ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL

ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH

ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT

AGREEMENTS AN D C O M M IT MEN T S

April 2021

Prepared by the U.S. Department of State

 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION  - 1 - 
PURPOSE  - 1 - 
SCOPE OF THE REPORT  - 1 - 
ADHERENCE AND COMPLIANCE  - 1 - 
U.S. Organizations and Programs to Evaluate and Ensure Treaty Compliance  - 3 - 
OVERVIEW  - 3 - 
PART I: U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND 
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS  - 4 - 
U.S. INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ORGANIZATION FOR ENSURING COMPLIANCE - 
4 - 
U.S. COMPLIANCE  - 4 - 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or 
BWC)  - 4 - 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)  - 5 - 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes Treaty 
(PNET), and Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)  - 6 - 
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare  - 6 - 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)  - 7 - 
Treaty on Open Skies (OST)  - 7 - 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT) - 7 - 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty or NST)  - 7 - 
PART II: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, 
NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 
PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR ISSUES  - 9 - 
TREATY ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE NEW START TREATY OR NST)  - 9 - 
PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR INITIATIVES CONCERNING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS  - 
10 - 
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)  - 15 - 
MYANMAR (BURMA)  - 16 - 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)  - 18 - 

 
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ISLAMIC REBUPLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)  - 22 - 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (SYRIA)  - 35 - 
THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT)  - 38 - 
NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIA AS INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE U.S. 
“ZERO-YIELD” STANDARD  - 40 - 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)  - 40 - 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)  - 41 - 
PART III: OTHER STATES’ ADHERENCE TO MISSILE COMMITMENTS AND ASSURANCES - 43 
- 
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)  - 43 - 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)  - 44 - 
PART IV: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, 
NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 
PERTAINING TO CHEMICAL ISSUES  - 45 - 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)  - 45 - 
PART V: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, 
NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 
PERTAINING TO BIOLOGICAL ISSUES  - 46 - 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)  - 46 - 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)  - 46 - 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)  - 47 - 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)  - 48 - 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)  - 50 - 
PART VI: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL, 
NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS 
PERTAINING TO CONVENTIONAL ISSUES  - 53 - 
TREATY ON OPEN SKIES (OST)  - 53 - 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)  - 53 - 
VIENNA DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  - 57 - 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)  - 58 - 
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)  - 67 - 
 

ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL,

NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

AND COMMITMENTS

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Report is transmitted pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as

amended (22 U.S.C. § 2593a), which requires a report by the President on Adherence to and

Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and

Commitments.

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This Report assesses U.S. compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament

agreements in 2020, as well as the 2020 compliance and adherence of other nations to arms

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, including confidence-

and security-building measures (CSBMs) and the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which

the United States is a participating State. The issues addressed in this Report primarily reflect

activities from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020, unless otherwise noted.

The Compliance Report includes reporting and analysis at the levels of classification for which

reliable supporting information is available. The unclassified version of this report recount as

much information as possible, but certain issues can be discussed only at higher levels of

classification. Some compliance concerns are raised and some findings of violations are made,

for instance, only in the SECRET or TOP SECRET/SCI-level versions of this Report and not in

the unclassified version.

ADHERENCE AND COMPLIANCE

Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments continue

to be important tools that can protect and advance U.S. interests. Their provisions can limit or

reduce threats to U.S. and allies’ and partners’ security, including by limiting participating

States’ access to or engagement in dangerous or destabilizing capabilities or activities, providing

insight and transparency into the actions of participating States, and encouraging stabilizing

patterns of behavior and interaction. In these ways, such agreements and commitments can

contribute broadly to transparency and stability on a global and regional scale.

Effective arms control requires countries to comply fully with arms control obligations and

commitments they have undertaken. In evaluating any country’s compliance with its arms

control, disarmament, and nonproliferation obligations, the United States considers a variety of

factors. These include the nature and precise language of the obligations undertaken in the

context of international law, information regarding the country’s activities – including that

acquired by so-called National Technical Means of verification (i.e., intelligence collection),

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cooperative verification measures, open-source information, and diplomatic means – and any

information provided by the country in question. A similar process is used to evaluate a

country’s adherence to politically binding commitments.

Many concerns relating to compliance involve matters of interpretation; many involve highly

classified information derived from sensitive sources and methods. Furthermore, some states

often attempt to conceal activity that is inconsistent with their obligations or commitments, and

some are able to do so with a thoroughness and sophistication that can make it difficult to “pierce

the veil” of denial and deception and establish the requisite factual basis for a compliance

assessment. For these reasons, it may take significant time to assess whether the actions or

activities that gave rise to concerns constitute violations or simply represent differences in

implementation approaches or some other permissible activity.

In this Report, the term “violation” refers to any action or omission by a State Party to an

international agreement that has been determined by the United States to be inconsistent with

obligations owed by that State Party to the United States under the agreement in question and

that may give rise to international legal remedies.

As noted above, there can sometimes be legal or factual uncertainty as to whether a violation has

occurred. Accordingly, this Report distinguishes between “violations” and instances in which

the U.S. Government is considering but has not yet determined whether a violation has occurred,

for example because there are unresolved factual or legal questions about compliance. The

Report refers to the latter category as “compliance concerns.”

In general, this Report uses the terms “violation” and “compliance” only in reference to legal

obligations undertaken in international agreements. When discussing politically binding

commitments, the Report generally uses the term “adherence” instead of “compliance.” Thus, a

State engaged in conduct that is determined to be inconsistent with a politically binding

commitment is said to be “not adhering” to that commitment, rather than “violating” the

commitment.

When concerns arise regarding the actions of treaty partners, the United States seeks, whenever

possible, to address its concerns through diplomatic engagement. However, in the event that the

United States determines violations to have occurred, we also have a range of options and means

to try to convince violators it is in their interest to return to compliance and to prevent violators

from benefitting from their violations.

This Report evaluates adherence to and compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and

disarmament agreements and commitments to which the United States is a participating State.

The United States and the majority of the other participating States involved in these agreements

and commitments are implementing these obligations and commitments and have indicated their

intention to continue doing so. As the Report makes clear, however, compliance concerns – and

in some instances treaty violations and actions determined to be inconsistent with political

commitments – exist involving a relatively small number of States. Where possible, the United

States continues to pursue resolution of those issues with the States in question, as well as to

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assess the implications of these States’ actions and how best the United States should respond to

them.

U.S. Organizations and Programs to Evaluate and Ensure Treaty Compliance

Because of our deep-seated legal traditions, our commitment to the rule of law, and our belief in

the importance of such agreements to enhance our security and that of our allies and partners, the

United States complies with its obligations under all applicable arms control, nonproliferation,

and disarmament agreements. It is longstanding U.S. policy to comply with international legal

obligations. To the extent the United States has determined that compliance with an obligation is

no longer in the U.S. national security interest, the United States has sought to negotiate

modification of the agreement in question or to withdraw from the agreement altogether – as

indeed occurred in 2019 with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty.

As a reflection of the seriousness with which the United States views these obligations, the

United States has established legal and institutional procedures to ensure U.S. compliance. As

described below, individual departments and agencies within the executive branch have

established policies and procedures to ensure that plans and programs under those departments

and agencies’ purview remain consistent with U.S. international obligations. For example, U.S.

Department of Defense (DOD) compliance review groups oversee and manage DOD compliance

with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments,

including CSBMs. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State, in its role as the lead U.S. agency

on arms control matters, is responsible for providing policy advice and expertise related to

compliance to individual departments and agencies and the interagency community. Further, an

interagency review is conducted in appropriate cases, including when other treaty parties

formally raise concerns regarding U.S. implementation of its obligations. Finally, Congress

performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations.

OVERVIEW

This Report addresses U.S. compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament

agreements(Part I), other States’ compliance with and adherence to arms control,

nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments pertaining to nuclear issues

(Part II), other States’ adherence to missile commitments and assurances (Part III), other States’

compliance with and adherence to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements

and commitments pertaining to chemical issues (Part IV), biological issues (Part V), and

conventional issues (Part VI).

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PART I: U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND

DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

U.S. INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ORGANIZATION FOR ENSURING

COMPLIANCE

There are processes and controls within the U.S. Executive Branch, including at the Department

of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),

that operate to ensure that plans and programs under those departments’ and agencies’ purview

remain consistent with U.S. international obligations and commitments in the areas of arms

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Additionally, the Department of State, as the lead

U.S. agency on arms control matters, has a role in providing policy advice and expertise related

to compliance to individual departments and agencies and the interagency community. These

processes and controls operate in parallel, and in addition to the Congressional oversight process.

In 1972, DOD established the first such department-level process. Under this compliance

process, established at the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that led to

arms control-related agreements on strategic offensive arms, key offices in DOD are responsible

for overseeing DOD compliance with all U.S. arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament

agreements and commitments, including CSBMs. DOD components ensure that their

implementing program offices adhere to DOD compliance directives and seek guidance from the

offices charged with oversight responsibility. Similar processes have been established by other

departments and agencies to ensure that their programs and activities comply with the United

States’ international obligations and commitments. For example, DHS similarly established a

compliance review process to assess DHS-sponsored research for compliance with all relevant

arms control agreements. Interagency reviews also are conducted in appropriate cases, such as

when other States formally raise concerns regarding the United States’ implementation of its

arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament obligations and commitments.

In addition, all Federal departments and agencies that fund, direct, or execute classified life

sciences research are required to implement oversight measures to ensure all department or

agency activities comply with applicable domestic and international legal obligations, and to

report on classified life sciences research projects and on the functioning of their oversight

processes.

U.S. COMPLIANCE

In 2020, the United States continued to be in compliance with all of its obligations under arms

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. When other countries have formally

raised a compliance concern regarding U.S. implementation activities, the United States has

carefully reviewed the matter to confirm its actions were in compliance with its obligations.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological

Weapons Convention or BWC)

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All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States continues to work toward enhancing

transparency of biological defense work and effective national implementation of BWC

obligations using the BWC confidence-building measures and a range of voluntary measures and

initiatives.

Nevertheless, Russia continues to raise questions about U.S. compliance with the BWC. In

2020, the Russian Federation again questioned the activities of the Lugar Center for Public

Health Research in Tbilisi, Georgia, and alleged that the U.S. Army Medical Research

Directorate-Georgia (USAMRD-G), located at the Lugar Center “carries out double purpose

research activities in the field of highly dangerous infectious diseases.”

These Russian accusations are groundless. USAMRD-G has a small contingent of researchers

working at the Lugar Center on health security at the request of the Government of Georgia. At

the Center, USAMRD-G conducts epidemiologic disease surveillance and sample collection,

basic science, translational research, and product development, including vaccine development.

These activities are legitimate medical research and do not violate the BWC.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of

Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)

The United States has provided a full and complete declaration of its chemical weapons (CW)

and associated CW facilities, and continues to work toward completing the destruction of CW

and associated CW facilities, in accordance with its CWC obligations. The CWC Conference of

the States Parties (CSP) decision regarding the “Final Extended Deadlines of 29 April, 2012”

requires the United States to report at each regular session of the Organization for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council (EC) on the progress achieved towards

complete destruction of remaining stockpiles. The United States provides a report and briefing

to each regular session of the EC and to the CSP annually on U.S. progress achieved towards

complete destruction.

The original deadline of 2012 could not be met because changes based on public safety and

environmental concerns in U.S. law required further research and development into alternative

chemical weapons destruction methods, other than transport and incineration.

The United States has completed destruction of its Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons and has

completed destruction of more than 95.74 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile.

There are two CW destruction facilities, one located in Pueblo, Colorado, and one in Blue Grass,

Kentucky, that are scheduled to complete destruction of the remaining stockpile not later than

December 31, 2023. Neutralization is used as the primary destruction technology at both sites.

Additionally, explosive destruction technologies are used to enhance safety, while accelerating

destruction schedules at both sites.

The United States continues to work very closely with the OPCW during the COVID-19

pandemic to ensure that both destruction sites remain in operation and have continuous on-site

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inspector presence able to conduct verification activities while addressing the need to take

measures to ensure the health and safety of inspectors and personnel at the sites.

The United States remains fully committed to complete destruction of its entire stockpile,

consistent with the Convention’s imperatives of public safety, environmental protection, and

international transparency and oversight.

The United States also is compliant with its CWC obligations related to commercial activities.

U.S. CWC Regulations (15 CFR § 710 et seq.) require commercial facilities exceeding CWC-

specified activity thresholds to submit annual declarations, notifications, and other reports,

including on past and anticipated activities, and to permit systematic and routine verification

through on-site inspections of declared commercial facilities.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful

Purposes Treaty (PNET), and Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban

Treaty (TTBT), was signed in 1974, with a Protocol signed in 1990. It establishes a nuclear

“threshold” by prohibiting each Party from undertaking underground nuclear weapon tests

having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and it

provides for notification and verification of testing activities. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Treaty (PNET) governs underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes at any place under

the jurisdiction or control of the Parties other than the test sites specified under the TTBT. The

Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) is a multilateral agreement that opened for signature and

entered into force in 1963. It prohibits nuclear weapon tests or any other nuclear explosion in the

atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

Under Section IV, paragraph 2, of the June 1990 Protocol to the TTBT, each party is required, by

not later than June 1 of each year, to inform the other of the number of underground nuclear

weapons tests by specified category that it intends to conduct in the following calendar year. For

purposes of the TTBT, an “underground nuclear weapon test” means either a single underground

nuclear explosion conducted at a test site, or two or more underground nuclear explosions

conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two kilometers,

conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 second, and whose combined yield is less than 150

kilotons. The TTBT Protocol defines the term “explosion” as “the release of nuclear energy

from an explosive canister.” The United States interprets “the release of nuclear energy from an

explosive canister” to mean the release of nuclear energy resulting from a physical breach of the

explosive canister.

The United States has not conducted any nuclear weapon explosive tests or any nuclear

explosions for peaceful purposes since 1992. All U.S. activities during the reporting period were

consistent with the obligations set forth in the TTBT, PNET, and LTBT.

1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or

Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

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All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the

1925 Geneva Protocol.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The United States continues to implement countermeasures vis-à-vis the Russian Federation,

specifically the cessation of implementation of certain CFE Treaty obligations (notifications,

data exchange, and inspections) in response to Russia’s continued violation of its obligations to

the United States under the CFE Treaty. These measures were closely coordinated with NATO

Allies, who also continued to implement similar steps in their respective national capacities.

Russia has not challenged this action. The United States continues to perform its obligations

under the CFE Treaty vis-à-vis all other States Party.

Treaty on Open Skies (OST)

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the

Treaty on Open Skies (OST), while the United States was a State Party.

On May 22, 2020, the United States notified the States Parties to the OST that the United States

had decided to withdraw from the treaty. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XV of the

Treaty, a State Party’s withdrawal takes effect six months after the date of notification. During

the six-month period between the provision of notice and the U.S. withdrawal taking effect, the

United States remained a Party to the OST, and complied with its provisions. On November 22,

2020, the United States’ withdrawal took effect, and the United States is therefore no longer a

State Party to the Treaty. Unless the United States decides to rejoin the treaty, future compliance

reports will not include material on the OST.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or

NPT)

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the

NPT.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for

the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty or

NST)

All U.S. activities during the reporting period were consistent with the obligations set forth in the

New START Treaty (NST).

-- 8 --

U.S. conversion procedures for B-52H heavy bombers and Trident II SLBM launchers fully

comply with Treaty provisions, and the United States has met its obligations under the Treaty to

remove these items from accountability.

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PART II: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS

CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND

COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR ISSUES

TREATY ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE NEW START TREATY OR NST)

For a discussion of Russia’s implementation of its obligations under the New START Treaty, see

the Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty submitted pursuant to Section (a)(10)

of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty Between the United

States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the “Condition (a)(10) Report”), and

appended to this Report.

Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) will no longer be covered in this section of the

Compliance Report, unless a significant issue is newly identified.

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PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR INITIATIVES CONCERNING TACTICAL NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

This chapter reports on a unilateral arms control commitment by the Russian Federation

(Russia).

In public speeches in 1991 and 1992, the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union

(and the Russian Federation or Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) pledged, as a

political commitment, to take separate but related steps regarding reductions in the number and

deployment of their tactical nuclear weapons.

These unilateral pledges are referred to as the

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs).

In a September 27, 1991, televised speech to the nation, President George H.W. Bush issued the

first set of unilateral PNI commitments, in which the United States pledged changes in both its

strategic and tactical nuclear forces. The U.S. tactical nuclear weapon-related pledges included

the following:

• Elimination of its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is,

theater nuclear weapons;

• Return to the United States and destruction of all nuclear artillery shells and short-range

ballistic missile (SRBM) warheads;

• Removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-

based naval aircraft;

and

• Destruction of many of these land- and sea-based warheads and securing remaining ones

in central areas.

