less than 4 percent.”

11) On November 5, 2002, the Coalition Against

Public Funding for Stadiums referendum passes

(55 to 45 percent). The passage cannot affect the

public financing passed the day before, but all

future public professional sport facility assistance

is affected.

12) In late 2002, the St. Louis Board of Aldermen

rescinds the five percent amusement tax, clearing

the way for redevelopment of land south of Busch

Stadium. In November, the Missouri

Developmental Finance Board (MDFB) approves

$29.5 million in tax credits for relocation costs of

utilities and roads. In December, the Missouri

Highways and Transportation Commission

approves $12.3 million for a highway ramp

relocation for the new stadium.

13) In March 2003, the Coalition Against Public

Funding for Stadiums begins work on an initiative

petition in St. Louis County, proposing a charter

amendment county-wide vote for any taxpayer-

financed professional sports facility. The petition

requires 25,000 voter signatures with signature

distribution relative to the seven County Council

districts.

14) By December 2003, the Cardinals had secured 10-

year leases for corporate suites with annual income

of $135,000-$180,000 for each. In late December,

the Cardinals also complete the sale of $200.5

million in private bonds and utilize $90 million in

owner’s equity investment to combine with St.

Louis County’s $45 million loan, $30.4 million in

Missouri tax credits, and the $12.3 million from

the Missouri Department of Transportation to

finally fully fund the Busch Stadium/Ballpark

Village Project.

Heather Cole, “Cardinals, City Sign Stadium Deal on Day

Before Election,” St. Louis Business Journal. May 25, 2002 ,

accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2002/11/11/s

tory8.html.

Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for Stadiums,”

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 90-91.

Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for Stadiums,”

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 91.

15) On January 17, 2004, the Cardinals break ground

on the new stadium.

16) In August 2004, the Coalition Against Public

Funding for Stadiums files a petition with 35,000

signatures to the St. Louis County Election Board.

On August 18, 2004, the St. Louis County Election

Board certifies 30,000 valid signatures, resulting in

the charter amendment, Proposition A, going onto

the upcoming November 2 ballot.

17) In November, Proposition A passes 72 to 28

percent, being approved by 366,000 voters.

Further, on November 17, 2004, bondholders,

particularly UMB Bank, file suit in St. Louis

County Circuit Court against the Coalition Against

Public Funding for Stadiums. Fred Lindecke and

state Representative Jeannette Mott Oxford are

defendants/appellants. St. Louis County serves as a

defendant/respondent. The bondholders seek

declaratory judgment that Proposition A cannot be

retroactively applicable to the Cardinals ballpark

bonds.

18) On March 3, 2005, the court finds in favor of the

bondholders with the Coalition appealing to the

Missouri Court of Appeals. St. Louis County has

already paid out $2.3 million (2004) and $2.4

million (2005) in bond costs.

19)

On June 2, 2005, the Cardinals announce Cordish

as co-developer on Ballpark Village.

20) On January 17, 2006, the Missouri Court of

Appeals again finds in favor of the bondholders

and not the Coalition Against Public Funding for

Stadiums.

21) On April 10, 2006, the new Busch Stadium, with

the stadium naming rights sold to Anheuser-Busch

for twenty years, has its grand opening ceremony

on MLB’s opening day.

Ibid.

Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for Stadiums,”

Ibid., 3.

Ibid.

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for Stadiums,”

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

28 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

22) On May 3, 2006, the Missouri Supreme Court

refuses to hear the Coalition’s case.

23) On October 27, 2006, Mayor Slay, and co-

developers the Cardinals and Cordish announce

initial Ballpark Village agreement.

24) On September 23, 2007, Mayor Slay announces

Centene, Clayton, Missouri, Fortune 500

healthcare-based corporation, will build a new

headquarters in Ballpark Village, anchoring the

development.

25) In October 2007, the Cardinals fire GM Walt

Jocketty and replace him with the assistant GM,

John Mozeliak.

26) In March 2008, Cardinals President Mark Lamping

resigns to become chief executive of the New

Meadowlands Stadium Company, which is

responsible for building the new NFL’s New York

Giants and New York Jets stadium complex. The

Cardinals replace him with Bill DeWitt III, son of

Bill DeWitt Jr., who is the Cardinal’s chairman of

the board and general partner.

27)

On May 26, 2008, Centene announces it will no

longer anchor or build new headquarters in

Ballpark Village, instead choosing to look at

options elsewhere.

28) In July 2008, the Cardinals finally agree to fill in

the giant mud hole in the Ballpark Village site.

Lindecke, “Coalition Against Public Funding for Stadiums,”

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

Ibid.

Joe Strauss, “Familiar Name, Fresh Approach: Unabridged

Mozeliak Presser,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. November 1, 2007,

accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/birdland/f

amiliar-name-fresh-approach-unabridged-mozeliak-

presser/article_934f066d-e7d8-5033-9d9e-c86fc9e1c2f5.html.

St. Louis Business Journal, “Mark Lamping Resigns as

Cardinals President, DeWitt III Named Replacement,” St. Louis

Business Journal. March 14, 2008, accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2008/03/10/d

aily79.html.

Lisa R. Brown, “Centene Pulls Out of Ballpark Village

Development,” St. Louis Business Journal. March 26, 2009,

accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2008/03/24/d

aily26.html.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 93.

29) In April 2009, the Cardinals transform Ballpark

Village site into a softball field and parking lot,

which is available to rent.

30) In July 2009, the Cardinals host the 2009 MLB

All-Star Game and Week.

31) On September 18, 2012, after the Missouri

Downtown Economic Stimulus Act (MODESA)

and then the St. Louis Board of Aldermen gave

approval on back-to-back days in July, the

Missouri Development Finance Board (MDFB)

approves the Ballpark Village project, finalizing

the $17 million in bonds.

32) On December 19, 2012, the co-developers of the

Cardinals and Cordish finalize their most recent

agreement with St. Louis City.

33) On February 8, 2013, the co-developers break

ground on the first phase of Ballpark Village.

34) On March 27, 2014, the first phase of Ballpark

Village opens, which is a 120,000 square-foot

structure containing nine marque venues. The first

phase includes development of the site

infrastructure for possible future construction of

the entire 10-acre site.

In growth machine theory, elite actors unite in their

common goal of growth, leveraging significant

influence and power over land areas and non-elites.

Relative to the local growth coalition (LGC)

components: public officials (strong: pro driver),

media (moderately strong pro),

corporations/businesses (weak pro), and Cardinals

(strong pro: catalyst), Click concludes,

Regarding the push of the growth machine for

public funding, public officials (driver) feared

being blamed for the loss of an iconic

Ibid.

Greta Weiderman, “Ballpark Village Project Approved,

November Groundbreaking Planned,” St. Louis Business

Journal. September 18, 2012, accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2012/09/18/ballpark-

village-project-approved.html.

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

Ibid.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 15.

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 29

institution in the Cardinals (catalyst), which

they not only perceived as an anchor to a city

and downtown that had significantly declined,

both in population and business, but also the

primary positive image/brand of St. Louis

throughout the community, State, Country, and

possibly even globally. Even if the Cardinals’

new stadium was within visual distance in East

St. Louis (IL), public officials viewed the

departure of the Cardinals as a terminal blow

to what was left of the City, a historic city no

longer viewed as a corporate headquarters

capital or a tier one city, but a branch and tier

two city. To public officials, if St. Louis even

had a chance of maintaining or creating

positive momentum, much less recapturing its

former glory, the Cardinals represented that

last vestige of hope and promise. As a result,

public officials and the overall growth machine

did not see the need for a public vote or even a

willingness to pay study, ignoring and working

around two eventual and resulting public

referenda that would suggest otherwise.