President Bush indicated the United States would implement these measures regardless of the

Soviet reaction, but he invited Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to take similar steps to “go

down this road with us.”

In an October 5, 1991, televised address, President Gorbachev offered “reciprocal steps.” In

regard to tactical nuclear warheads, he pledged that the Soviet Union would do the following:

• Eliminate all nuclear mines, nuclear artillery munitions, and nuclear warheads for tactical

missiles;

The United States no longer uses the term “tactical nuclear weapon” preferring the term “non-strategic nuclear

weapon” because we do not envision any use of nuclear weapons to be tactical in character or effect. We note that

all nuclear weapons can have strategic implications. The use of any nuclear weapon would fundamentally alter the

nature of a conflict.

President George H.W. Bush further explained that “The bottom line is that under normal circumstances our ships

will not carry tactical nuclear weapons.”

-- 11 --

• Withdraw nuclear warheads for air defense missiles from the troops and concentrate them

in central bases as well as eliminate a portion of them; and

• Remove all tactical nuclear warheads from surface ships and general-purpose submarines

and store the weapons, as well as those associated with land-based naval aviation, in

central storage sites. A portion of the weapons would be eliminated.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin confirmed that Russia

accepted responsibility for carrying out the PNI pledges. In a January 29, 1992, televised

speech, President Yeltsin responded to President George H.W. Bush’s second PNI

pronouncement

by further pledging to do the following with regard to tactical nuclear warheads:

• Cease production of nuclear warheads for land-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery

shells, and nuclear mines and eliminate the stockpile of these weapons;

• Eliminate one third of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons;

• Eliminate one half of nuclear warheads for air defense missiles; and

• Eliminate half of all air-launched tactical nuclear munitions.

In an October 6, 1991, meeting with U.S. officials, then-Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister

Obukhov said that, since weapons subject to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty had been eliminated, and since under the October 6 (sic) Gorbachev initiative Soviet

tactical nuclear warheads would be eliminated, there would remain no nuclear warheads for

surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) below intercontinental range (i.e., 5,500 kilometers) once the

relevant actions in Gorbachev’s speech were completed. He also confirmed that after completion

of the steps outlined in the Gorbachev initiative, there would be no nuclear weapons aboard

Russian ships other than submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Because presidential speeches are the primary source of the PNI pledges, the terms used to

describe the types of weapons included or the actions of eliminating/withdrawing tactical nuclear

warheads from operational units to central storage were never precisely defined. Little has been

done to clarify further the terms used to describe the types of weapons included or the actions

taken with respect to withdrawing tactical nuclear warheads from operational units to central

storage or destroying the warheads. Since the time the pledges were made, both the United

States and Russia have begun using the term “non-strategic nuclear weapons” (NSNW).

The Department of State has previously raised questions publicly about Russia’s fulfillment of

its PNI pledges. In 2004 and 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker made clear

U.S. concerns about Russia falling short in its implementation of its PNIs. On April 12, 2006,

then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker said publicly: “The United States has

fully implemented its undertakings under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. I am not aware of

President Bush made this second PNI during his 1992 State of the Union address. This PNI only addressed U.S.

strategic forces.

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anyone in the Russian government or elsewhere who questions whether the United States has

done so. We believe that Russia has not completely fulfilled the Russian side of the Presidential

Nuclear Initiatives.” The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review stated that Russia is either rejecting

or avoiding its obligations or commitments under several instruments, including the PNIs. In the

2020 Compliance Report, the Department of State publicly detailed inconsistences between

Russia’s PNI commitments and its actions.

FINDING

The United States assesses that Russia is not adhering to all of its PNI commitments. Although

Russia has consolidated its NSNW into “centralized” storage at fewer nuclear weapons storage

sites, Russia’s efforts to retain NSNW for its ground forces are inconsistent with its PNI pledge

to eliminate nuclear warheads for land-based tactical missiles. In a May 22, 2020, interview,

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov claimed “Russia’s presidential initiatives have been

fulfilled completely.” Despite this assertion, a 2014 statement by a Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (MFA) official that PNIs “are still carried out by Russia,” and other carefully worded

statements by Russia that the PNIs are still “relevant” to Russia, the United States assesses,

based on Russian activities, that Russia is not fully adhering to its PNI pledge to eliminate all

nuclear warheads for its ground-based tactical missiles.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Russia has provided little information substantiating the full implementation of its PNI pledges.

General-Lieutenant Buzhinskiy of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) International Affairs

Directorate told the United States in 2005 that Russia was revisiting some of its pledges on

NSNW and that he “could not say that Russia…would implement all of its PNI pledges.” This

was a change in tone from statements before 2003, in which Russian officials still held out the

possibility that all PNI initiatives – including elimination of nuclear warheads for Ground Forces

– would be implemented. In 2007, Russian Colonel-General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, then the

chief of the MOD’s 12th Main Directorate (GUMO) – the Defense Ministry organization

responsible for maintaining and securing Russia’s nuclear weapons stockpile – claimed that

Russia had met its PNI commitments where “Russia particularly committed itself to removing

tactical nuclear weapons from the ground forces completely. Those weapons were also cut by 50

percent in the Air Force, by 60 percent in missile defense troops and by 30 percent on nuclear

submarines of the Russian Navy.”

Russia currently has an active stockpile of NSNW. Russia’s NSNW arsenal includes warheads

for SS-21/Tochka-U/9K79-1 close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) system and nuclear-capable

version of the SS-26/Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system and the SSC-

7/9M728 short-range cruise missile.

Russian officials have made a series of public statements that say either explicitly or implicitly

that Russia’s ground forces are equipped with nuclear warheads, and in particular that the SS-26

SRBM is nuclear-capable. Addressing the press after an April 29, 1999, Security Council

meeting, then-Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Putin reportedly said that President

Yeltsin had signed a decree on a new concept for the development and use of NSNW; Russian

-- 13 --

press reports following the meeting said that the Security Council approved a nuclear capability

for the SS-26. In May 2000, Colonel-General Yuri Bukreyev, then Chief of Staff of the Ground

Forces Directorate, describing the current and future state of affairs of the Ground Forces in

Armeyskiy Sbornik, declared that the most important requirements for the Ground Forces

included the ability to carry out combat missions with the use of both nuclear and conventional

weapons, indicating Russia had retained nuclear warheads for its SS-21 CRBM system. Colonel-

General Vladimir Nikolayevich Zaritskiy, Chief of the Armed Forces Rocket Troops and

Artillery, told the Russian press in November 2003 that his troops continued to train in the use of

NSNW in order to remain at “permanent readiness” to carry out nuclear strikes. In 2008, his

successor noted to the press that the “missile forces and artillery solve the tasks of … nuclear

destruction of the enemy in operations and combat operations.” According to a report by the

Russian news agency Interfax, General Nikolai Makarov, the chief of Russia’s General Staff,

publicly stated in late 2008 that Russia regarded tactical nuclear weapons as “a restraining factor

for the huge numbers of [conventional] weapons located in [NATO] European countries. And

General Verkhovtsev (see above) stated publicly in late 2007 that Russia “has a difficult southern

sector, it has nuclear powers on its borders, and therefore tactical nuclear weapons represent for

the Russian Federation a deterrence factor against aggressive influences hostile to it.”

According to a 2011 review of the accomplishments of a senior Russian nuclear weapons

scientist at the Russian nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov, Russia created a nuclear warhead

for the Iskander missile. In November 2018, the Russian military’s TV channel, TVZvesda,

reported both the Iskander SRBM (the SS-26) and the SSC-7 cruise missile can carry up to a 50

kiloton nuclear warhead. In November 2019, the Russian MoD noted that the Iskander complex

can carry a nuclear warhead in a website announcement that a missile brigade unit in western

Russia was receiving Iskander equipment to replace its SS-21s. The Russian MoD noted that the

Iskander can be equipped with a nuclear warhead in its announcement on its website.

Iskander missile equipment began to enter the Ground Force inventory in 2010-2011, replacing

the SS-21 CRBM system in the missile brigades. Each Iskander Transporter-Erector-Launcher

(TEL) can carry two missiles, as compared to the SS-21 TEL, which carries one. In November

2019, the Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleg Salyukov, said rearmament with the

Iskander complex was completed. Based on publicly released data, the United States estimates

that by the beginning of 2020 Russia had deployed enough Iskander launchers to launch 288

nuclear-capable SS-26 or SSC-7 missiles (that is, 144 launchers with two missiles apiece at 12

brigades).

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

The PNIs, which were announced in Presidential speeches in 1991 and 1992, are non-legally-

binding unilateral political commitments. There are no specific verification measures associated

with these political commitments. As a result, monitoring and assessment of Russia’s adherence

to its PNI pledges relies primarily upon information obtained unilaterally.

-- 14 --

In response to the 2020 Compliance Report, Russia’s Foreign Ministry published on July 8,

2020, seven paragraphs of commentary, none of which addressed whether Russia adheres to the

PNIs. However, in a May 22, 2020, interview, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov

claimed “Russia’s presidential initiatives have been fulfilled completely. The number of

nonstrategic nuclear warheads has been reduced by three-fourths and all weapons of this nature

have been moved to Russian national territory.”

Based on the information reported above, Russia’s efforts to retain and to produce new nuclear

warheads for its Ground Forces are inconsistent with its PNI pledge to cease production of

nuclear warheads for land-based tactical missiles, and nuclear mines, and to eliminate its

stockpile of these weapons.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States will continue to raise in bilateral settings and publicly its concerns with

Russia’s failure to eliminate all nuclear warheads for its ground-based tactical missiles.

-- 15 --

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

This chapter of the Report covers developments relevant to other nations’ compliance with the

1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or

NPT), including their compliance with related obligations under Comprehensive Safeguards

Agreements (CSAs) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

This chapter also

addresses, where relevant, the status of countries’ efforts to conclude and implement a modified

Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA and their efforts to conclude and implement an

Additional Protocol (AP) to their CSA.

The chapter focuses on developments in Burma, Iran,

North Korea, and Syria.

As of the end of 2020, there were nine non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) Party to the NPT

that had not yet brought into force a CSA with the IAEA.

Although the CSA was designed to

meet the requirements of the NPT, the AP in combination with the CSA is now widely

considered to be the global standard for nuclear safeguards. The AP contains measures that

increase the IAEA’s ability to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and to

provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State, and

thereby to provide assurances that the State has met its NPT obligation to place all nuclear

material in peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. The United States supports universal adoption

of the AP by States Party to the NPT and believes that AP adherence is essential to ensuring the

effectiveness and credibility of IAEA safeguards. As of the end of 2020, 136 States Party had an

AP that had entered into force, and Iran was provisionally applying its AP pending its entry into

force. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the

IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America (U.S. AP) entered into

force for the United States on January 6, 2009.

Article III of the NPT requires each NPT non-nuclear weapon State (NNWS) to accept safeguards “for the

exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under [the] Treaty with a view to

preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Concluding and implementing a CSA with the IAEA fulfills this obligation. In the case of a State with very limited

quantities of nuclear material, the State also may enter into a Small Quantities Protocol to the CSA that reduces the

safeguards implementation burden for such States.

The Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency

for the Application of Safeguards (AP) was developed in 1997 to provide the IAEA with broader access to

information and locations, and thereby to increase the IAEA’s ability to provide assurance of the absence of

undeclared nuclear material and activities in States Party. With a supermajority of NPT States Party now

implementing APs, in practice the combination of a CSA together with an AP has become the international standard

for IAEA verification.

The NPT States Party without a CSA in force as of December 31, 2020, are as follows: Cape Verde, Equatorial

Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Micronesia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and Timor-Leste. In 2015,

the Palestinians deposited an instrument of accession to the NPT. The United States does not believe the “State of

Palestine” qualifies as a sovereign State and does not recognize it as such. Accession to the NPT is limited to

sovereign States; therefore, the United States believes that the “State of Palestine” is not qualified to accede to the

NPT and does not consider itself to be in a treaty relationship with the “State of Palestine” under the NPT.

-- 16 --

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

MYANMAR (BURMA)

FINDING

The available evidence does not support a conclusion that Myanmar (Burma) violated the NPT;

however, the United States remains concerned about Burma’s lack of transparency regarding

past nuclear work, as much of this knowledge remains within the military and is not reported to

the civilian government. Burma’s signing of an AP in 2013 and its announcement that it would

adhere to the modified SQP contributed significantly to U.S. confidence in the civilian

leadership’s peaceful intentions regarding its nascent nuclear program. However, more than five

years have passed and neither the AP nor the modified SQP have entered into force. It was the

view of the United States at the end of 2020 that efforts to bring them into force and implement

them would require cooperation between the civilian and military elements of the Burmese

government. Notwithstanding the political situation in Burma, the United States urges the

Burmese government to complete the work necessary to bring the AP and modified SQP into

force. Burma’s implementation of the AP and a modified SQP will improve confidence

regarding an assessment of Burma’s NPT compliance. At the same time, the United States urges

the full restoration of the democratically-elected civilian government, which has been a key

partner in progress to date.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Burma became a State Party to the NPT in 1992, its CSA with the IAEA entered into force in

1995, and it signed an AP with the IAEA in 2013. Entry into force (EIF) of the AP will occur

when Burma notifies the IAEA that its domestic statutory requirements have been met, after

which Burma will have 180 days to submit its initial declaration to the IAEA. As a country with

little to no nuclear material, Burma concluded an SQP to its CSA in 1995, which holds in

abeyance key provisions in the CSA as long as Burma does not possess quantities of nuclear

material that exceed a defined threshold or maintain nuclear material “in a facility as defined in”

its CSA.

In 2005, the IAEA approved an update of the Model SQP. Burma has not yet modified

its SQP to conform to the update, but in 2012, then-President Thein Sein announced Burma’s

intention to do so.

Burma publicly announced its intention to acquire a nuclear research reactor for peaceful

purposes as early as 2002, and in 2007 it signed an agreement with Russia for assistance building

a nuclear research center, including a light-water research reactor. In 2010, an analysis

commissioned by a dissident group alleged that Burma was seeking nuclear technology,

concluding that “[t]his technology is only for nuclear weapons and not for civilian use or nuclear

power.” The Burmese government at the time dismissed the claims as “groundless allegations.”

Burma reported in 2010 that it had suspended its reactor plan with Russia “due to inadequacy of

resources and the government’s concern for misunderstanding it may cause.” Russia and Burma

did sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear

energy on June 18, 2015, and the two countries reportedly established a working body for

nuclear technology cooperation under the MOU in October 2016. The Burmese government had

-- 17 --

described the MOU as addressing cooperation on research and development of nuclear energy

for peaceful purposes, as well as nuclear safety, assessments of the environmental impact of

nuclear energy, and nuclear medical technology. No significant nuclear projects between the

two countries have yet moved forward as a result of this MOU.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Under NPT Article II, each NNWS Party undertakes, among other things, “not to manufacture or

otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” In NPT Article III, each

NNWS Party “undertakes to accept safeguards … for the exclusive purpose of verification of the

fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of

nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This

obligation requires conclusion and implementation of a CSA with the IAEA.

When Burma’s AP enters into force, it will be obligated to, among other things, provide the

IAEA with a declaration that includes information on any nuclear facilities and additional

nuclear-related activities. Burma will also be required to provide the IAEA with expanded

inspection access, including to additional parts of its nuclear research program. The AP will also

enable the IAEA to collect samples and information to verify compliance. When Burma

modifies its SQP to conform to the 2005 update, this will, among other things, require it to

declare all nuclear material. Additionally, Burma will be required to provide early design

information for any planned nuclear facilities and corresponding inspection access, obligations

which are currently held in abeyance under the existing SQP.