Impact

Relative to impact, particularly economic, the numbers

available are generally either outdated projections or

primarily unexplained or explained only by the

Cardinals. With at least thirteen variations of a

Ballpark Village proposed since the turn of the

century,

not including also the numerous proposed

stadium variations, much of the impact data relies

heavily on Ballpark Village inclusion. As a result,

some information is increasingly unreliable and

debatable as time passes and Ballpark Village changes

dramatically. Note, while some data is for a standalone

stadium, recall that Ballpark Village is an initial

required part of the building of the stadium and public

funding, so it is a package deal.

Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public

Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 211.

Kelsey Volkmann, “Slideshow: The 13 Versions of Ballpark

Village,” St. Louis Business Journal. August 10, 2011,

accessed October 20, 2014,

http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2011/08/10/slideshow

-the-13-versions-of-ballpark.html.

Fred Lindecke and Tom Sullivan contend the media

simply did not report the entire stadium story. The

Cardinals put up an estimated $420 million in initial

private funding: bonds cost plus retirement and

owner’s equity investment. However, the Cardinals

also receive significant returns through an estimated

$520 million in public subsidies: $350 million from St.

Louis City’s five percent admission tax 30-year

waiver, $20 million from St. Louis City’s 25-year

property tax abatement, $108 million paid by St. Louis

County to retire the $45 million in stadium bonds, and

$42 million from Missouri tax credits and highway

ramp construction. Further, the Cardinals also receive

an additional estimated $150 million in new stadium

selling sources: $100 million over 30 years on stadium

naming rights, $40 million from the Ballpark Founders

Program that charges season ticket holders $2,000-

$7,500 for new stadium seats, and $10 million from

old Busch Stadium memorabilia sales. Moreover, these

amounts do not include increased Cardinal revenue

from sources such as higher ticket prices, premium

seats, luxury suites, concessions and advertising.

In 2002, the Missouri Department of Economic

Development (MDED) produced economic impact

studies through the Missouri Economic Research and

Informational Center (MERIC) on proposed versions

of the new Busch Stadium/Ballpark Village

and new

Busch Stadium

at the time. While the studies make a

number of assumptions and projections, follow-up post

economic studies on the actual produced entities are

seemingly not available. In particular, the studies rely

significantly on three primary assumptions, MERIC

concludes, “Annual ticket sales have averaged

approximately 3 million over the past 20 years. More

than 90% of all visitors to Busch Stadium reside

outside the City. Almost 40% of all visitors to Busch

Fred Lindecke and Tom Sullivan, “What the Public Paid for

the Cardinal’s Stadium: The Media Never Told the Whole

Story,” St. Louis Journalism Review 37, no. 296 (June 2007):

22-23.

Missouri Economic Research and Information Center.

Missouri Department of Economic Development, Economic

Impacts of the Proposed St. Louis Ballpark Stadium and

Village, David J. Peters. (March 2002): 1-34.

Missouri Economic Research and Information Center.

Missouri Department of Economic Development, Economic

Impacts of the Proposed St. Louis Ballpark Stadium: Update

for November 2002, David J. Peters: 1-10.

30 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

Stadium reside outside the State of Missouri.”

These

studies and primary assumptions are often utilized in

Cardinal economic figures.

In 2009, the current Cardinals President Bill DeWitt III

states, “The provisions in the 2002 Redevelopment

Agreement requiring the Cardinals to expend or cause

to be expended $60 million of costs within the

Ballpark Village area were conditioned upon the

receipt of acceptable tax incremental financing in

connection with such expenditures and the proposed

project described in the agreement.”

The five years

before the Redevelopment Agreement were 1997-

2001, which serve as a tax baseline for the old stadium

versus the first three years of the new stadium (2006-

2008).

Before dropping the admissions tax, the

Cardinals were paying 12% to St. Louis City and

Missouri, which was the highest team tax rate in

MLB.

Regarding St. Louis City revenue projections,

DeWitt III writes, “City revenue projections were

based on using the average tax flows received from the

period 1997-2001. This figure was grown at a 3% rate

until 2005. From 2005 to 2006, the city’s 5%

admissions tax was dropped, but all other taxes were

increased by 25%. For 2007 and beyond, a 3% growth

rate resumes off of 2006 levels.”

With the city

amusement tax gone, in 2006, the Cardinals (team and

its affiliates) paid $10.8 million in direct city taxes,

over $3.8 million beyond the original projection ($1.8

million resulted from the post-season World Series

championship run). With no playoffs in 2007 and

2008, the Cardinals exceeded tax revenue projections

by $1.7 million ($8.9 million total) and $1.9 million

(9.4 million total) respectively. Further, from 1997-

2001, the Cardinals averaged $7.7 million in yearly

taxes, but, from 2006-2008, the Cardinals averaged

$9.7 million, which represents a 26% average

increase.

Missouri Economic Research and Information Center.

Missouri Department of Economic Development, Economic

Impacts of the Proposed St. Louis Ballpark Stadium: Update

for November 2002, 1.

Bill DeWitt III, St. Louis Cardinals, Talking Points re State

Funding for Ballpark Village. (April 9, 2009): 1.

Ibid., 2.

Bill DeWitt III, St. Louis Cardinals, Financing the New

Busch Stadium: A Public Policy Home Run for the City of St.

Louis and the State of Missouri, (April 9, 2009): 2.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 4-5.

Regarding Missouri revenue projections, DeWitt III

adds, “State revenue projections were based on using

the average tax flows received from the period 1997-

2001. This figure was grown at 3% until 2005. From

2005 to 2006, the taxes were increased by 25% to

reflect new ballpark revenue. For 2007 and beyond, a

3% growth rate resumes off of 2006 levels.”

In 2006,

the Cardinals paid the state $19.8 million in direct

taxes ($3.2 million from postseason taxes). This figure

exceeds the projection by $7.1 million. In 2007 and

2008, the Cardinals exceeded state tax revenue

projections by $2.9 million ($16 million total) and

$3.35 million (16.9 million total) respectively. Further,

from 1997-2001, the Cardinals averaged $9 million in

yearly taxes, but, from 2006-2008, the Cardinals

averaged $17.6 million, which represents a 96%

average increase.

Moreover, in regards to the public

policy and financing of the new Busch Stadium,

DeWitt III declares:

Looking back at the deal, the Cardinals, the

city of St. Louis, and the State of Missouri can

all point to the success of the partnership. The

facility opened to great reviews, and the

Cardinals continue to put a winning team on

the field. The city and state each benefit from

growing streams of tax revenue and the project

has sparked new adjacent development. And

Ballpark Village, which is now possible

because the new stadium opens up to the old

ballpark site and creates views into the game,

will add significant new tax growth in the

future and solidify downtown St. Louis as one

of the great urban revitalization stories in the

country.

Assuming similar underlying principles apply to the

projected and actual tax results provided by the

Cardinals through their website (Busch Stadium

Financing Report Card), the Cardinals continue to

generate significant additional tax revenue for both St.

Louis and Missouri. While some of the numbers

previously provided by DeWitt III above are slightly

up or down in comparison to these provided numbers,

Ibid., 8.

Ibid., 7-9.

DeWitt III, Financing the New Busch Stadium, 9.

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 31

they are very similar and likely only minor

correctional adjustments were made. However, since

the methodology on these numbers is not available,

one is left to speculate. The Cardinals’ contend, “With

eight years of actual results now in, it is clear that the

tax revenue produced by the new ballpark to the City

and State have exceeded expectations. The Cardinals

and their affiliates have paid over $244 million in

sales, income, real estate and other taxes to the City

and State from 2006 to 2013.”

One, St. Louis City

average direct taxes paid from 2006 to 2013 are

$11,179,000 versus $7,700,000 from 1997-2001.

Playoff year average taxes (2006, 2009, and 2011-

2013) are $12,750,400 versus $9,645,333 in non-

playoff year average taxes (2007-2008, and 2009). The

two highest tax years are World Series years: 2011

(14,256,000) and 2013 ($14,432,000). Two, Missouri

average direct taxes paid from 2006 to 2013 are

$18,439,000 versus $9,100,000 from 1997-2001.