Although the United States continues to be concerned about Burma’s willingness to be

transparent about its previous nuclear work given that much of this knowledge remains within

the military, which was not under the civilian government’s control, the United States had no

evidence of ongoing activities under Burma’s civilian government that raised compliance

concerns. Burma’s declarations of nuclear-related activities and locations under an AP, its initial

declaration of nuclear material under a modified SQP, and its responsiveness to IAEA questions

following EIF and implementation of an AP and modified SQP will be key to assessing activities

that have raised concerns in the past regarding its military’s nuclear intentions and activities.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States has held a series of workshops for Burmese stakeholders, which included a

complementary access exercise to increase awareness of the AP and the modified SQP, and to

help prepare for their future implementation. A workshop was held in August 2018, at which

experts from the IAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy consulted with representatives from

Burma’s Attorney General’s office and legislative committees in parliament. In 2020, the United

States continued to emphasize the importance of ensuring the cooperation of all relevant

agencies to provide complete reporting to the IAEA, address all IAEA outstanding questions and

-- 18 --

concerns regarding Burma’s nuclear activities, and to bring the AP into force and update the

SQP. The United States worked with partners, particularly with Japan and Australia, to

encourage Burma’s civilian government to bring the AP into force and to update the SQP. Such

efforts going forward must be assessed in the context of engagement with the military regime.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

FINDING

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) was in violation of its

obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and its CSA with the IAEA at the time it

announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, and it remains accountable for these violations.

North Korea’s continuing nuclear activities make clear that it also has not adhered to its

commitments in the 2018 Singapore Summit Joint Statement to work towards the complete

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks

to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return at an early date to

the NPT and IAEA safeguards. As discussed in prior Reports, North Korea failed to adhere to its

commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea is in violation of its IAEA

safeguards obligations.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

North Korea acceded to the NPT in December 1985, and its CSA with the IAEA entered into

force in 1992.

Previous editions of this Report have described in detail violations by North Korea of its

obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and its CSA before it announced its withdrawal

from the NPT in 2003.

As further discussed in prior Reports, North Korea also failed to adhere

to its commitments to the United States under the 1994 Agreed Framework by developing a

clandestine uranium enrichment program and by breaking its previous freeze on its plutonium

production facilities.

Irrespective of one’s interpretation of whether or not North Korea’s 2003 notice of withdrawal

from the NPT became legally effective, the DPRK remains subject to IAEA safeguards

obligations. If that withdrawal did become effective, North Korea’s 1992 CSA would have

terminated and its prior 1977 safeguards agreement with the IAEA would have resumed

applicability. Alternatively, if the DPRK’s withdrawal did not become effective in 2003, North

Korea’s 1992 CSA would still be in force today. In either case, therefore, North Korea is

presently in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations, since the IAEA has not conducted

routine monitoring activities at any of the facilities covered by either agreement.

Production Facilities

In a September 2020 report, the IAEA assessed, based on indicators and its analysis, that it is

almost certain the 5MW(e) reactor has remained shut down since early December 2018.

-- 19 --

The IAEA also reported that, as of September 2020, activity observed at Yongbyon

Radiochemical Laboratory, indicates that a physical presence has been maintained there.

In August 2020, the IAEA noted there were activities consistent with production of enriched

uranium at the reported centrifuge facility located with the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod

Fabrication Facility. In 2017, the IAEA Director General Amano said that North Korea’s

uranium enrichment facility had doubled in size, noting that the situation had “gone into a new

phase.” In August 2019, the IAEA noted that it had observed no further construction or

renovation work since 2017.

North Korea is also constructing an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) at Yongbyon,

which North Korea revealed publicly in 2010. As previously reported, during late September

and early October of 2018, the IAEA reported it observed activities consistent with the transfer

of major reactor components into the reactor containment building. No additional transfers of

such components have been observed since then. Based on observations of activity near the

ELWR, including deliveries of materials and the presence of construction vehicles, it is likely

that internal construction work has continued during the current reporting period. The IAEA has

not observed any indications of reactor operation, although there was an indication of a test of

the infrastructure for cooling water during April 2020, similar to that which was observed in

March 2019.

If successfully completed and operated, the ELWR could provide North Korea with a relatively

small source of electricity. It may be intended to provide North Korea with a civilian

justification to possess uranium enrichment technology that could be used to produce fissile

material for nuclear weapons.

In August of 2020, the IAEA reported that there were indications of ongoing mining, milling and

concentration activities at locations previously declared as the Pyongsan uranium mine and

Pyongsan uranium concentration plant.

The United States believes there is a possibility of additional unidentified nuclear facilities in

North Korea.

Testing

North Korea has not

conducted a nuclear test since its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017,

which it claimed was of a “two-stage thermo-nuclear weapon.” On January 1, 2018, Kim Jong

Un announced that during 2017 North Korea had accomplished the goal of “perfecting the

national nuclear forces.”

Kim Jong Un announced on April 20, 2018, that North Korea would discontinue all nuclear and

ICBM tests and dismantle the P’unggye Nuclear Test Site. North Korea announced on May 25,

2018, that the P’unggye Nuclear Test Site had been “completely dismantled.” In a separate

statement, the Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK noted that “dismantling the nuclear test

ground was done in such a way as to make all the tunnels of the test ground collapse by

-- 20 --

explosion and completely close the tunnel entrances.” Foreign journalists were invited to

witness the “dismantlement” during a ceremony on May 24; however, international inspectors

were not invited to verify the process, so the United States is unable to confirm the extent to

which the site has been dismantled. Although Kim Jong Un committed to allow a visit by U.S.

experts to the P’unggye Nuclear Test Site, this visit has yet to occur.

The results of dismantlement activities at P’unggye Nuclear Test Site on May 24, 2018, are

almost certainly reversible.

It is also possible that North Korea could develop another nuclear test site, if it chose to do so.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea committed to abandoning all

nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to returning at an early date to the NPT and

IAEA safeguards. North Korea signed a Joint Statement at the June 2018 Singapore summit in

which, among other things, it committed “to work toward complete denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.” Since then, North Korea has not conducted additional nuclear tests and

announced that the P’unggye Nuclear Test Site had been completely dismantled. At the end of

December 2019, Kim Jong Un said that the DPRK no longer felt bound by its self-imposed

moratorium on testing nuclear weapons.

North Korea was in violation of its obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT and its CSA

before it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Throughout 2020, the United States

continued to have significant concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its

continued production of fissile material.

North Korea’s failure to permit qualified international inspectors to observe and verify the

dismantlement calls into question whether North Korea will forego further nuclear explosive

tests.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

Following intensive diplomatic engagement and a thaw in relations between North and South

Korea, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un held a summit in Singapore on June 12,

2018, and signed a joint statement in which Chairman Kim committed to work toward complete

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Since the summit, the United States has continued to

engage with North Korea to work toward implementation of the commitments made in

Singapore. On September 19, 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un

signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, in which North Korea expressed its willingness to take

additional steps, including the permanent dismantlement of its Yongbyon nuclear facility if the

United States “takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.-

DPRK Joint Statement.” North Korea also committed in the Joint Declaration to “permanently

-- 21 --

dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of

experts from relevant countries.”

President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un met a second time in Hanoi, Vietnam, February

27-28, 2019. While no deal was reached, detailed positions were exchanged. The United States

communicated to its DPRK counterparts that the United States was prepared to pursue –

simultaneously and in parallel – all of the commitments made in the Singapore Joint Statement,

including transforming relations, building a lasting and stable peace, and achieving the complete

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States was also prepared to explore how

to mobilize investment, improve infrastructure, enhance food security, and more, provided the

DPRK fulfills its denuclearization commitments.

President Trump and Kim Jong Un briefly met a third time on June 30, 2019, at the

Demilitarized Zone, but no detailed discussions on nuclear issues occurred.

On October 5, 2019, the United States and the DPRK held working-level talks between Special

Representative Biegun and his DPRK counterpart Kim Myong Gil in Stockholm, Sweden.

While no arrangements were reached, the two sides exchanged views on the denuclearization of

the Korean Peninsula.

On January 1, 2020, Kim Jong Un, stated when referring to the DPRK “halting its nuclear test

and ICBM test-fire and shutting down the nuclear-test ground,” that “there is no ground for us to

get unilaterally bound to the commitment any longer.”

During the reporting period, in a variety of multilateral fora, including the UN General

Assembly, the UN Security Council, the Asia-Europe Meeting, the East Asia Summit, the IAEA

General Conference, countries from every region of the world recognized the unacceptable threat

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses to international peace and security. The United

States remains ready to engage North Korea in a constructive negotiation; however, until the

final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea is achieved, UN and U.S. sanctions will

remain in place. The United States continues to work with a broad range of partners and the

international community on the need for continued pressure on North Korea – and the need for

continued vigilance against its proliferation activities worldwide – in order to impede its ability

to sustain and advance its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to incentivize

North Korea to engage in sustained and intensive negotiations with the United States to

ultimately achieve complete denuclearization The United States has also taken enforcement

action, including U.S. Treasury sanctions designations, against those involved in UN and U.S.

sanctions evasion.

The United States remains engaged with the IAEA and welcomes the IAEA’s efforts to enhance

readiness to resume monitoring and verification activities in North Korea at the appropriate time.

The United States continues to closely monitor North Korea’s nuclear activities. The

denuclearization of North Korea remains the overriding U.S. objective, and the United States

remains committed to continued diplomatic negotiations with North Korea toward that goal. The

-- 22 --

United States remains engaged with the IAEA and welcomes the IAEA’s efforts to enhance

readiness to resume monitoring and verification activities in North Korea at the appropriate time.

ISLAMIC REBUPLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)

FINDING

NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

During the 2020 reporting period, the IAEA Director General (DG) issued several reports on Iran

that make clear that serious, outstanding concerns remain regarding possible undeclared nuclear

material and activities in Iran today. In November 2019, the Acting IAEA DG first reported the

IAEA’s detection of chemically processed uranium particles at an undeclared location in Iran

and noted that this indicates the possibility of undeclared nuclear material in Iran. At the time,

the Acting DG stressed that “time is of the essence” for Iran to provide full cooperation. Despite

exchanges between the Agency and Iran, the DG reports that as of November 2020 Iran had not

provided technically credible or satisfactory answers to the IAEA’s questions. As of the end of

the reporting period, the matter remained unresolved.

In addition, the IAEA reported during 2020 that multiple other investigations into possible

undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran were open and ongoing. In particular, in March

and June 2020, the IAEA DG reported that Iran had failed to provide the IAEA with required

access to two specified locations not declared by Iran, with respect to which the Agency had

questions about possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities, and had not

responded substantively to the IAEA’s requests for clarification regarding possible undeclared

nuclear material or activities at those locations and a third, unspecified location. Iran

subsequently provided the required access to the two specified locations in August and

September 2020. The United States has made clear that providing required access is only the

first step toward resolving the IAEA’s concerns and questions, and that Iran must provide the

IAEA with any requested clarifications as required by its safeguards obligations without delay.

Based on IAEA reporting on the implementation of Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement

(CSA) and the Additional Protocol (AP), the United States has concluded that serious concerns

remained regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran as of the end the

reporting period. For example, the IAEA continues to investigate the possible presence of

undeclared uranium metal in Iran in the 2003 timeframe and its possible location today. The

potential presence of undeclared uranium metal in Iran would be of significant proliferation

concern given its relevance to nuclear weapons research and development. The IAEA’s ongoing

safeguards investigations and Iran’s failure for much of the reporting period to provide the

necessary cooperation with the IAEA in connection with them raise concern with regard to Iran’s

compliance with its obligation to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT

Any intentional failure by Iran to declare nuclear material would constitute a clear violation of

Iran’s NPT-mandated CSA, and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT itself. As

of November 2020, the IAEA DG continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under its AP and to

-- 23 --

seek an explanation from Iran regarding the presence of chemically processed uranium particles

at a location in Iran not declared to the Agency

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its uranium enrichment activities and

stocks of enriched uranium, key factors in the amount of time the United States assesses would

be required to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon or device, should Iran decide

to pursue nuclear weapons.

Iran’s efforts to retain files, documents, and personnel related to its pre-2004 nuclear weapons

program – as revealed in the Iranian nuclear archive acquired by Israel in 2018 – suggest that

Iran may have maintained this information at least in part to preserve technical expertise relevant

to a nuclear weapons capability, and potentially to aid in any future effort to pursue nuclear

weapons again, if a decision were made to do so. If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise

acquire a nuclear weapon, such actions would violate its obligations under Article II of the NPT.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE/ADHERENCE CONCERNS

History of Past NPT Violations

Iran became a State Party to the NPT in 1970, and its CSA entered into force in 1974. Iran

signed but did not ratify an AP to its CSA in 2003 and voluntarily implemented AP measures

from late 2003 to early 2006, when it stopped such implementation. Since January 2016, Iran

has been provisionally applying its AP pending its entry into force, as it committed to do under

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran’s compliance with the NPT was first

addressed in the 1992 Compliance Report. The United States found Iran in noncompliance with

its CSA, as well as with Articles II and III of the NPT, in the 2005 Report.

Activities in connection with Iran’s past violations of its obligations under Articles II and III of

the NPT and its CSA began in the early 1980s. In 2002, an Iranian opposition group publicly

revealed covert nuclear facilities under construction at Natanz and Arak that Iran had failed to

declare to the IAEA. Reports from the resulting IAEA investigation led the IAEA Board of

Governors (BOG) to declare Iran in noncompliance with its CSA in 2005 and to report the case

to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006. In 2009, the United States, the UK, and

France announced that Iran had been constructing a secret, second uranium-enrichment facility,

Fordow, in the mountains near the holy city of Qom. Iran informed the IAEA about the

existence of the facility at that time, but only after learning that it had been discovered by the

United States. From 2006 to 2011, the Security Council adopted multiple resolutions on Iran,

five of which imposed binding obligations and sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

(UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929).

From 2006-2013, as detailed in previous Compliance Reports as well as multiple IAEA reports,

Iran continued to perform uranium enrichment-related and heavy-water-related activities in

contravention of both UNSC and IAEA BOG resolutions, including: research and development

work on advanced centrifuges; enrichment of uranium up to nearly 20 percent at both the Natanz

Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; construction of parts

of the IR-40 heavy water-moderated research reactor at Arak, which was suited to weapons

-- 24 --

grade plutonium production; and operation of its heavy water production plant at Arak. During

this timeframe, Iran did not fully cooperate with the IAEA with regard to its declared facilities.

In particular, as noted in previous versions of this report, Iran did not provide design information

or report design changes in advance of any action taken to modify existing facilities or construct

new ones, as required by modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran’s CSA.

From 2008 through 2014, the IAEA reported ongoing concerns about the possible existence in

Iran of undeclared nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations. The Annex

to the November 2011 report of the IAEA DG detailed the basis for concerns regarding what the

IAEA then called the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. The report

stated that, according to credible reports from multiple sources, Iran had a structured military

program through 2003, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a

missile, and that some nuclear weapon-related activities may have continued after 2003. Despite

these revelations, Iran continued to refuse to acknowledge or provide certain information about

the military dimensions of its past nuclear activities. On December 2, 2015, the IAEA issued its

Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program. The

report noted areas where the IAEA did not receive sufficient information from Iran in response

to its inquiries, or where other information available to the IAEA did not support Iran’s

statements. This final PMD report found that the coordinated nuclear weapons program was

discontinued in 2003, although certain weapons-applicable work related to computer modeling

and explosive detonation remained ongoing in Iran until 2009.

In December 2015, following receipt of the IAEA DG’s Final Assessment, the IAEA Board of

Governors adopted a resolution that noted the DG’s Final Assessment and stated its decision to

close consideration of the PMD agenda item and terminate previous BOG resolutions following

Iran’s verified completion of certain nuclear-related actions specified in the JCPOA. With this

resolution the BOG turned its focus to a new agenda item covering verification and monitoring

of the JCPOA in Iran. The United States made clear at that time and since that the closing of the

PMD agenda item does not preclude the IAEA from investigating any new indications that Iran

may possess undeclared nuclear material or be pursuing undeclared nuclear activities. On

January 16, 2016, the JCPOA was implemented between Iran and the P5+1 (United States,

Russia, China, UK, France, and Germany), and the IAEA DG reported that it had verified that

Iran had completed the nuclear-related steps specified in the JCPOA, resulting in corresponding

actions being taken by the United States and EU to lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran

consistent with JCPOA commitments.

In May 2018, the United States announced its exit from the JCPOA and subsequently began the

re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran that had been lifted or waived under the deal.

Renewed Concerns in Recent Years

The disclosure in 2018 by Israel of Iranian records from the Amad Plan – Iran’s pre-2004

nuclear weapons program – raised additional questions about Iran’s concealment of critical

information about its past nuclear weapons activities from the IAEA. Iran’s retention of these

files and information and its assignment of key Amad Plan-era scientists and officials into a new

organizational structure affiliated with Iranian military entities, and under the leadership of the

-- 25 --

Amad Plan’s former head, suggest that Iran undertook these efforts at least in part to preserve

technical expertise relevant to a nuclear weapons capability, and potentially to aid in in any

future efforts to pursue nuclear weapons, if a decision were made to do so.