Playoff year average taxes are $20,422,800 versus

$16,584,667 in non-playoff year average taxes. The

two highest tax years are again 2011 and 2013

respectively: $22,156,000 and $22,795,000.

According to the Cardinals, in the building of Busch

Stadium, 84% of the construction firms used were

from the St. Louis area.

A representative of the

Cardinals declares:

The Ballpark construction project was the most

successful project of its size in St. Louis

history with respect to the participation of

minority and women-owned businesses. Eighty

minority and women-owned firms received

130 contracts totaling $65 million. In addition

the mentor-protégé program was a tremendous

success with leaving the market stronger by

helping small start-ups. Every prime contractor

on the project was required to actively mentor

at least once city-certified minority or women-

owned firm. Twenty-two protégé firms

“Busch Stadium Financing Report Card- Busch Stadium

Financing: A Look Back,” St. Louis Cardinals, accessed

October 21, 2014,

http://mlb.mlb.com/stl/ballpark/ballpark_financing.jsp.

St. Louis Cardinals, “Busch Stadium Financing Report

Card.”

Cardinals. St. Louis Cardinals, The Cardinals and the City of

St. Louis—A History of Shared Success, (2008): 2.

received a total of $21 million in contracts, for

an average of more than $800,000 per

contract.

Minority and women-owned business participation

exceeded Mayor Slay’s goal of both 25 percent

minority-owned and five percent women-owned

business participation.

Further, relative to Ballpark

Village, the Cardinals and Cordish write,

A priority commitment of the Ballpark Village

development team has been to ensure an

inclusive approach in all aspects of the

construction and operation of the district.

Ballpark Village developers have worked in

partnership with the city, community leaders

and others to ensure that the economic benefits

of the project reach historically disadvantaged

sectors of the community. The developers used

a variety of proactive strategies to maximize

minority participation and workforce diversity

during the construction, as well as to achieve a

diverse operational workforce reflective of the

St. Louis region. The first phase of the project

is projected to achieve 21.62% MBE,

7.78%WBE contractor participation and 31%

minority workforce utilization for the core and

shell construction.

The Cardinals and Cordish have also asked each tenant

to voluntarily meet the state’s Minority and Women

Owned Enterprise (M/WBE) and workforce goals in

their interior construction. Ballpark Village has

worked with the St. Louis Agency on Training and

Employment (SLATE) to create a permanent

recruitment and training office to assist city residents,

especially historically disadvantaged populations.

Regarding Ballpark Village, the Cardinals write, “The

construction of Ballpark Village, which began in

February 2013, has been a welcome boost to our local

economy. Over a thousand construction workers

collaborated to build the first-phase of Ballpark

Village, and close to a thousand permanent new jobs

Ibid.

Ibid., 4.

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

Ibid.

32 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

have been created with the new businesses operating

within the district.”

Note, in addition to being a co-developer, the

Cardinals are utilizing some of the space for

businesses, which also allows them to capture

additional spending. Cardinals Nation is 34,000 square

feet and four levels, featuring a two-story restaurant

and bar, an 8,000 square foot Cardinals Hall of Fame

and Museum, a Cardinals Authentics store and a 334-

seat rooftop deck to watch the games all-inclusively.

100

Further, Busch Stadium is also available for special

event bookings.

101

The Cardinals have recently even

started hosting international soccer games.

102

Before Ballpark Village, the 2009 All-Star game

serves as an example of local economic user trends.

Parker shares, “Those whose job it is to promote the

city billed the five days of All-Star events as an

overwhelming success, saying the estimates they used

going in of 230,000 people spending $60 million

appeared on target. But the businesses that boasted the

biggest bumps in sales seemed to be those located near

America's Center or Busch Stadium, or on the route

between the two. Otherwise, downtown businesses

reported mixed results.”

103

Now, the “Ballpark Village

Effect” is occurring. A number of bars, especially

older and sports or baseball seasonal, are reporting a

decline in sales, including some loosing employees to

Ballpark Village.