In September 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly announced at the UN General

Assembly that Iran had maintained a warehouse facility located in Tehran thought to contain

equipment and materials associated with Iran’s past nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu

claimed that the warehouse once contained 15 kilograms (kg) of nuclear material that had since

been removed.

On November 7, 2019, the IAEA BOG met in special session at the request of the Acting DG to

discuss two urgent issues regarding Iran’s implementation of its NPT-mandated safeguards

agreement. The first issue involved the IAEA’s detection of particles of chemically processed

uranium at an undeclared location in Iran. The second issue was Iran’s late October temporary

detention of an IAEA inspector. The Acting IAEA DG determined the issues were sufficiently

important to be brought to the IAEA BOG in special session and said that he would keep the

Board informed on these matters.

The IAEA’s final quarterly report of 2019 notes that “the Agency has detected natural uranium

particles of anthropogenic origin at a location in Iran not declared to the IAEA. It is essential for

Iran to continue interactions with the Agency to resolve the matter as soon as possible.”

The IAEA has confirmed to Member States in closed briefings that the undeclared site

referenced in the Acting DG’s November 2019 report is the Turquzabad warehouse site publicly

highlighted by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in September 2018.

The summary of the November 21 IAEA Board meeting noted that several members “urged the

Secretariat to keep the Board informed of any developments regarding Iran’s cooperation with

the Agency.”

The IAEA continues to investigate the original source of the uranium particles detected at the

undeclared location in Iran. Iran has thus far failed to provide an explanation for the presence of

the detected uranium particles that is consistent with the IAEA’s technical analysis.

Iranian President Rouhani announced on May 8, 2019, one year following President Trump’s

announcement of the cessation of the United States’ participation in the JCPOA, that Iran would

begin reducing its performance of key nuclear commitments under the deal if Iranian demands

with regard to sanctions relief were not met. Iran then began exceeding key nuclear-related

restrictions in the JCPOA on a step-by-step basis, with an announcement of a new step

approximately every 60 days.

The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities, including

those that exceed JCPOA limits.

At the time, Iran most likely pursued this phased approach in an effort to generate negotiating

leverage with the United States and European participants in the JCPOA.

-- 26 --

In mid-June 2019, Iran publicly announced it would exceed the low enriched uranium stockpile

volume limit 300kg, on July 7, Iran announced its intent to enrich above the 3.67 percent level.

In early September 2019, Iran announced that its next step to scale back implementation of its

JCPOA commitments would involve lifting all limits on its development of more advanced

centrifuges for uranium enrichment. President Rouhani stated that “all of our commitments for

research and development under the JCPOA will be completely removed,” and announced new

advanced centrifuge research and development (R&D) activities, along with the production and

testing of new models of centrifuges for potentially greater efficiency.

On November 5, 2019, Iran announced that its fourth step to scale back implementation of the

JCPOA would involve injecting uranium gas into more than 1,000 centrifuges at its Fordow

enrichment facility to produce enriched uranium. The Fordow facility, revealed as a covert

enrichment facility in 2009, is a deeply buried underground facility near the Iranian city of Qom.

Iran stated that the Fordow facility was ready to produce 20 percent uranium enrichment with an

increased number of centrifuges.

In his November 2019 report to the Board of Governors, the Acting IAEA Director General

reported on additional activities and developments with respect to Iran’s uranium enrichment

activities. In October and November 2019, Iran had completed installation of additional IR-2,

IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges at the PFEP at Natanz, and intended to produce more

enriched uranium using these machines once these cascades were completed. Iran also informed

the IAEA that it was installing additional advanced centrifuges, including the IR-7, IR-8B, IR-9,

IR-s, and IR-6s at the PFEP, and that it was planning to test a new generation of centrifuges at a

new location. All of these activities exceeded the JCPOA limits, and the addition of these

centrifuges enhances Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity

Current Activities of Concern

Expanding Nuclear Program Beyond Accepted Restrictions:

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its proliferation-sensitive nuclear

activities. IAEA reporting in 2020 makes clear that Iran continues to significantly expand its

proliferation-sensitive uranium enrichment activities, and at the end of the year, it exceeded by

twelve-fold the JCPOA’s cap of 300 kg on the amount of LEU (UF

mass), which is equivalent

of 202.8 kg (uranium mass). Iran is accumulating LEU at the Natanz-based above ground Pilot

Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), also at Natanz,

and at the deeply buried Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom. From July 2019 to the end of

the reporting period, Iran enriched uranium up to 4.5% U-235. The IAEA reported that as of

November 2, 2020, Iran possessed a total stockpile of about 3,613.8 kg LEU ( UF

mass), all

enriched below 5 percent, or the equivalent of 2,442.9 kg uranium mass (plus 337.5 kg since the

September report).

On January 5, 2020, Iran announced it was “abandoning the last key point of operational

restrictions under the JCPOA, namely the limitations on the number of the centrifuges,” and that

its nuclear program “will move forward only according to its technical needs.” It is now in

nonperformance of many of the restrictions outlined by the JCPOA, which Tehran says it hopes

-- 27 --

will pressure the other nations involved to increase economic incentives to make up for the tough

sanctions imposed by Washington after the U.S. withdrawal. Iranian officials have stated that

their actions are reversible if the European JCPOA participants meet their economic demands

and the United States ends its sanctions; however, the experience Iran gains from advanced

centrifuge R&D work could lead, over time, to irreversible knowledge gains.

On January 20, 2020, the UK, France, and Germany triggered the JCPOA Dispute Resolution

Mechanism. At that time, Iran warned that it would withdraw from the NPT if its nuclear

program was referred to the UN Security Council.

On July 1, an explosion at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant destroyed the Iran Centrifuge

Assembly Center (ICAC), a recently completed aboveground workshop at Natanz designed for

large-scale assembly and quality control of advanced centrifuges. Atomic Energy Organization

of Iran (AEOI) Chief Salehi announced in September 2020 that Iran is building a new centrifuge

assembly plant / hall underground in the mountains in Natanz, stating that it will be “a more

modern, larger and more comprehensive hall in all dimensions.” Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing

is subject to continuous monitoring and verification, and the IAEA has noted that once the

facility is operational, it would have to be included in Iran’s AP declarations.

Public satellite imagery provided additional information on the new centrifuge assembly plant at

Natanz. Press reports noted that new tunnel entrances for underground construction are visible

under a ridge in the mountain foothills south of the Natanz FEP, about 140 miles south of

Tehran, and the underground construction is compatible with a facility about the same size as the

centrifuge assembly building that was destroyed and that Iran indicated it was rebuilding in the

mountains. A flurry of activity in Natanz also captured by satellites in recent months includes

the building of new roads and additional excavations, which started after the explosion in

July. According to public reporting, imagery analysts had previously identified the area and said

that additional tunnels are being constructed, suggesting work on an even larger underground

complex is underway.

According to the IAEA report in November, Iran continues to install, test, operate, and

accumulate enriched uranium from advanced model centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment

facility. Iran is testing 14 advanced centrifuge designs at the PFEP, six of which were introduced

to the PFEP for the first time within the last year. The centrifuges operating at the PFEP include:

IR-1, IR-2m, IR-3, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6m, Ir-6s, IR-6sm, IR-7, IR-8, IR-8s, IR-8B, IR-s, and

IR-9. Specifically the IAEA reported that five smaller cascades of up to nine IR-4 centrifuges,

eight IR-5 centrifuges, six IR-6 centrifuge and another cascade of 20 IR-6 centrifuges, 10 IR-6s

centrifuges are operational and accumulating enriched uranium at the pilot fuel enrichment plant.

Two larger cascades of 152 IR-4 centrifuges 110 IR-6 centrifuges are also operational and

accumulating enriched uranium at the PFEP. In addition, since March 2020, the IAEA reported

that there are 1, 057 IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow, many of which are enriching uranium,

inconsistent with Iran’s JCPOA commitments regarding this facility.

In recent months, the IAEA reported that Iran is moving centrifuges from an above-ground

facility to its underground facility at Natanz, and continues to increase the numbers of

centrifuges at Natanz. In November, the IAEA reported details of Iran’s decision to transfer

-- 28 --

cascades of centrifuges, comprising IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges, from the above-ground

pilot plant to the main enrichment hall underground at Natanz. Tehran informed the agency that

the decision to move the centrifuges was made “with the aim that eventually all of the

enrichment R&D activities will be concentrated in this area,” but it is possible that Iran was also

motivated to move the cascades after an apparent act of sabotage on its centrifuge assembly

facility in July caused significant damage to advanced machines at that location. The

underground enrichment hall at Natanz is presumably more protected from sabotage attacks.

The November 11 reports indicates that only the cascade of IR-2m centrifuges had been moved

to Natanz underground and that they were not yet enriching uranium. One week later, however,

in his November 18 remarks to the BOG, the IAEA DG updated his report to note that Iran had

begun feeding UF6 into the recently installed cascade of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the FEP in

Natanz. So far, the 174 IR-2m cascade is the first of three advanced cascades Iran plans to

transfer. This cascade joins 30 cascades of first-generation IR-1 centrifuges already producing

LEU at Natanz, the only enrichment capacity allowed for in the JCPOA for 10 years.

Iran’s expansion of uranium enrichment activities, including changes to centrifuge cascade

configuration at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant and installation of advanced, more efficient

centrifuges in underground facilities, allow Iran to enrich more uranium more quickly and to

higher levels.

These actions and activities move Iran closer to having the materials necessary to

produce a nuclear weapon in the event that there is a future decision to pursue one. In addition,

increases in numbers of centrifuges and low enriched uranium stockpiles beyond JCPOA limits

reduce the amount of time Iran would require for a breakout, in which Iran attempts to produce

weapons-grade uranium for a testable nuclear device using its declared nuclear facilities, should

Iran decide to do so.

Following the late November 2020 assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the architect of the

Amad Plan, the Iranian Parliament adopted a bill, approved by the Guardian Council on

December 2 and made law, which requires the Iranian government to further expand Iran’s

nuclear activities, likely at least in part as further leverage toward sanctions relief. The law

requires, among other things, that Tehran produce a minimum 120 kg of 20% enriched uranium

annually. The bill includes requirements for the AEOI to install “at least 1000” IR-2M

centrifuges within three months of the passage of the law. It also requires the Iranian

government to reduce its cooperation with the IAEA to only that required by its CSA, including

cessation of “the voluntary implementation” of provisions of its AP, if Iran’s banking relations in

Europe as well as the volume of oil purchases by Europe do not return to satisfactory conditions

within three months of the law’s enactment.

The new law prompted the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to issue a Joint

Statement in alarm, stating that Iran’s move to substantially increase uranium enrichment was

“deeply worrying” and limit IAEA monitoring access goes against the spirit of deal and would

be “incompatible with the JCPOA and Iran’s wider commitments.”

IAEA NPT Safeguards Reports – Questions Related to Iran’s CSA and AP

The IAEA continues to investigate the original source of chemically processed uranium particles

detected at the undeclared location in Iran, including whether it originated at a site not disclosed

-- 29 --

to the IAEA. Iran has thus far failed to provide a credible explanation for the presence of the

detected uranium particles that is consistent with the IAEA’s technical analysis. In March 2020,

the IAEA DG issued a standalone safeguard report to the Board – the first of its kind since 2015

to highlight his new concerns.

As previously reported, the IAEA visited the undeclared site in early 2019 and took

environmental samples which revealed chemically processed

uranium particles. Based on

subsequent information provided by Iran, the Agency took environmental samples at two

declared nuclear facilities in Iran. The Agency’s assessment of the analyses of these samples

was that some findings were not inconsistent with information provided by Iran, but there were a

number of other findings for which further clarifications and information needed to be provided

and questions needed to be answered by Iran.

These other findings included the presence, at the location in Iran not declared to the Agency, of

isotopically altered particles of low enriched uranium, with a detectable presence of U-236, and

of slightly depleted uranium.

The DG’s November 11, 2020 report indicates that these particles

had been identified as a result of the IAEA’s further analysis of the samples it took in February

2019 and which was conveyed to Iran for the first time in a letter dated September 2, 2020.

On October 21, 2020 Iran provided additional information and explanations. In relation to the

low enriched uranium particles, Iran said that “the evidence of such contamination is under

investigation.” The Agency considered Iran’s response to be unsatisfactory because it was not

technically credible and therefore, sought further clarifications and information from Iran, taking

note of the amount of time that had elapsed in addressing these issues. On November 5, Iran

provided some more information related to its explanations. Following an assessment of this

new information the Agency informed Iran on November 9 that it continues to consider Iran’s

response to be not technically credible.

At the November 2020 Board, the DG emphasized that the presence of the uranium particles of

anthropogenic origin, including isotopically altered particles, at the location not declared to the

Agency, “still needs to be fully and promptly explained by Iran to allay any possible concerns

about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.” The report further

notes that evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran

are ongoing.

The IAEA DG’s standalone safeguards report in March 2020, also highlighted questions relating

to possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran not related to the warehouse site.

In his March 9 address to the BOG, the DG stated that “[t]he Agency has identified a number of

questions related to possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three

locations that have not been declared by Iran.”

Based on the Agency’s technical analysis, including evaluation of all safeguards-relevant

information, the questions and requests for clarifications relate to the three locations indicated

below as follows:

(U) Since IAEA reports use chemically processed, anthropogenic, and man-modified or man-made as terms for

uranium particles, the Compliance Report uses these terms interchangeably.

-- 30 --

• The possible presence in Iran between 2002 and 2003, at a location later identified by the

Agency to Iran, of natural uranium in the form of a metal disc, with indications of its

undergoing drilling and hydriding, which may not have been included in Iran’s declarations;

the origin of this disc; and where such material is currently located. As previously reported

by the Agency, this location underwent extensive sanitization and levelling in 2003 and

2004. Consequently, the Agency has assessed that there would be no verification value in

conducting a complementary access at this location.

• The possible use or storage of nuclear material and/or conducting of nuclear-related

activities, including research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, at a

location in Iran specified by the Agency. This location may have been used for the

processing and conversion of uranium ore including fluorination in 2003. This location also

underwent significant changes in 2004, including the demolition of most buildings; and

• The possible use and storage of nuclear material at another location specified by the Agency

where outdoor, conventional explosive testing may have taken place in 2003, including in

relation to testing of shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors. From July 2019

onwards, the Agency observed activities consistent with efforts to sanitize part of the location

and/or repurpose it for use by another entity.

The DG had notified Iran in January, pursuant to Article 4.b (i) and Article 5.c of the AP, to

provide access to two specified locations in order to carry out location-specific environmental

sampling for the purpose of assisting the IAEA in assuring the absence of undeclared nuclear

material and activities and to resolve the questions identified in its previous letters. The IAEA

reported that on January 27, Iran informed the Agency verbally that it was unable to provide

access to either location. On January 28, 2020, Iran informed the Agency that it “will not

recognize any allegation on past activities and does not consider itself obliged to respond to such

allegations.”

Following up in his safeguards report in June 2020, the DG noted “with serious concern that, for

over four months, Iran has denied access to the Agency…to two locations and, for almost a year,

has not engaged in substantive discussions to clarify Agency questions related to possible

undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities in Iran.” In this report, he also noted

indications of recent or past sanitization at all three relevant locations, none of which had been

declared to the IAEA. In one case, the IAEA had observed activities consistent with sanitization

in the July 2019 time frame. The DG stated that the delays and the sanitization were “adversely

affecting the Agency’s ability to clarify and resolve the questions and thereby to provide credible

assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities” in Iran.

The DG’s June safeguards report, noting that these issues at that point remained unresolved,

prompted the Board to adopt a resolution on June 19 – tabled by France, Germany, and the

United Kingdom – echoing the serious concern noted in the June report and calling on Iran to

fully cooperate with the Agency and satisfy the Agency’s requests without any further delay,

-- 31 --

including by providing prompt access to the locations specified by the Agency. Significantly,

the Secretariat explained to Member States that such a prolonged refusal to provide required

access was unprecedented under the AP, an instrument that is specifically intended to help the

IAEA detect any indications of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

In September 2020, the DG also reported that in recent meetings in Tehran with Iranian President

Rouhani, Foreign Minister Zarif, and Vice President and head of the AOEI Salehi, which

resulted in a joint IAEA-Iran statement announcing that Iran agreed to provide the IAEA with

access to the two locations to which the Agency sought complementary access under Iran’s AP.

The IAEA confirmed that Iran granted the IAEA access to one location in August and the other

on September 30.

The IAEA Board welcomed the joint statement issued by Iran and DG Grossi following his

travel to Tehran. The U.S. statement at the BOG noted the recent agreement between Iran and

the IAEA but highlighted that this is just a first step and it took too long for Iran to agree to

provide the required access.

In his November 11, 2020 report, the IAEA DG notes that several issues related to Iran’s NPT

safeguards obligations remain unresolved. Iran’s responses on the matter of the IAEA’s

detection of uranium particles continue to be unsatisfactory and not technically credible. In

addition, the IAEA provided updates on its multiple investigations into possible undeclared

nuclear material and activities in Iran. The IAEA continues to analyze samples taken during its

complementary access to the two locations in August and September, which will take some time.

Specifically, there remain at least four open areas of significant concern with respect to the

IAEA’s ability to confirm that Iran’s declarations to the IAEA are correct and complete:

• Iran’s continued failure to credibly explain the detection by the IAEA of chemically-

processed uranium particle at an undeclared location in Iran, which the IAEA visited in

January 2019;

• Outstanding IAEA questions related to potential undeclared nuclear material at another

location in the past that the IAEA assesses may have been used in undeclared uranium

conversion work;

• Outstanding IAEA questions related to potential undeclared nuclear material in the past at

a location where conventional explosives testing may have taken place; and

• Outstanding IAEA questions regarding the possible presence in the past of undeclared

uranium metal in Iran.

The IAEA’s announcement of its investigations into potential undeclared nuclear material in Iran

detected in November 2019 raises the possibility that such material could still be present in Iran

today, outside IAEA monitoring. These issues raise significant questions of what Iran may be

trying to hide, and whether Iran is in compliance with its safeguards obligations today. The

United States has made clear that Iran must provide the IAEA with the cooperation required

under its safeguards obligations.

-- 32 --

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE/ADHERENCE QUESTIONS

During the reporting period, the United States continued to assess that Iran is not currently

engaged in key activities associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon.

As noted in the IAEA’s December 2015 Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding

Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program, however, Iran has yet to answer significant questions

regarding its past nuclear weapons program. The IAEA’s ongoing safeguards investigations and

Iran’s failure for much of the reporting period to provide the necessary cooperation with the

IAEA in connection with them raise concern with regard to Iran’s compliance with its obligation

to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT.

In addition, Iran’s retention of files and information dating from its pre-2004 nuclear weapons

program, its efforts to conceal this information from the international community, and its

reassignment of key Amad Plan-era scientists and officials into a new organizational structure

affiliated with Iranian military entities and under the Amad Plan’s former leader,

suggest that

Iran undertook these efforts at least in part to preserve technical expertise relevant to a nuclear

weapons capability, and potentially to aid in any future efforts to pursue nuclear weapons, if a

decision were made to do so. If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear

weapon, it would be in violation of its obligations under Article II of the NPT.

The IAEA continues to investigate the source of the chemically processed uranium particles

detected during the IAEA visit to Tehran in February 2019. However, now almost two years

later, at the end of this reporting period, the matter remains unresolved. At the November 2020

Board, the DG emphasized that the presence the presence of the uranium particles of

anthropogenic origin, including isotopically altered particles, at the location not declared to the

Agency, “still needs to be fully and promptly explained by Iran to allay any possible concerns

about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.”

Since March 2020, as the DG has stated in reports on the implementation of NPT safeguards in

Iran, the IAEA has identified a number of questions related to possible undeclared nuclear

material and nuclear-related activities at three other locations that have not been declared by

Iran. Although information concerning this material relates to the 2003 timeframe, if true, the

material may still be unaccounted for. In addition to the issue of the processed uranium particles

at the warehouse site, the IAEA is investigating possible undeclared materials and activities at

two different locations in Iran, one a location where the IAEA says pilot-scale uranium

conversion activities may have taken place in the 2003 timeframe and another where

conventional explosives work may have taken place in the same period, potentially involving the

use of nuclear material.

Because of Iran’s past refusal to cooperate with the IAEA, the Amad Plan’s work on uranium

conversion is less understood than the larger, and IAEA safeguarded, AEOI conversion activities

centered at the Esfahan complex.

-- 33 --

The IAEA also reported in June 2020 that preparations for the use of neutron detectors may have

occurred at the location with possible explosive testing, which suggests Iran may have used or

planned to use or store nuclear material there. The combination of these activities and the

remaining questions raise deeply troubling questions about possible past nuclear weapons-related

work at the location and possible nuclear material that may still be undeclared today.

The United States also knows from past IAEA reporting that Iran has not resolved the IAEA’s

questions about the possible presence in Iran of undeclared uranium metal that the Agency

believes may have been present at an undeclared location between 2002 and 2003. Even small

amounts of undeclared uranium metal in Iran would be of serious proliferation concern given its

applicability to nuclear weapons research and development.

The United States also has concerns that the steps Iran has been taking to expand its uranium

enrichment program, especially in the area of centrifuge-related research and development, have

been increasing its knowledge base. By gaining knowledge over time, it could achieve

proficiency in the manufacture, testing, and operation of advanced centrifuges to enable a

production-scale operation that eventually could significantly reduce the time for Iran to produce

enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear device, if it made a decision to do so.

At the end of the reporting period, these serious, outstanding concerns remain regarding possible

undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran today, as evidenced by the IAEA’s ongoing

safeguards investigations described above. The IAEA’s November 2020 report further notes that

evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran are

ongoing. These ongoing investigations and Iran’s failure for much of the reporting period to

provide the necessary cooperation with the IAEA in connection with them raise concern with

regard to Iran’s compliance with its obligation to accept safeguards under Article III of the NPT.

Moreover, Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards

would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s CSA required by the NPT and would constitute a

violation of Article III of the NPT itself. Iran’s level of cooperation with IAEA monitoring and

verification activities, including in connection with the IAEA’s efforts to evaluate safeguards-

relevant information in the Amad Plan documents acquired by Israel, will be important factors in

assessing Iran’s compliance with its NPT and safeguards obligations in future editions of this

Report.

In the November 2020 report, the IAEA DG summarized and elaborated on the current situation,

noting that the Agency continues to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the AP. It will take time to

process the environmental samples from the two sites visited by the IAEA in August and

September. The DG has also emphasized that the IAEA may request access to additional sites.

He added that timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing complementary access

facilitates implementation of the AP and enhances confidence.

As we consider the IAEA’s unanswered questions about possible undeclared nuclear material

and activities in Iran, it is important to note Iran’s past pursuit of nuclear weapons, retention of a

vast collection of records from that nuclear weapons program, and continued employment of the

scientists who worked on that program. The United States has made clear that Iran must comply

-- 34 --

fully with its nuclear safeguards obligations without delay, denial or deception that inhibits the

IAEA’s essential nuclear safeguards verification work.

In addition to the issue of processed uranium particles is the IAEA’s investigation of undeclared

materials and activities at two different locations in Iran, one a location where the IAEA says

pilot-scale uranium conversion activities may have taken place in the 2003 timeframe and

another where conventional explosives work may have taken place in the same period.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS AND NEXT STEPS

In light of the new concerns regarding Iran’s safeguards cooperation raised by the IAEA during

the reporting period, the United States has underscored that Iran must immediately provide the

IAEA nothing short of full cooperation and comply with its nuclear safeguards obligations. The

United States remains deeply concerned that it took over one year of IAEA engagement, a

decision of the Board of Governors, and the threat of further Board action to ultimately compel

Iran to provide the required access. Such delay and denial is deeply troubling, and the

international community must remain clear that nothing short of full cooperation without further

delay would be acceptable.

The United States remains committed to denying Iran any pathway to a nuclear weapon and will

work through the IAEA’s Board of Governors to provide the IAEA the support it needs to

resolve these serious matters. Iran is legally obligated to provide the IAEA with requested

clarifications and required accesses.

The United States will continue to review all relevant information regarding possible undeclared

nuclear material and related activities in Iran, as well as any new information regarding potential

nuclear weapon-related research, development, and testing activities in Iran, including relevant

procurement-related information, for signs that Iran has resumed, or intends to resume any

nuclear weapons development effort.

The United States seeks a comprehensive diplomatic solution to addressing nuclear concerns in

Iran, a solution that must be built on effective verification. U.S. sanctions since November 2018

have targeted critical sectors of Iran’s economy, such as its energy, shipping, and shipbuilding

sectors, as well as the provision of insurance to designated persons or for sanctionable activities,

and transactions involving designated Iranian financial institutions.

In 2020, the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury imposed sanctions on nearly 40 Iranian

proliferation-related individuals and entities – including targets linked to AEOI and SPND –

pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which provides authority to impose sanctions on

proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and on their

supporters. The designations underscore the dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear escalations of the

JCPOA restrictions and undisclosed past nuclear-related activities under the Amad Plan,

including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.

The United States continues efforts to detect and thwart Iran’s illicit procurement activities

related to nuclear, missile, or conventional weapons programs.

-- 35 --

The United Nations Secretariat also continues to report on nuclear-related transfers to Iran

notified by UN Member States to be in violation of UNSCR2231 (specifically, paragraph 2 of

Annex B).

The United States will continue to encourage the international community to provide its full

support to the IAEA, as it continues to fulfill its critical mandate to verify the non-diversion of

nuclear materials or activities in Iran to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As of the end of the reporting period, the IAEA continued to monitor and verify Iran’s

compliance with its obligations under its CSA and AP, as well as Iran’s adherence to its JCPOA

commitments. The United States will continue to closely monitor Iran’s nuclear activities and its

level of cooperation with the IAEA, including its cooperation with IAEA efforts to investigate

the source of chemically processed uranium detected at an undeclared location in Iran and other

Iranian locations raising questions of potential undeclared nuclear material and activities.

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (SYRIA)

FINDING

The Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) remains in violation of its obligations under Article III of the

NPT and its CSA with the IAEA. Syria failed to declare and provide design information to the

IAEA for the construction of a nuclear reactor at Al Kibar (also known as Dair Alzour), which

was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike in September of 2007. Syria’s clandestine construction of

the Al Kibar reactor and its continued denial of IAEA requests for access and information

concerning the Al Kibar reactor and information concerning three reported functionally related

locations are clear violations of its obligations under its CSA, including with respect to modified

Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its CSA. To the extent that these activities were

undertaken in connection with an effort to develop nuclear weapons, Syria may have also

violated Article II of the NPT. Given the IAEA’s finding of particles of chemically processed

uranium compounds at the site, the United States remains concerned that undeclared nuclear

material might exist in Syria.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Syria became a State Party to the NPT in 1968, and its CSA entered into force in 1992. It had

not signed the AP as of September 2020.

Al Kibar Site. Until September 2007, Syria was building an undeclared nuclear reactor at Al

Kibar (in the province of Dair Alzour) in Syria’s eastern desert. North Korea assisted Syria with

its construction.

In May 2011, the IAEA Director General (DG) released a report assessing that the facility at Al

Kibar was “very likely” a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency pursuant

to Articles 41 and 42 of Syria’s CSA and Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements thereto. The

IAEA based its assessment on a broad spectrum of factual information, including environmental

-- 36 --

samples taken during the Agency’s visit to the site in June 2008 (which contained particles of

anthropogenic natural uranium), as well as commercial satellite and radar imagery, procurement

information, and information provided by IAEA Member States. The report also noted that the

reactor had features comparable to the gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon in

the DPRK.

The 2007 Israeli air strike destroyed the reactor before it could become operational. Following

the reactor’s destruction, Syria went to great lengths to clean up the site and to destroy evidence

of what had previously existed at the site. By December 2007, Syria had constructed a large

building directly over the location where the reactor had once stood.

During the reporting period, the IAEA DG issued a written report on Syria and provided updates

at IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meetings confirming that Syria had not provided any new

information that would have an impact on the Agency’s assessment that the facility at Dair

Alzour was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. The IAEA DG

continued to urge Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with all unresolved

issues provide all information and access necessary for the IAEA to address all outstanding

issues related to the site, including information on additional sites having a possible functional

relationship to the Al Kibar reactor.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Article 41 of Syria’s CSA with the IAEA specifies that “the provision of design information in

respect of the new facilities … shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is

introduced into a new facility.” Article 42 states, among other requirements, that “design

information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility, when

applicable: (a) the identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal

capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business

purposes .…” The NPT states in Article III (1) that “[t]he safeguards required by this Article

shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities

within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control

anywhere.”

On May 24, 2011, the IAEA DG released a report assessing that the building destroyed at Al

Kibar was “very likely” a nuclear reactor that should have been declared by Syria pursuant to

Articles 41 and 42 of its CSA and modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements thereto.

The United States agreed with this finding. In addition, as noted above, the United States

considers Syria to be in violation of its obligations under the NPT.

The ongoing civil war and security situation in Syria do not affect this finding. The IAEA DG’s

specific, repeated requests to Syria for additional information and access have consistently been

met with Syrian denials, rather than provision of the information requested and consultations on

how it would provide the requested access when conditions allow.

-- 37 --

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

On June 9, 2011, the IAEA BOG adopted a resolution finding Syria in noncompliance with its

CSA for the undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour, and called for Syria to

urgently remedy its noncompliance and provide the IAEA with access to all information, sites,

material, and persons necessary to resolve all questions regarding the exclusively peaceful nature

of Syria’s nuclear program. The Board also called upon Syria to sign and bring into force an AP

to its CSA.

The IAEA BOG resolution also referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC). Following the IAEA’s referral, the UNSC met in 2011 to discuss the matter, but took

no action. The UNSC has not addressed Syria’s nuclear activities subsequently. For the

reporting period the United States has continued to ensure that the issue remains on the IAEA

BOG’s agenda. For 2020, the IAEA continued to urge Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA in

connection with all unresolved issues. The United States did not hold any bilateral discussions

with Syria on its nuclear program in 2020.

At IAEA BOG meetings during the reporting period, the United States and likeminded partners

have regularly reiterated the need for Syria to urgently cooperate with the IAEA to remedy its

longstanding NPT safeguards noncompliance, and called for continued reporting from the DG

and maintaining the item on the agenda for each quarterly BOG meeting. The United States also

raised the issue of Syria’s NPT noncompliance in national statements at the 2018 and 2019 NPT

Preparatory Committee meetings. At the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee meetings, the United

States proposed a joint statement highlighting Syria’s long-standing noncompliance with its CSA

and NPT Article III obligations. The United States secured 51 co-sponsors for this joint

statement, which called on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA and remedy its safeguards and NPT

Article III non-compliance.

For 2020, the IAEA DG confirmed that Syria has not provided any new substantive information

to the IAEA regarding the Al Kibar reactor, and continued to urge Syria to cooperate fully with

the IAEA in connection with all unresolved issues.

The DG also publicly called on Syria at the

September 2020 BOG meeting to reengage with the IAEA and noted that he was willing to talk

to Syria “constructively and cooperatively.”

The United States will continue to support the IAEA’s investigation of Syria’s undeclared

nuclear activities, including the IAEA’s requests for greater Syrian transparency, and to work to

ensure that the BOG and DG remain seized of the issue until Syria has fully cooperated with the

IAEA to address all outstanding issues. The UNSC did not address Syria’s nuclear program in

2020, and the United States does not foresee UNSC action in 2021, given the ongoing security

issues in Syria and the continued likelihood that key UNSC members, such as Russia and China,

would veto any substantive resolution.

-- 38 --

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT)

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban

Treaty (TTBT), was signed in 1974, with a Protocol signed in 1990. The Treaty entered into

force in 1990. It establishes a nuclear “threshold” by prohibiting each Party from undertaking

underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its

jurisdiction or control, and it provides for notification and verification of testing activities.

FINDING

The United States assesses that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons-related experiments that

have created nuclear yield since renewing its nuclear testing moratorium in 1996, though the United

States does not have such a concern for 2020 specifically because its activities may have been

curtailed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia may, in prior years, have been testing in a

manner that releases nuclear energy from an explosive canister, which raised compliance concerns

with Russia’s TTBT notification obligation. Russian intent to carry out at its test site an underground

nuclear weapons-related experiment that is supercritical (creates a self-sustaining chain reaction) and

that is anticipated to result in a release of nuclear energy through a physical breach of the explosive

canister, regardless of the magnitude of its planned nuclear yield, would require an affirmative TTBT

notification to the United States. A Russian nuclear test notification would alert the United States of

the forthcoming opportunity to conduct specified verification activities in accordance with the TTBT

Protocol.