Even newer bars are having a hard time competing

with Ballpark Village’s validated parking and massive

marketing budget. One newer bar cites a 20-25 percent

decline this year. With its non-game day and year

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

100

Ibid.

101

“Special Events at Busch Stadium,” St. Louis Cardinals,

accessed October 21, 2014,

http://stlouis.cardinals.mlb.com/stl/ballpark/events/.

102

“Busch to Host Man City, Chelsea Match in May,” St. Louis

Cardinals, accessed October 21, 2014,

http://m.cardinals.mlb.com/news/article/43517394/busch-

stadium-to-host-manchester-city-chelsea-match-in-may.

103

Steve Parker, “What’s the Bird Say About the All-Star

Game’s Economic Impact?,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. July 15,

2009, accessed October 18, 2014,

http://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/birds-nest/what-s-

the-bird-say-about-the-all-star-game/article_d6a72a83-5f25-

56e3-a568-3d457bab48bd.html.

around events, Ballpark Village is on pace to meet its

projection of six million visitors this year. While Bill

DeWitt III believes Ballpark Village is absorbing the

majority of the game day crowd, he also believes

Ballpark Village is increasing traffic in the area to

other bars and restaurants. In response, many bars are

attempting more innovative ideas or providing food

and drink discounts, hoping this trend will start to wear

off over time (honeymoon effect).

104

From a marketing and branding standpoint, the

Cardinals have a long and storied history, not only in

St. Louis but also throughout baseball. Only the

Yankees have won more World Series Titles. The

Cardinals state, “The St. Louis Cardinals are one of the

most storied franchises in all of baseball. Since they

joined the National League in 1892, the Cardinals have

won more than 9,500 games, 11 World Series

Championships and 19 N.L. Pennants, 3 N.L. Eastern

Division Titles, 8 N.L. Central Division Titles and 2

N.L. Wild Card Titles. Over 40 former Cardinals

players and managers are enshrined in the National

Baseball Hall of Fame.”

105

“The Cardinal Way” is

often referred to, even recently receiving a Sports

Illustrated cover and themed issue. However, not

everyone agrees with or likes the Cardinal Way. In this

year’s not overly scientific Wall-Street Journal (WSJ)

Hateability Index, relative to the ten playoff teams, the

Cardinals ranked the most hateable. The team

primarily achieved this ranking through recent success

(winning), being called Cardinal Nation, and also

being referred to as having the best fans in baseball.

106

In response, Mayor Slay used this opportunity to write

an open semi-humorous letter in WSJ informing

everyone of why St. Louis is not simply “flyover

country” or a “big deal in October” but for other

104

Tim Bryant, “Ballpark Village: Competitors are Feeling the

‘Ballpark Village Effect’,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. June 13,

2014, accessed October 21, 2014,

http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/competitors-are-

feeling-the-ballpark-village-effect/article_9b3cc96c-4f13-5257-

9208-747caa5a6c49.html.

105

The Cordish Companies, “$100 Million First Phase of

Ballpark Village Opens.”

106

Brian Costa, “The 2014 Baseball Playoffs Hateability Index;

Which Teams Should You Root Against This October?,” Wall

Street Journal. September 30, 2014, accessed October 21,

2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-2014-baseball-playoffs-

hateability-index-1412008971?tesla=y.

Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 33

highlighted reasons. In short, the Cardinals do garner

publicity and exposure.

107

The more the Cardinals win, the more likely they are

to increase taxes paid and publicity, so spur both

tangible and intangible economic benefits. Since the

current ownership started in 1996, the Cardinals are

winning a lot, translating into increased attendance

before and after the new stadium. The last nine years

(1997-2005) the old stadium attendance averaged

3,113,653 versus 3,367,058 new stadium attendance

averaged for the first nine years (2006-2014). Further,

the first four years (2006-2009) the new stadium

attendance averaged 3,433,955 versus 3,313,540 the

last five years (2010-2014). Overall, since 1996, the

average yearly attendance is 3,209,532, with the team

attendance reaching 3.5 million plus in 2005, 2007,

and 2014.