A failure on the part of Russia to provide an accurate annual notification of planned nuclear tests,

as defined above, for the following calendar year, and to provide timely revised notifications as

may be required, would prevent the United States from exercising its verification rights, as

specified in paragraph 2(b) of Section III of the Protocol. Based on available information,

Russian activities since declaring its moratorium raise concerns about Russia’s compliance with

its TTBT notification obligation.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Russia declared a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing in 1991, and renewed its moratorium in

1996. In its annual test notifications submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section IV of the

Protocol, including the notification for calendar year 2020, Russia indicated that in the following

calendar year it would not conduct any underground nuclear weapons tests within the meaning of

the TTBT. However, information for prior periods (other than 2020) could indicate otherwise, as

the United States assesses that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons-related experiments that have

created nuclear yield since declaring its moratorium and may have done so in a manner that releases

nuclear energy from an explosive canister.

Russia’s test activities in 2020 may have been curtailed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

-- 39 --

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Russia’s nuclear activities since declaring its moratorium and in recent years, though not in 2020,

have raised compliance concerns with Russia’s TTBT obligation to notify.

Under Section IV, paragraph 2 of the June 1990 Protocol to the TTBT, the Russian Federation

(Russia) is required, by not later than June 1 of each year, to inform the United States of the

number of underground nuclear weapons tests by specified category that Russia intends to

conduct in the following calendar year. For purposes of the TTBT, an “underground nuclear

weapon test” means either a single underground nuclear explosion conducted at a test site, or two

or more underground nuclear explosions conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a

circle having a diameter of two kilometers, conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 second,

and whose combined yield is less than 150 kilotons. The TTBT Protocol defines the term

“explosion” as “the release of nuclear energy from an explosive canister.” The term “explosive

canister” is defined as “with respect to every explosion, the container or covering for one or

more nuclear explosives.” The United States interprets “the release of nuclear energy from an

explosive canister” to mean the release of nuclear energy resulting from a physical breach of the

explosive canister.

Whether there is a compliance concern with respect to the activities at the declared Russian

nuclear test site depends in the first instance upon the nature of the activity conducted.

Subcritical nuclear experiments are not prohibited by the TTBT and are never required to be

reported, based on the TTBT’s definition of a “test.” Supercritical nuclear weapons-related

experiments per se also are not prohibited by the TTBT but would trigger TTBT notification

obligations if such supercritical tests were anticipated to result in the release of nuclear energy

through a physical breach of the explosive canister.

Russian intent to carry out at its test site an underground nuclear weapons-related experiment that is

supercritical (creates a self-sustaining chain reaction) and that is anticipated to result in a release of

nuclear energy through a physical breach of the explosive canister, regardless of the magnitude of its

planned nuclear yield, would require an affirmative TTBT notification to the United States. A

Russian nuclear test notification would alert the United States of the forthcoming opportunity to

conduct specified verification activities in accordance with the TTBT Protocol.

A failure on the part of Russia to provide an accurate annual notification of planned nuclear tests,

as defined above, for the following calendar year, and to provide timely revised notifications as

may be required, would prevent the United States from exercising its verification rights, as

specified in paragraph 2(b) of Section III of the Protocol.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

Efforts have been made recently to discuss nuclear testing definitions in a P-5 context; so far

they have been unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the United States will continue to monitor Russian

activities at Novaya Zemlya and hold Russia accountable to its TTBT obligations. The United

States will pursue dialogues with Russia on test site transparency and other confidence building

measures. U.S. concerns could be mitigated by greater transparency.

-- 40 --

NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIA AS INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

THE U.S. “ZERO-YIELD” STANDARD

By September 1996, each of the nuclear-weapons States (NWS) under the NPT – China, France,

Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – had unilaterally declared voluntary nuclear

testing moratoria, which are not legally binding. Although the United States is not a participant

in other countries’ testing moratoria, these unilateral commitments are included in the

Compliance Report as a matter of discretion.

Dating back to 1993, the United States has defined its own nuclear testing moratorium as a

commitment not to conduct “nuclear explosive tests,” and from August 1995 onward the United

States made clear that it adheres to a U.S. “zero-yield” standard. In U.S. usage, this means that

the moratorium covers any nuclear explosive test that is supercritical – that is, which produces a

self-sustaining chain reaction. The United Kingdom and France apply the same standard in their

respective testing moratoria.

The degree to which the other NWS follow this U.S. interpretation – i.e., “zero-yield” as defined

to mean avoiding the production of a self-sustaining chain reaction – is important to assessing

the other NWS’ adherence to their own nuclear testing moratoria.

For purposes of this analysis, the term “nuclear explosive” test includes tests that are

supercritical, i.e., that involve a limited multiplying fission chain reaction resulting in the release

of nuclear fission energy, whether driven by high explosives or assembled by other means such

as a gun assembly. Under the “zero-yield” standard to which the United States adheres in its own

moratorium, no such nuclear explosive tests may be conducted. Supercritical testing is

inconsistent with the zero-yield standard as defined by the United States.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)

FINDING

In recent years, China continued work at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site. China’s possible

preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round and lack of transparency on its nuclear

testing activities – have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the U.S. “zero yield” nuclear

weapons testing moratorium adhered to by the United States, United Kingdom, and France.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

In recent years, China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round and lack of

transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the

U.S. “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in their

respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria. China continued work at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons

test site throughout 2020.

-- 41 --

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

China’s lack of transparency regarding the nature of its testing activities raise concerns regarding

China’s adherence to its testing moratorium, which China declared in 1996, judged against the

U.S. “zero-yield” standard.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

In recent years, the United States has attempted to engage China in discussions about test site

transparency, as a confidence building measure, and sought to begin the process by inviting the

P-5 States (China, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia) to the Nevada National Security

Site. U.S. concerns about China’s testing posture were also raised with Chinese diplomats in the

P-5 context. China has been strongly resistant to any such engagements on nuclear testing

concerns.

The United States will continue to monitor activities in China for evidence of nuclear testing

activities. U.S. concerns could be mitigated by greater transparency.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

FINDING

The United States finds that, since declaring its testing moratorium, Russia has conducted

nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with the U.S.

“zero-yield” standard. However, the United States does not have such a concern for 2020,

because Russia’s activities may have been curtailed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

The United States assesses that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons-related experiments that

have created nuclear yield since renewing its nuclear testing moratorium in 1996.

Despite Russia renewing its nuclear testing moratorium in 1996, some of its activities since 1996

have demonstrated a failure to adhere to the U.S. “zero-yield” standard, which would prohibit

supercritical tests. However, in 2020, Russian nuclear testing may have been curtailed due to the

COVID-19 pandemic.

Additional information is provided in higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

The United States assesses that Russia’s testing activities have not consistently adhered to

Russia’s testing moratorium, declared in 1991 and subsequently renewed in 1996, when judged

-- 42 --

against the U.S. “zero-yield” standard. The United States assesses that Russia’s development of

new warhead designs and overall stockpile management efforts have been enhanced by its

approach to nuclear weapons related experiments. The U.S. understanding of nuclear weapon

development leads the United States to assess that Russia’s supercritical testing activities would

help it improve its nuclear weapons designs and capabilities.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States has in previous years attempted to engage Russia in discussions about test site

transparency, as a confidence building measure, and sought to begin the process by inviting the

P-5 States (China, France, the UK, and Russia) to the Nevada National Security Site.

Due to ongoing activities in Russia, the United States will continue to monitor Russia for

evidence of nuclear testing activities.

-- 43 --

PART III: OTHER STATES’ ADHERENCE TO MISSILE COMMITMENTS AND

ASSURANCES

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement among Partner governments sharing a common interest in

controlling missile proliferation. The MTCR is not a treaty and it does not impose legally

binding obligations on participating countries. The MTCR Partners control exports of a common

list of items (the MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex, also referred to as the

MTCR Annex) according to a common export control policy (the MTCR

Guidelines). The Guidelines and Annex are implemented according to each country’s national

legislation and regulations. The MTCR has no Regime-wide compliance or verification

provisions.

Membership in the MTCR has grown steadily since the Regime’s creation in

1987, and as of December 31, 2020, 35 countries are now members. In addition, several

countries, including Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Latvia are recognized as unilateral adherents to the

Regime. The United States is not aware of any instances of non-adherence to the MTCR by

Partner countries in 2020.

The United States sought and received a bilateral political commitment from China (which is not

an MTCR Partner Country) in November 2020 to not proliferate certain missile technology.

-- 44 --

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)

FINDING

The People’s Republic of China (China) has failed to adhere to its November 2000 commitment

to the United States not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic

missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a

payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers).”

This failure to adhere to its November 2000 commitment is reflected in Chinese entities’

continued supply of MTCR-controlled items to missile programs of proliferation concern.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE/COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE/COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Chinese entities continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of

proliferation concern in 2020.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE/COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT

STEPS

Throughout 2020, the United States raised a number of cases with China concerning transfers of

missile-related goods and technology by Chinese entities to programs of concern. Although the

United States has asked that China investigate and put a stop to such activities, most of these

cases remain unresolved. In 2020, the United States imposed sanctions against eight Chinese

entities pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act for transferring missile

technology to Iran.

The United States will continue to seek to persuade Chinese authorities to establish full

adherence to its November 2000 commitment. In order to prevent proliferation of missile

technology by Chinese entities to Iran and other programs of concern, the United States will

continue to encourage China to implement its missile nonproliferation commitments, fully

implement all relevant UNSCRs, strengthen its missile-related export control laws and

regulations, devote more priority and resources to nonproliferation, and diligently enforce its

export control laws and regulations to prevent transfers by Chinese entities to missile programs

of concern.

-- 45 --

PART IV: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS

CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND

COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO CHEMICAL ISSUES

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

For a detailed discussion of other nations’ adherence to their obligations under the Chemical

Weapons Convention, see the Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention,

submitted pursuant to Condition 10(C) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the

Chemical Weapons Convention (also known as the “Condition 10(C) Report”), and appended to

this Report.

-- 46 --

PART V: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS

CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND

COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO BIOLOGICAL ISSUES

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC or Convention)

opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. As of the end of 2020, there were

182 States Party to the BWC and four signatory States for which the treaty is not yet in force. In

1987, BWC States Party established an annual data exchange, referred to as the Confidence-

Building Measures (CBMs). The CBMs were modified and expanded in 1991 and streamlined

in 2011. Submission of CBMs is a politically binding commitment, but not all States Party

routinely submit reports.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)

FINDING

The People’s Republic of China (China) engaged in activities with dual-use applications, which

raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the BWC. In addition, the United States

does not have sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed

historical biological warfare (BW) program, as required under Article II of the Convention.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

China became a State Party to the BWC in 1984. Questions and concerns on its compliance with

the Convention have been raised since the 1993 Report.

The United States assesses that China possessed an offensive biological warfare program from

1950s to at least the late 1980s. Although China has submitted BWC Confidence-Building

Measures (CBMs) each year since 1989,

China’s CBM reporting has never otherwise disclosed it

ever pursued an offensive BW program, and China has never acknowledged publicly or in

diplomatic channels its past offensive program. As part of its historical BW program, China had

probably weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins, and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera,

plague, and tularemia.

China continues to develop its biotechnology infrastructure and pursue scientific cooperation

with countries of concern. Available information on studies conducted at Chinese military

medical institutions has included information that discusses identifying, testing and

characterizing diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use applications.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

-- 47 --

Available information shows China engaged in activities that raise concerns with regard to its

obligations under Article I of the BWC, which requires States Party “never in any circumstances

to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain …[m]icrobial or other biological

agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that

have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes,” as well as

“weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile

purposes or in armed conflict.” The United States has compliance concerns with respect to

Chinese military medical institutions’ toxin research and development because of the dual-use

applications and their potential as a biological threat. In addition, the United States assesses that

China possessed an offensive BW program from the early 1950s to at least the late 1980s. There

is no available information to demonstrate that China took steps to fulfill its treaty obligations

under Article II of the BWC, which requires China to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes all

items specified in Article I of its past offensive BW program.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

In 2020, due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, the United States attempted to engage China

virtually on issues related to the BWC, however, the Chinese officials “postponed” the meeting,

citing unspecified “technical reason.” The United States will continue to monitor and report

about China’s biological activities in relation to its BWC obligations. The United States will also

continue to request bilateral meetings with China to discuss BWC issues, as annual meetings

were held prior to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2017-2019.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)

FINDING

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s (Iran’s) activities continue to raise concerns regarding its

compliance with Article I of the BWC. The United States continues to assess that Iran has not

abandoned its intention to conduct research and development of biological agents and toxins for

offensive purposes. This is based on a cumulative assessment of current and past Iranian activity

and its continued lack of transparency. Also, Iran maintains flexibility to use, upon leadership

demand, legitimate research underway for biodefense and public health purposes for a capability

to produce lethal BW agents; whether maintaining this flexibility is pursuant to decisions by

leadership is unknown. The United States remains unable to differentiate some of Iran’s public

health research and biodefense activities from those that are prohibited under the BWC,

complicating assessments of Iranian compliance.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Iran became a State Party to the BWC in 1973. Its compliance with the Convention has been

addressed since the 1993 Report.

-- 48 --

Prior to submission of an incomplete CBM in 2016, Iran had not submitted an annual CBM

report since 2011. Previous Iranian CBM submissions asserted that Iran did not have a

biodefense program, but “has carried out some defensive studies on identification,

decontamination, protection, and treatment against some agents and toxins.”

Iran has engaged in dual-use activities with potential for BW applications such as building a

plant for pharmaceutical botulinum toxin production. Iranian biotechnology entities, particularly

military-affiliated institutions, continued to pursue dual-use technologies. Open source reports

note Iranian military-associated universities and affiliated research centers have conducted BW-

relevant projects on bioregulators and have built a plant for the commercial production of

botulinum toxin.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Available information shows Iran engaged in activities that raise concern with regard to its

Article I obligations under the BWC, which requires States Party to “never in any circumstances

to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain …[m]icrobial or other biological

agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that

have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” Although it

remains difficult for the United States to differentiate between some of Iran’s public health

research and biodefense activities from those that would be prohibited under the BWC, the

nature of Iran’s sophisticated toxin research and production and its capability to produce lethal

agents on demand raise concerns regarding Iran’s compliance with its obligations under Article I

of the BWC.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

There were no discussions during the reporting period between the United States and Iran

regarding Iran’s compliance with the BWC. The United States will continue to monitor Iran’s

activities as they relate to Iran’s obligations under the BWC. As appropriate, the United States

will seek to engage Iran to clarify activity that may be inconsistent with the BWC.

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

FINDING

The United States assesses that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) has an

offensive BW program and is in violation of its obligations under Articles I and II of the BWC.

North Korea is assessed to have had BW capabilities since at least the 1960s. Although the

United States has fragmented insight into North Korea’s offensive BW program, previous

reporting illustrated that North Korea had BW capabilities intended for use to counter U.S. and

South Korean military superiority.

-- 49 --

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s and continued its

program despite having become a State Party to the BWC in 1987. Its compliance with the

Convention has been addressed in prior Reports.

North Korea submitted a null BWC CBM report in 1990, where it noted there was nothing

relevant to report. It has failed to submit a report since 1990.

Available information indicates that North Korean entities have continued to engage in a range

of biological research and development activities that demonstrate capabilities applicable to

developing biological weapons. North Korea has publicly denied having a BW program as

recently as 2017, according to North Korean state media.

However, the United States assesses that North Korea has a dedicated, national level effort to

develop a BW capability and has developed, and produced BW agents, and may have

weaponized them for use. North Korea probably has the capability to produce sufficient

quantities of biological agents for military purposes upon leadership demand.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Based on reported information, North Korea has pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s,

having a dedicated, national level effort that has developed and, produced BW agents, and may

have weaponized them for use. Because of such activities, the United States concludes that

North Korea’s activities described above violate its obligations under Article I of the BWC,

which requires States Party “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or

otherwise acquire or retain… [m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their

origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for

prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” and Article II, which requires States Party to

“destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes” the BW items specified in Article I of a past

offensive program.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States will continue to monitor North Korea’s activities in relation to its obligations

under the BWC. As appropriate, the United States will continue to assess the feasibility of

engaging North Korea on activities that violate its obligations under the BWC.

-- 50 --

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

FINDING

The United States assesses that the Russian Federation (Russia) maintains an offensive BW

program and is in violation of its obligation under Articles I and II of the BWC. The issue of

compliance by Russia with the BWC has been of concern for many years.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The Soviet Union became a State Party to the BWC in 1975. Russia’s BWC compliance was

first addressed in the 1993 Report, though the Soviet Union’s BWC noncompliance was first

addressed in the January 1984 Report to Congress on Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control

Agreements.

Russia’s Incomplete Acknowledgement of Inherited Soviet Activities. Russia inherited the Soviet

Union’s biological weapons program. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported in 1949

that the Soviet BW program began “sometime in the middle of the 1930s” or perhaps as early as

1928 and continued during World War II. Soviet biological weapons development progressed

unabated before and after the Soviet Union signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention in 1972. The post-1972 program was composed of four major components: the

Ministries of Defense, Agriculture and Health, and the then newly-created civilian Biopreparat

organization, supported by other institutional actors. Between them they comprised 40-50

research, development and production facilities, plus a testing facility on Vozrozhdeniye Island

in the Aral Sea. This weapons complex developed a broad range of biological pathogens for use

against plants, animals, and humans. Evidence of Soviet biological weapons activities became

available to the outside world in 1979 when an accident at Sverdlovsk released anthrax spores,

killing 64, an incident later confirmed by Russian President Yeltsin in 1992.

In April 1992, President Yeltsin signed a decree committing Russia as the BWC successor to the

Soviet Union and prohibiting illegal biological warfare activity in Russia. During discussions in

Moscow in September 1992, Russian officials confirmed the existence of a biological weapons

program inherited from the Soviet Union and committed to its destruction.

On September 14, 1992, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia met in Moscow where

Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory V. Berdennikov made the following admission: “[T]he Soviet

Union was violating this convention [BWC] and was running a program in the sphere of

offensive biological research and development, which has been declared unlawful by the

convention. . . . These activities were in progress from 1946 until March of 1992.” This

statement, and subsequent reports under the BWC confidence-building measures, however,

acknowleged only a BW research and development program.

Although President Yeltsin vowed to end Russia’s BW program, his efforts were thwarted by

some in his military establishment, who continued the program. In September 1992, these

military officials played a significant role in Russia’s participation in a Trilateral Process with

the United States and Great Britain that sought to create confidence that Russia had terminated

-- 51 --

all illegal biological weapons activity. Russia initially consented to U.S. and British inspections

at Russian BW facilities, but ultimately refused to sign the “Trilateral Agreement” unless the

United States and Great Britain accepted reciprocal inspections, including at private

pharmaceutical companies in their countries. After inspecting U.S. facilities, Russia never

granted U.S. and British inspectors further access to military biological research and production

centers in Russia The Trilateral Process broke down in the mid-1990s without resolving U.S.

concerns regarding Russia’s compliance with the BWC. Key military biological facilities

associated with the Soviet offensive program remain, inaccessible, and untransparent, nearly 30

years after Yeltsin’s decree.

Russia inherited a past offensive program from the Soviet Union, however, Russia’s annual

BWC CBM submissions since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented the complete extent of

its programs and whether the items of these programs specified under Article I were completely

destroyed or were diverted to peaceful purposes, in accordance with Article II of the

BWC. Issues raised in prior reports regarding knowledge and capabilities acquired from its

inherited program, which might facilitate Russia’s ability to potentially produce and deploy BW

agents to support a range of military and security objectives, have yet to be resolved.

Moreover, CBMs submitted by the Russian Federation have consistently reported “nothing new

to declare” with respect to its biodefense research and development programs. However, since

2011, the Russian Federation has revised plans and funding to its national chemical and

biological facilities that fall under the Russian Ministry of Defense without providing relevant

details in their annual CBM reports.

Further, Russian government entities remained engaged during the reporting period in dual-use

activities, potentially for purposes incompatible with the BWC.

Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The United States assesses that Russia maintains an offensive BW program and is in violation of

its obligations under Articles I and II of the BWC. Article I of the BWC requires States Party

“never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or …[r]etain

microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of

types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful

purposes” and Article II requires States Party to “destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes” the

BW items specified in Article I of a past offensive program. While States Party to the BWC

have a political commitment to report a past offensive program, since April 11, 1992, subsequent

Russian CBM submissions have remained incomplete and misleading. Russia is providing an

incomplete acknowledgment of the former Soviet program, a lack of evidence of the

dismantlement or cessation of key activities, and continues its ongoing secrecy efforts (including

both the military facilities noted above and legislation criminalizing any disclosure of

information about the former Soviet program). As such, Russia has not fulfilled its obligations

under Article II to “destroy or divert to peaceful purposes” the BW specified in Article I of the

Convention that it inherited from the Soviet Union.

-- 52 --

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEP

While there were no specific expert level consultations in 2020, on August 27, 2020 the United

States added the 48

Central Scientific Research Institute, Kirov; 48

Central Scientific

Research Institute, Sergiev Posad; and 48

Central Scientific Research Institute, Yekaterinburg -

the key military biological facilities previously referenced - to the Entity List (Supplement No. 4

to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations). These three entities have been

determined by the U.S Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign

policy interests of the United States. Specifically, the United States has reasonable cause to

believe these institutes are Russian Ministry of Defense facilities associated with the Soviet and

Russian biological weapons program.

-- 53 --

PART VI: OTHER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH AND ADHERENCE TO ARMS

CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND

COMMITMENTS PERTAINING TO CONVENTIONAL ISSUES

TREATY ON OPEN SKIES (OST)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

FINDING

In 2020, the United States continued to assess that Russia was in violation of the Treaty on Open

Skies (OST). Specifically, in 2020, Russia remained in violation of the Treaty in the following

respects:

1) Section III of Annex A to the Treaty and Open Skies Consultative Commission

(OSCC) Decision 3/04 for imposing and enforcing a sublimit of 500 kilometers over the

Kaliningrad Oblast for all flights originating out of Kubinka Open Skies Airfield (OSA).

2) Article VI of the Treaty for refusing access to observation flights within a 10

kilometer corridor along Russia’s border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The United States first began addressing compliance concerns regarding Russia and OST in the

2004 Compliance Report.

In 2014, Russia introduced a 500-kilometer sublimit on the distance that any observation mission

originating from Kubinka Open Skies Airfield could fly over the Kaliningrad Oblast; Kubinka

otherwise has a maximum flight distance of 5,500 kilometers and provides sufficient range to

observe the entire Kaliningrad Oblast. In 2017, Russia rejected three proposed flight plans from

the United States that had flight distances of greater than 500 kilometers over the Kaliningrad

Oblast. After Russia rejected these flight plans, the observing Parties modified the flight plans,

under protest, to include a distance of less than 500 kilometers over Kaliningrad in order to be

permitted by Russia to conduct the observation mission. In the corresponding mission reports,

the United States cited Russia’s imposition of the sublimit as the reason for the modifications,

which the United States made clear to Russia were proposed without prejudice to the United

States’ Treaty rights. There were no observation missions in 2018.

In 2019, the Kaliningrad

flight distance sublimit was tested three times – once on a U.S. shared mission and twice on

The OSCC did not approve by consensus a distribution of flight quotas for 2018. Absent such an approved

distribution, States Party were not obliged to receive observation flights in 2018. However, the United States, along

with the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and Romania conducted an extraordinary observation mission

over Ukraine in December 2018. Such extraordinary observation flights are voluntary and do not count against

States Parties’ annually distributed flight quotas (Annex L, Section III, paragraphs 3-4); thus they were not legally

affected by States Parties’ failure to reach consensus on a flight quota distribution for 2018.

-- 54 --

Allied missions. In all three instances, Russia upheld the restriction. In February 2020, Russia

allowed a U.S.-Lithuanian-Estonian observation mission with a flight distance of 505 kilometers

over Kaliningrad. However, Russia made clear in 2020 that it had not yet changed its standing

policy of limiting flights to 500 kilometers over Kaliningrad when originating from Kubinka

Open Skies airfield, and it has not formally rescinded the sublimit via a replacement Treaty

Format 26 notification regarding the designation of sites. As such, the violation remains

unresolved.

Since May 2010, Russia has prohibited observation missions over its territory to fly within 10

kilometers of its borders with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, claiming the

applicability of the prohibition in Article VI, Section II, paragraph 2, on flights within 10

kilometers of non-States Party. In the 2018 edition of this report, the United States cited this

restriction as a violation of Russia’s obligations under the Treaty since South Ossetia and

Abkhazia are within the internationally-recognized borders of Georgia, a State Party to the OST.

On April 23, 2018, Russia stated that without prejudice to its interpretation of Article VI, Section

II, paragraph 2 it would resume “receiving observation flights in 10 kilometers contiguous to two

sections of Russia’s state border in the Caucasus, which was discontinued in May 2010.” Russia

further claimed that “[p]ermission to conduct observation flights in these zones will be

permanent provided that Georgia implements in good faith its obligations to accept Russian

observation missions.” (Note: Georgia ceased implementation of the Treaty vis-à-vis Russia in

2012 in response to Russia’s restrictions along its border. End Note.) On April 8-12, 2019, a

joint U.S., Swedish, and German OST mission sought to fly over Russia within 10km of the

Russian-Georgian border, but Russia rejected the proposed mission plan. Russia required

modifications that removed the flight path that approached within 10 km of the border, to which

the observing Parties agreed under protest. This mission therefore confirmed that Russia’s

violation remained unresolved. This violation was not tested in 2020 due to the limited amount

of OST observation missions conducted in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the previous reporting period, the United States and Canada (the “observing Parties”)

carried out a shared Open Skies observation mission over eastern Russia that coincided with the

Russian annual capstone military exercise TSENTR 2019 (in Russia’s Central Military District).

A full statement of the facts may be found in last year’s report. In summary, though Russia and

the observing Parties reached agreement on a mission plan that would overfly areas involved in

the TSENTR exercise, midway through the mission, Russia informed the observing Parties that it

would not permit the second agreed flight segment to proceed. Despite the observing Parties’

efforts, no resolution was achieved that would allow the mission to proceed in a mutually

satisfactory manner. The observing Parties therefore discontinued the mission and transited to

the point of exit. The result of the Russian failure to accommodate the flight segment was that

the observing Parties were unable to observe territory within a 150 km ring around Orenburg

airfield during the TSENTR military exercise.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

As established in Annex A, Section III, flights originating from the Kubinka Open Skies Airfield

are subject to a maximum flight distance of 5,500 kilometers. No Treaty provision permits a

State Party to establish a sublimit within the maximum flight distance of an established Open

-- 55 --

Skies Airfield, as Russia has done for missions originating from the Kubinka Open Skies

Airfield over the territory of Kaliningrad. Rather, OSCC Decision 3/04, subparagraph 1(b),

precludes a State Party from decreasing the maximum flight distance from an Open Skies

Airfield. Russia’s 500 kilometer sublimit on flights over the Kaliningrad Oblast is therefore

inconsistent with Annex A, Section III and OSCC Decision 3/04. As noted above, although

Russia allowed a U.S.-Lithuanian-Estonian observation mission with a flight distance of 505 km

over Kaliningrad, Russia made clear that it had not changed its policy of limiting flights to 500

kilometers over Kaliningrad when originating from Kubinka Open Skies airfield, and it has not

formally rescinded the sublimit via a replacement Treaty Format 26 notification on the

designation of sites.

Article VI, Section II, paragraph 2, prohibits observation flights within 10 kilometers of a border

with a non-State Party. Russia claims that the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia

are independent States that are not Party to the Treaty, and thus takes the position that Article VI,

Section II, paragraph 2 prohibits flights within 10 kilometers of its border with those regions.

However, no other State Party shares this view. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are within the

internationally recognized borders of Georgia, which is a State Party to the Treaty. Accordingly,

there is no basis within the Treaty to prohibit observation flights from within 10 kilometers of

any portion of the Russian-Georgian border.

Russia’s policy with regard to such flights is therefore inconsistent with Russia’s obligations

under Article VI of the Treaty. Russia’s policy was not tested in 2020 due to the pause in

planned observation missions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Russia has not

rescinded its policy regarding flights within 10 kilometers of its border with the South Ossetia

and Abkhazia regions.

Russia’s 2019 denial of an agreed U.S.-Canadian flight segment over the TSENTR 2019 exercise

violated Article VI of the Treaty, as discussed in detail in last year’s report. Though a violation

of this kind was not repeated during the 2020 flying season, Russia has continued to assert that

its denial of the agreed TSENTR overflight segment did not violate the Treaty. Russia claims

that the reason for the denial was an abundance of caution for the safety of the OST mission,

which could not be guaranteed during the conduct of a live-fire exercise in the planned overflight

area. As discussed in last year’s report, this is not a valid justification under the Treaty. The

kind of deconfliction of airspace required in this situation is routine, and Article VI, Section I,

paragraph 15 of the Treaty states that the “observed Party shall ensure that its air traffic control

authorities facilitate the conduct of observation flights in accordance with this Treaty.”

Therefore, in this situation, Russia should have ensured the safe facilitation of the agreed OST

mission plan for the second segment, rather than denying it]. In addition, the observing Parties

offered to revise the agreed segment over the TSENTR exercise, such that it would fly at an

altitude that was permitted under the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) in effect for general air traffic

in the area. Russia refused to permit even this revised segment.

From September 24-26, 2020, Germany and France conducted an OST observation mission over

areas associated with the Russian KAVKAZ military exercise. All agreed observation segments

were conducted as planned, unlike the U.S.-Canadian observation mission over the TSENTR

2019 exercise. However, as noted above, Russia has yet to acknowledge that its conduct with

-- 56 --

respect to the agreed flight segment over the TSENTR exercise in September 2019 violated the

OST.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

During the reporting period the United States and other States Parties raised their compliance

concerns repeatedly at various forums and to Russia. The United States continued to oppose any

restriction inhibiting or impacting an observing Party’s right to observe any point on the

observed Party’s territory in accordance with the Treaty, even if the restriction did not preclude

such observation.

Since 2015, the United States has worked with key Allies and partners to build support for a

coordinated approach to address Russia’s noncompliance with the OST. On January 16-17,

2018, the United States and several Allies and partners met to identify options to encourage

Russia to return to full compliance with its OST obligations. Participants stated their shared

belief that Russia continued to be in breach of several provisions of the OST, including the 500

kilometer limitation it imposes for observation flights over Kaliningrad originating from

Kubinka Open Skies Airfield.

As reported in the 2018 edition of this report, in September 2017, the United States announced

several Treaty-compliant and reversible measures it was taking to encourage Russia to return to

full compliance with the Treaty. Specifically, the United States: (1) revised the flight distance

associated with the access to the Open Skies airfield in Honolulu, Hawaii to a maximum of 900

kilometers as part of the special procedures provided for in Annex E subparagraph 5(b)(2); (2)

ceased the practice of waiving certain published Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules,

procedures, and guidelines of flight safety for Open Skies flights; and (3) stopped allowing

courtesy overnight accommodations at certain mainland Open Skies refueling airfields that are

not needed to enable full territorial access.

In October 2017, Russia stated it would take “reciprocal” actions in response to the

aforementioned U.S. measures.

Specifically, Russia stated it would: (1) cease implementing a

series of bilateral, operational agreements/arrangements instituted in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2011

to facilitate Open Skies implementation; (2) discontinue providing overnight accommodations to

flight crews at three refueling airfields during conduct of observation flights involving the United

States; and (3) comply strictly with requirements of officially published Russian air traffic

management documents.

The implementation of the U.S. measures and Russia’s “reciprocal” actions remained in effect in

2020, until the effective date of the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty.

On May 22, 2020, the United States notified the Treaty Depositaries and all States Parties of its

decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies, in accordance with Article XV, paragraph

2 of the Treaty, which states that each State Party has the “right to withdraw,” with six months’

advance notice. The United States noted that it might reconsider its decision to withdraw from

the Treaty if Russia returned to full compliance with its obligations prior to the effective date of

-- 57 --

U.S. withdrawal. Notwithstanding its notice to withdraw, the United States remained committed

to diplomatic efforts to resolve Russian noncompliance.

On July 5, 2020, at a conference of States Parties (CSP) convened by the Treaty Depositaries

under Article XV, paragraph 3 to “consider the effect of the withdrawal on th[e] Treaty,” the

United States provided States Parties with its rationale for withdrawal, with specific reference to

Russia as a serial violator of its arms control obligations and commitments. Russia’s violations

of the Treaty on Open Skies represent one instance in Russia’s broader disregard for its arms

control obligations and commitments.

On October 8, 2020, during the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Open Skies, the

United States reiterated the points made at the July 5, 2020 CSP.

Russia did not return to full compliance, and the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty took effect on

November 22, 2020.

VIENNA DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

On November 30, 2011, the participating States of the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted Vienna Document 2011 (VD11), which added to and

built upon the commitments in previous versions of the Vienna Document (1990, 1992, 1994,

and 1999); subsequent Vienna Document Plus decisions build on VD11. The confidence- and

security-building measures (CSBMs) contained in VD11 and Vienna Document Plus decisions

are not legally-binding upon the participating States, but are firm political commitments.