108

Moreover, relative to community impact,

as previously disclosed, while some of the charitable

work of the Cardinals is a contractual obligation, the

Cardinals do substantial charitable work in the

community, especially through Cardinal Care.

109

According to Forbes, in 2005, before the new Busch,

the Cardinals’ team value was $370 million (10

MLB) with a 18% change increase and a -$3.9 million

operating income.

110

The current team value is $820

million (8

in MLB) with a 15% change increase and a

$65.2 million operating income.

111

With a $49 million

107

Francis G. Slay, “St. Louis to America: Don’t Be Jealous,”

Wall Street Journal. October 2, 2014, accessed October 21,

2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/st-louis-to-america-dont-

be-jealous-1412273454?KEYWORDS=francis+slay.

108

“Year by Year Results,” St. Louis Cardinals, accessed

October 21, 2014,

http://stlouis.cardinals.mlb.com/stl/history/year_by_year_result

s.jsp.

109

“Cardinals in the Community,” St. Louis Cardinals,

accessed October 21, 2014,

http://stlouis.cardinals.mlb.com/stl/community/index.jsp.

110

Michael K.Ozanian, “Baseball’s Most Valuable Teams,”

Forbes. April 7, 2005, accessed October 18, 2008,

http://www.forbes.com/2005/04/06/05mlbland.html.

111

Kurt Badenhausen, Michael Ozanian, and Christina Settimi,

“Baseball’s Most Valuable Teams,” Forbes. March

26, 2014,

accessed October 23, 2014,

http://www.forbes.com/2005/04/06/05mlbland.html.

net team cost in 1995, the team is now worth 16.7

times more.

112

Since the Cardinals only recently completed and

opened Phase 1 of the initially promised Ballpark

Village, economic impact, both tangible and

intangible, is difficult to measure for the overall Busch

Stadium/Ballpark Village Project. In essence, led by

government entities, the impact of this project will

need to be measured incrementally and sometimes

separately, as this now decade-old project may be

complete unless another phase(s) of Ballpark Village is

built. Relative to taxes and Busch Stadium, the

Cardinals have certainly met and exceeded tax

projections, which should continue and possibly even

grow if the Cardinals maintain winning baseball and/or

keep capturing additional revenue both in the stadium

and out. However, how Ballpark Village will affect

forthcoming taxes paid by the Cardinals is unclear, as

this future number(s) could be separate from the

stadium. Since this is the first year of operation and the

Cardinals are the co-developers and also operate a

number of venues within Ballpark Village, the overall

numbers Ballpark Village yields after this fiscal year

and how these numbers are broken down is pertinent to

analysis. Further, relative to economic analysis by the

governments, how do current tax gains offset the

public subsidies, including debt retirement and St.

Louis County? Overall, current economic analysis of

the Busch Stadium/Ballpark Village Project lacks

depth and needs a more integrated approach to put

both numbers provided and numbers not provided in

context.

Final Remarks

Especially relative to recent regional unrest, St. Louis

City needs to continue to be cognitive of how these

kinds of economic development projects fit into larger

ongoing economic and social issues, particularly

education, crime, and the deeply related poverty and

discrimination. The city faces unique challenges by

continuing to be separated from St. Louis County and

112

Fred Lindecke and Tom Sullivan, “What the Public Paid for

the Cardinal’s Stadium: The Media Never Told the Whole

Story,” 23.

34 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014)

from the overall fragmented structure of government in

St. Louis.

While the city is often known for beer and baseball, St.

Louis needs to ensure that beer and baseball serve only

as distraction from everyday problems instead of as an

excuse not to deal with other pressing issues in the city

and beyond. St. Louis City, St. Louis County, Missouri

and other applicable governments, including in Illinois

and possibly even federal, must work together to

ensure not only positive economic impact but also

positive social impact for all citizens, not just elites.

While one project cannot be expected to be the

solution, this overall holistic approach can start to

bridge the gap and help to make St. Louis not only a

gateway but also a sustainable destination.