This chapter covers VD11 adherence by participating States during 2020. Five OSCE

participating States (the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan) of the six participating States with adherence concerns discussed in last year’s

Report are included again this year. As noted in last year’s Report, a sixth participating State,

Tajikistan, took action in 2019 to address its issue of adherence concern and is therefore no

longer included in this Report.

As this report covers the period from January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020, the annual VD11

exchange of data pertinent to this reporting period was held on December 15, 2019, for

participating States with military forces in the VD11 zone of application to provide data effective

as of January 1, 2020.

In some instances important developments reflected in data as of

January 1, 2021, are noted; changes to adherence concerns based on these data will be included

in the next year’s Report.

The COVID-19 pandemic plainly cast a long shadow over verification activities in 2020. In

addition to many inspections, evaluations and visits being postponed or cancelled, normal

diplomatic discourse was severely curtailed for much of 2020, with most direct contacts limited

to telephone or email, and limited-participation videoconferences replacing formal meetings. As

Under the terms of VD11, participating States provide data each December regarding their forces in the zone of

application effective as of January 1 of the following year.

-- 58 --

a consequence, follow-up actions on prevailing concerns with all of the listed countries were

limited.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

Russia has joined the consensus adoption of each version of the Vienna Document (1990, 1992,

1994, 1999, and 2011) and of subsequent Vienna Document Plus Decisions. Russia’s adherence

to the Vienna Document was first addressed in the 1999 Compliance Report.

FINDINGS

The United States assesses that the Russian Federation’s (Russia’s) selective implementation of

certain provisions of VD11 and the resultant loss of transparency about Russian military

activities has limited the effectiveness of the CSBM regime and raises concerns as to Russia’s

readiness to provide transparency regarding its military forces.

In 2020, Russia continued its occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, which remains

part of the sovereign territory of Ukraine, as well as its arming, training, and fighting alongside

anti-government forces in eastern Ukraine.

In its VD11 data as of January 1, 2020, Russia again failed to provide information on its military

forces located in the Russian-occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The same Russian data as of January 1, 2020 did include the 126

Coastal Defense Brigade in

Crimea, Ukraine, which had not been declared since its formation in 2014, and the Fighter

Aviation Regiment at Kursk, which had been omitted from Russia’s annual data as of January 1,

2020 despite having been fully rearmed with Su-30SM combat aircraft. This resolves the

adherence concerns with regard to declarations of these two units that were reported in last

year’s report.

With regard to reporting major weapons and equipment in its VD11 data, Russia failed to report

on two types of combat aircraft and one type of attack helicopter that were deployed to units in

the VD11 zone of application. Russia also continued to exclude improperly the BRM-1K

armored infantry fighting vehicle from its reporting.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Russia’s 2014 occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea a part of the sovereign territory of

Ukraine as well as its arming, training, and fighting alongside anti-government forces in eastern

Ukraine, continued through 2020.

In its VD11 data as of January 1, 2020, Russia again did not provide information on its military

forces located in the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, neither

reporting such forces at normal peacetime locations in Russia as it had done from 2008 through

-- 59 --

2011, nor identifying the forces’ normal peacetime locations in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia

regions of Georgia.

Russia again failed to include three types of aircraft – the Su-35S and Su-30SM multirole

fighters, and the Ka-52 attack helicopter – in its VD11 data as of January 1, 2020, despite the

fact that these aircraft are subject to VD11 reporting and have been assigned since at least 2017

to active units in the VD11 zone of application. Additionally, Russia continued its practice of

improperly excluding the BRM-1K armored infantry fighting vehicle from its annual data.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, paragraphs 2 and 3, participating States recall the continued validity of commitments

on refraining from the threat or use of force contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the

Document of the Stockholm Conference, as seen in light of the Charter of Paris and the Charter

for European Security.

Russia’s 2014 occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, Ukraine, a part of the sovereign

territory of Ukraine, as well as its arming, training, and fighting alongside anti-government

forces in eastern Ukraine, continued throughout 2020. This conduct runs counter to the Helsinki

Final Act and the declaration on Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force contained in

paragraphs 9 to 27 of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, reaffirmed in paragraphs 2

and 3 of the VD11, respectively.

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10.2, participating States will annually exchange

information on their military forces in the zone of application concerning the military

organization, manpower, and major weapon and equipment systems.

Russia has failed again to provide information on its military forces in the Russian-occupied

Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, claiming that these regions are not part of the

VD11 zone of application. However, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are within the internationally

recognized borders of Georgia and are considered by all other participating States to be part of

Georgia and within the VD11 zone of application.

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9, 11.2, and 13, participating States will provide data on new

types or versions of major weapon and equipment systems, at the latest when it deploys the

systems concerned for the first time in the zone of application for CSBMs, and exchange

information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems.

Russia failed again to declare Sukhoi Su-35 and Su-30SM multirole fighters, and Ka-52 attack

helicopters in its data as of January 1, 2020, and once again did not include the BRM-1K

armored infantry fighting vehicle in this data. In addition, Russia has not provided the data

VD11 requires for plans to deploy and actual deployment of new types or versions of major

weapon and equipment systems, including the Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters, and the Ka-52

attack helicopter.

Finally, the BRM-1K armored infantry fighting vehicle continues to be excluded from annual

exchange of information. The vehicle is a reconnaissance variant of the BMP-1 armored infantry

fighting vehicle and was reported as an armored combat vehicle look-alike in the Russian data as

-- 60 --

of January 2005 and January 2006. It has not been reported since that time, despite the

continued presence of the vehicle in the VD11 zone of application.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

During 2020, the United States and other participating States continued to raise in the OSCE the

grave issues of Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea and Russian support for the anti-

government forces in eastern Ukraine, which run counter to OSCE security commitments

recalled in VD11.

The United States will continue to work with Russia through diplomatic channels, including in

cooperation with the 55 other OSCE participating States, to address concerns related to Russia’s

implementation of VD11, including its military activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and the

absence of information about new equipment systems, with the aim of increasing the

transparency of Russia’s military forces and activities.

The United States is a leading advocate of modernization of VD11 to make it a more effective

tool for providing transparency on, and addressing security concerns related to, conventional

military forces in Europe. To date, Russia has refused to engage on VD11 modernization.

REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA (ARMENIA)

Armenia has joined the consensus adoption of each version of the Vienna Document (1990,

1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011) and of subsequent “Vienna Document Plus” decisions.

FINDING

In 2020, Armenia failed to notify plans to deploy or the actual deployment into the VD11 zone of

application of four Su-30SM combat aircraft.

By the end of 2020, Armenia had not yet submitted its annual VD11 data on its armed forces.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

During 2020, Armenia did not report plans to deploy or the actual deployment into the VD11

zone of application of four Su-30SM combat aircraft, although these same aircraft were notified

(as Su-30s) under another conventional arms control regime. On February 4, 2020, Armenia

transmitted a Format 22 notification under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE), declaring the entry into service of the four Su-30 combat aircraft. No corresponding

Vienna Document notification was issued.

On December 16, 2020, Armenia notified participating States that its submission of its annual

VD11 data on its military forces would be delayed beyond the December 15 deadline. As of the

end of 2020, the data had not yet been provided.

-- 61 --

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9, 11.2, and 13, participating States will provide data on plans

for the deployment of new types or versions of major weapon and equipment systems before, or

at the latest when, they deploy the systems concerned for the first time in the zone of application

for CSBMs, and exchange information annually on major weapon and equipment systems

assigned to units at the level of regiment, brigade, or above.

Armenia did not adhere to this commitment with respect to the entry into service of four Su-30

combat aircraft in 2020.

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States will exchange annually

information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each

year.

Armenia did not provide this annual information in December 2020. It notified participating

States that its data would be delayed.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s far reaching effects on diplomatic engagement throughout the

OSCE region and Armenia’s postponement of all verification activities under the Vienna

Document, normal contacts on Vienna Document issues were limited for most of 2020, with

most direct contacts restricted to telephone or email, and limited-participation videoconferences

replacing formal meetings. As a consequence, follow-up action on prevailing concerns was

limited.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN (AZERBAIJAN)

Azerbaijan has joined the consensus adoption of each version of the Vienna Document (1990,

1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011) and of subsequent “Vienna Document Plus” Decisions.

Azerbaijan’s adherence to the Vienna Document was first addressed in the Compliance Report in

1998.

FINDING

The Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) failed to notify at least one major military exercise or

activity for calendar year 2020, despite its Ministry of Defense announcement of a large-scale

military exercise held in May 2020.

By the end of 2020, Azerbaijan had not yet submitted its annual VD11 data on its armed forces.

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CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Azerbaijan failed to provide notification of at least one major military exercise or activity during

calendar year 2020, despite publicly announcing and conducting a major exercise in May 2020

and engaging in other large-scale military activities during the year.

On December 11, 2020, Azerbaijan notified participating States that its submission of its annual

VD11 data on its military forces would be delayed beyond the December 15 deadline. As of the

end of 2020, the data had not yet been provided.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per Vienna Document Plus Decision No. 9/12, participating States will notify annually at least

one major military exercise or activity if no military activity otherwise meets Chapter V

notification thresholds.

Azerbaijan conducted and publicized military exercises in 2020, but failed to provide notification

of at least one major military exercise or activity.

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States will exchange annually

information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each

year.

Azerbaijan did not provide this annual information in December 2020. It notified participating

States that its data would be delayed.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States will continue to highlight with Azerbaijan, bilaterally and at OSCE meetings,

the importance of complete and timely notification of military activities, particularly annual

notification of at least one exercise or activity in the absence of any that exceed Chapter V

thresholds. Military activities that are unreported or incompletely reported undermine the

Vienna Document’s objective of building confidence through increased transparency. We will

continue to encourage Azerbaijan to be more transparent about its exercises, including by

providing additional details about their size and purpose.

KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyzstan has joined the consensus adoption of each version of the Vienna Document (1990,

1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011) and of subsequent “Vienna Document Plus” Decisions.

Kyrgyzstan’s adherence to the Vienna Document was first addressed in the Compliance Report

in 2001.

FINDING

Kyrgyzstan failed to provide VD11 data on its armed forces (as of January 1, 2020) by

December 15, 2019.

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Kyrgyzstan also failed to notify at least one major military exercise or activity for calendar year

2020.

While Bishkek has chronically declined VD11 inspection and evaluation requests by

participating States, there were no new requests this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Kyrgyzstan has not provided its annual data since it provided that data effective as of January 1,

2014.

Kyrgyzstan failed to provide advance notification of at least one major military exercise or

activity during calendar year 2020.

Although it did not do so in 2020—a year in which many verification activities were postponed

or cancelled because of the COVID pandemic-- Kyrgyzstan has declined several requests for

VD11 inspections and evaluations in the past, citing “incomplete internal governmental

procedures” connected with the reconciliation of national legislation with provisions of the

Vienna Document 11.”

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States will exchange annually

information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each

year.

Kyrgyzstan failed to provide VD11 data on its armed forces (as of January 1, 2020) by

December 15, 2019. Kyrgyzstan has not provided such data since it provided data effective as of

January 1, 2014.

Per Vienna Document Plus Decision No. 9/12, participating States will notify annually at least

one major military exercise or activity if no military activity otherwise meets Chapter V

notification thresholds.

Kyrgyzstan failed to provide advance notification of at least one major military exercise or

activity during calendar year 2019, although it carried out an air defense exercise in mid-

September 2020, according to the Kyrgyzstani press.

Per VD11, Chapter IX, participating States will reply in the affirmative to an inspection request

in accordance with the applicable timelines and limitations, and the inspection will be carried out

absent reasons of force majeure. Per VD11, Chapter IX, participating States will provide the

opportunity for an evaluation visit in accordance with the applicable timelines and limitations,

absent explanation of unit unavailability or force majeure.

Kyrgyzstan received no requests for inspections or evaluations in 2020, but the standard Kyrgyz

response to inspection or evaluation requests in the past has been that in the view of the conflict

between national legislation and the provisions of the Vienna Document 11 “the conduct of the

requested inspection does not seem possible.” In light of Kyrgyzstan’s chronic refusals of

inspection and evaluation requests, as outlined above, the pause in verification activities this year

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due to the COVID-19 pandemic does not provide any basis for assessing whether this this issue

continues. Reasons for denial noted on past occasions do not adhere to VD11, Chapter IX

provisions.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States will continue to work with Kyrgyzstan to implement its Vienna Document

commitments, especially with regard to the annual exchange of military information and

receiving inspections and evaluation visits. The United States will seek opportunities at future

meetings of the FSC attended by a representative of Kyrgyzstan, including the Annual

Implementation Assessment Meeting and OSCE VD11 data exchange, to encourage Kyrgyzstan

and all other participating States with armed forces in the Vienna Document zone of application

to provide CSBM data on a timely basis, consistent with VD11, Chapter I commitments. The

United States will encourage other states to engage Kyrgyzstan.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmenistan has joined the consensus adoption of each version of the Vienna Document (1990,

1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011) and of subsequent “Vienna Document Plus” Decisions.

FINDING

Turkmenistan failed to provide annual VD11 data on its armed forces (as of January 1, 2020) by

December 15, 2019.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Turkmenistan has not provided its annual VD11 data effective of January 1, 2020.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States shall exchange annually

information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each

year.

Turkmenistan has not provided its annual VD11 data effective as of January 1, 2020.

Turkmenistan has not provided such VD11 data since January 2015, when it provided its data

effective as of January 1, 2015.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States discussed bilaterally with Turkmenistan its VD11 commitments and failure to

provide an annual CSBMs data declaration. The United States has encouraged Turkmenistan to

provide its overdue VD11 data on its armed forces valid as of January 1, 2020, and to return to

its previous practice of providing an annual VD11 data declaration.

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The United States will work with Turkmenistan to encourage it to improve its implementation

and will seek opportunities at future meetings of the FSC attended by a Turkmenistan

representative, including the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and annual data

exchange, to encourage Turkmenistan and all other participating States to provide data on a

timely basis, consistent with VD11, Chapter I commitments. The United States will encourage

other states to engage Turkmenistan as well.

REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN (UZBEKISTAN)

Uzbekistan has joined the consensus adoption of each version of the Vienna Document (1990,

1992, 1994, 1999, and 2011) and of subsequent “Vienna Document Plus” Decisions.

Uzbekistan’s adherence to the Vienna Document was first addressed in the Compliance Report

in 2000.

FINDING

The Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan) failed to provide VD11 data on its armed forces (as of

January 1, 2020) by December 15, 2019.

Uzbekistan also failed to notify at least one major military exercise or activity for calendar year

2020 although it carried out at least one military exercise or activity during the year.

CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Uzbekistan has not provided its annual VD11 data effective as of January 1, 2020. Uzbekistan

has not provided such data since a late submission on February 12, 2003, when it provided data

effective as of January 1, 2003.

Uzbekistan failed to notify of at least one major military exercise or activity despite carrying out

at least one military exercise or activity during the year.

ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS

Per VD11, Chapter I, paragraphs 9 and 10, participating States shall exchange annually

information on their military forces in the zone of application not later than December 15 of each

year.

Uzbekistan has not provided its annual VD11 data effective as of January 1, 2020. Uzbekistan

has not provided such data since a tardy submission on February 12, 2003, when it provided data

effective as of January 1, 2003.

Per Vienna Document Plus Decision No. 9/12, participating States shall notify annually at least

one major military exercise or activity if no military activity otherwise meets Chapter V

notification thresholds.

Under the referenced Decision, Uzbekistan should have notified at least one exercise, as it

carried out at least one military exercise or activity during the year.

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EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ADHERENCE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS

The United States discussed bilaterally with Uzbekistan its VD11 commitments and failure to

provide an annual VD11 data declaration. The United States has encouraged Uzbekistan to

provide its overdue data on its armed forces effective as of January 1, 2020, and to return to its

previous practice of providing an annual VD11 data declaration.

The United States will work with Uzbekistan to encourage it to improve its implementation and

seek opportunities at future meetings of the FSC attended by an Uzbekistani representative,

including the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and annual data exchange, to

encourage Uzbekistan and all other participating States with reportable armed forces to provide

data on a timely basis, consistent with VD11, Chapter I commitments. The United States will

encourage other states to engage Uzbekistan on this topic as well.

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TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

For a discussion of other nations’ compliance with their obligations under the Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, see the Report on Compliance with the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, submitted pursuant to Condition 5(C) of the Senate

Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the CFE Flank Document (also known as

the “Condition 5(C) Report”), and appended to this Report.

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U.S. Department of State

April 2021